Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 120-B, 409, 420, 465 & 471 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Ss. 13 (1)(d)(i) & 13(1)(d)(ii) - Framing of Charge.
A court while framing charges under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should apply the prima facie standard. Although the application of this standard depends on facts and circumstance in each case, a prima facie case against the accused is said to be made out when the probative value of the evidence on all the essential elements in the charge taken as a whole is such that it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the facts pertaining to such essential elements or to consider its existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts existed or did happen. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
(N.V. RAMANA) AND (S.
ABDUL NAZEER) JJ.
JANUARY 17, 2018.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
315/2011
MAUVIN GODINHO Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL
NO. 314/2011 M/S
MARMAGOA STEEL LTD.& ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
313/2011 T.
NAGARAJAN Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
312/2011 KATREDDI
VENKATA SAHAYA KRISHNAKUMAR Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.
311/2011 M/S GLASS
FIBRE DIVISION Appellant(s) (A Division of Binani Zinc Ltd.) presently known as
M/S GOA GLASS FIBRE LTD. VERSUS STATE OF GOA Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. These
Criminal Appeals, by way of special leave, are filed by the appellants against
a common order dated 26th
October, 2007 passed by the
High Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Revision Application Nos. 3, 10, 19, 21
and 22 of 2007, whereby the High Court while setting aside the charges framed
by the learned Special Judge, Panaji against the accused—appellants for the
offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465 and 471, IPCand directed
to frame charges against them under Sections 13 (1)(d)(i) and 13(1)(d)(ii) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B, IPC.
2. In
a nutshell, the genesis of the dispute in all these appealspertains to a
Notification dated 30thSeptember, 1991 issued by
the Government of Goa, duly approved by the Cabinet, according to which those
industrial units who apply for bona fide use of High Tension or Low Tension
power supply to their industrial units would be eligible for a rebate of 25% in
their tariff for a period of five years. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
315 of 2011 (Accused No. 1) was the Minister of Power for the State of Goa during
the period 22-12-1994 to 29-07-1998 whereas the appellant in Criminal Appeal
No. 313 of 2011 (Accused No. 2) was also a public servant at that time being
Chief Electrical Engineer.Accused Nos. 3 and 4 were Managing Director and
Executive Director, respectively, of the appellant Company in Criminal Appeal
314 of 2011 (Accused No. 6), while the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 312 of
2011 (Accused No. 5) was the General Manager of appellant Company in Criminal
Appeal No. 311 of 2011 (Accused No. 7).
3. The
Government of Goa, during the tenure of accused No. 1 as Minister of Power,
with the consent of Cabinet, issued another Notification dated 31-03-1995
cancelling the earlier Notification dated 30-09-1991 without assigning any
reason for its cancellation. Afterwards, it is alleged that another
Notification dated 15-5-1996 was issued, without approval of the Cabinet
introducing another category of ‘Extra High Tension’ power supply and after
that one more Notification dated 01-08-1996 was issued, again without Cabinet
approval, restoring the benefit of 25% rebate, at the instance of accused No.
1, only to benefit accused nos. 6 & 7 Companies.
4. Acting
upon a complaint lodged by an M.L.A., the State levelled allegations against
the accused individuals that by entering into a criminal conspiracy they
provided wrongful gains to both the appellant Companies (Accused Nos. 6 &
7) and favored the two Companies for availing 25% rebate on power tariff by
illegal means and thereby caused huge loss of Rs.4,52,77,856/- to the exchequer
of Government of Goa.
5. Taking
note of the allegations levelled against the accused, the Special Judge, Panaji
by order dated 8thDecember, 2006 framed
charges against the accused—appellants for the offences punishable under
Sections 120-B, 409, 420, 465, 468 and 471, IPC and also under Section
13(1)(d)(i) and 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. The aggrieved appellants approached the High Court by way
of Criminal Revision Applications. The High Court on the analysis of facts, arrived
at the conclusion that the facts of the case do not disclose an offence of
cheating and there was no offence of criminal breach of trust. Accordingly, the
appellants were discharged from the offences punishable under Sections 120-B,
409, 420, 465, 468 and 471, IPC. However, the High Court observed that there is
sufficient prima facie material against the accused for framing charges against
them under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and 13(1)(d)(ii) read with Section 120-B, IPC.
Feeling aggrieved thereby, the accused— appellants are before us in these
appeals.
6. We
have heard Mr. M.L. Varma, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant
in Criminal Appeal No.315/2011, Ms. Binu Tamta, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.311 of 2011, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, learned
counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.313 of 2011 and
alsothe learned counsel appearing for the State of Goa at length.
7. Learned
senior counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 315 of 2011 relying
upon this Court’s order in Civil Appeal Nos. 3206-3217 of 1999, passed on 13th February, 2001 while dealing with the same Notifications,
submitted that there is no need to continue further criminal proceedings
against the appellants herein. The said order reads thus:
“The High Court by
the impugned judgment has held that the circular dated 31st March, 1998 issued
by the Government of Goa suspending the release of rebate with immediate effect
as well as suspension of rebate agreed to be governed in sixty monthly
installments has no legal efficacy and is, therefore, invalid. The High Court
has further held that the notification dated 24th July, 1998 is legal and
valid. Consequently the High Court directed that the writ petitioners are
entitled to 25% rebate in power tariff till 26th July, 1998. This has been challenged
by means of the present appeals. Second set of appeals have been filed by the
writ petitioners against the judgment of the High Court whereby and whereunder the
High Court has held that notification dated 27th July 1998 is valid. We have
heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. The High Court has taken
the aforesaid view after taking into consideration overall facts and
circumstances and inasmuch as public interest which, according to us, is very
balanced view of the matter. We, therefore, are not inclined to interfere with
the matters Both the sets of appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs”.
8. It
is further argued before us that the High Court erred in not taking into
account the factum that the complaint against the accused—appellants was filed
by political opponent of the appellant whohad foisted the charges which are
mala fide, misconceived and concocted with a view to score political
vendetta.Whereas power rebate policy was existing in the State since 1991 and
in 1993, out of the High Tension category an Extra High Tension category was carved
out by the Government for the purpose of providing additional benefit to
industrial consumers. Drawing our attention to a judgment of this Court in MRF Limited vs. Manohar Parrikar
& Others, (2010)
11 SCC 374, learned senior counsel submitted that this Court has already
considered the Notifications in question, in an earlier round of litigation and
expressed the view that the decision taken by the appellant herein—accused No.
1 as a Minister was balanced.
9. Ms.
Binu Tamta, learned counsel appearing for the appellantsin Criminal Appeal Nos.
311 & 312 of 2011 submitted that as a matter of fact, the complaint in
question was already closed on 2.2.1999, but to meet the political will of the
complainant when he came to power in the State, the complaint was reopened at his
instance. The view taken by the Courts below in framing charges against the
accused is entirely wrong inasmuch as the trial Court made an observation that
the circumstances give rise to suspicion that accused Nos. 1 to 5 conspired to
extend benefit to the accused Nos. 6 & 7 Companies. Mere suspicion does not
warrant framing of charges against the appellants. learned counsel wrongly
placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Hira Lal Hari
Lal Bhagwati Vs.
CBI, New Delhi, (2003) 5 SCC 257 and submitted
that by virtue of the Notifications in question, no benefit was got by the
appellant and whatever amount had to be paid, has already been paid, and
accordingly the charges against the appellant should be dropped.
10. Learned
counsel appearing for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.313 of 2011, Ms. Asha
G. Nair, submitted that the appellant in his official capacity had only made
submissions in accordance with the instructions received by superiors in the normal
course of discharging his official duties. By any stretch of imagination, the
appellant cannot be equated as conspirator when the deciding authorities were
the Secretary and the Minister. She has further submitted that the appellant
has already retired from his service and virtually he has no role to play in
the alleged conspiracy and the allegation that he is close to Minister does not
form a ground for levelling charges against him.
11. Learned
counsel for the State while supporting the impugned judgment, submitted that
there was enough material on record to establish that accused Nos. 1 & 2,
being public servants at the relevant time, had entered into a criminal
conspiracy to facilitate wrongful gains to accused Nos. 6 & 7 Companies in collusion
with their officials (accused Nos. 3 & 4). In pursuit of their criminal
conspiracy, they abused their positions and caused huge loss to the public
exchequer and benefited accused Companies by illegal means. It is also
vehemently argued that accused No. 1 while abusing his official capacity
prepared a false document giving an appearance of genuine one and deceived the
Government in taking policy decision and enabled the accused Companies to avail
25% rebate on power supply. He ultimately made a submission that taking note of
misdeeds of all the accused, the High court has in clear terms expressed the
opinion that there is sufficient prima facie material to frame charges against
all the accused, hence there is no occasion for this Court to interfere and
revisit the matter.
12. At the outset it would be
pertinent to note the law concerning the framing of charges and the standard
which courts must apply while framing charges. It is well settled that a court while
framing charges under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should
apply the prima
facie standard.
Although the application of this standard depends on facts and circumstance in each
case, a prima
facie case
against the accused is said to be made out when the probative value of the
evidence on all the essential elements in the charge taken as a whole is such
that it is sufficient to induce the court to believe in the existence of the
facts pertaining to such essential elements or to consider its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that those facts
existed or did happen. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry
into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial. [Refer Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368; State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417; State by the
Inspector of Police, Chennai vs. S. Selvi and Ors., (2018) 1 SCALE 5.]
13. Having
thoughtfully considered the arguments advanced by respective learned counsel
and upon going through the record, particularly the impugned judgment, in the
light of sequence of events, prima facie, it cannot be said that no case can be made out against the
accused—appellants. Allegedly, the Notifications dated 15-5-1996 and 1-8-1996
were issued without the approval of Cabinet and by violation of rules. Looking
at the facts of the case in a holistic manner, we do not think it necessary to
go into the aspect of thorough examination of merits of the case, particularly
when the issue is still at the stage of framing of charges only. There is no error
in framing charges, as suggested by the High Court, when presumably the
material on record obligated the Court to do so.
14. In light of the above
discussion, we do not see any illegality in the impugned order. Therefore, we
find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. However,
learned counsel appearing for the appellants, at this stage wants to place before
the trial Court, the material, judgments and the earlier passed order of this
Court which are referred before us. We grant liberty to the learned counsel to
do so.
15. With the above
observations, the appeals are disposed of.

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