Delay in Lodging FIR - No Independent Witness - Contradictions in Witness Statement [Case Law] | First Law

Criminal Procedure - Delay in lodging FIR - Delay in lodging of FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discarding the delay in lodging FIR would put the Court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered for the delay and if offered whether it is satisfactory or not. There can be no hard and fast rule that any delay in lodging FIR would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful.

Evidence Law - Independent Witness - A witness in normally to be considered as independent unless he/she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused to which to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprits and falsely implicate an innocent person.

Evidence Law - Contradictions in Witnesses’ Statement - In every case there was bound to be some exaggerations, embellishments or improvements, which at time could even be deliberate. There was bound to be slight exaggeration but then the Court is required to sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimonies of the witnesses. Total repulsion of evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.

Cr. Revision No. 76 of 2007

Date of decision: 19.03.2018

Madan Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent.

For the petitioners : Mr. N. S. Chandel, Advocate.

For the respondent : Mr. Vinod Thakur and Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, Addl. A.Gs. with Mr. Bhupinder Thakur, Dy. A.G.

Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge

The present revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the ‘Code’) is directed against the judgment dated 16.05.2007, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. in Criminal Appeal No. 27-D/X/2002, whereby he dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners and affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class (II), Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., on 9/11.09.2002, in Case No. 39-II/2002, whereby the petitioners were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- each under Section 325 IPC and in default of payment of fine the convicts were directed to undergo simple imprisonment for two months. The convicts were also sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for three months under Section 323 IPC and were also sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for three months under Section 342 IPC. The convicts were further sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for three months under Section 506 IPC.

2. The case of the prosecution is that on 09.07.2001, the complainant went to the shop of the petitioner-Madan Kumar for purchasing of eggs at about 9:00 p.m. where Parshottam Lal brother of Madan Kumar was also present. When he asked for one dozen of eggs then the petitioner-Madan Lal asked him that he connived with the police to search the shop of the petitioner and the petitioners started to call bad names. When he asked not to call bad names then Petitioners (both brothers) closed the shutter of the shop and confined the complainant inside the shop and gave beatings with danda. Petitioner-Madan Lal gave a blow with danda on his right hand and right eye and blood started oozing out. He fell down and started calling Bachao-Bachao. On hearing this, Surjit Singh, Vipan Singh and Onkar Chand entered into the shop and rescued him from the clutches of the petitioners. The complainant reported the matter to the police vide his rapat No. 4, dated 10.07.2001 which was Ext.PW1/A and on the basis of rapat FIR Ext. PW7/A was registered against the petitioners.

3. On the basis of the FIR, statements of the witnesses were recorded and accordingly both the accused were challaned for the offences punishable under the aforesaid sections. Both the accused were put to charges to which they pleaded not guilty and preferred trial.

4. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined as many as 10 witnesses and thereafter petitioners were examined under Section 313 of the Code in which they have claimed false implication, however, they did not lead any evidence in their defence.

5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence on record vide judgment dated 9/11.09.2002 convicted and sentenced the petitioners for committing the offences as aforementioned.

6. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, the petitioners filed an appeal under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, however, the same came to be dismissed, constraining them to file the instant revision petition.

7. It is vehemently argued by Mr. N. S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioners, that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Courts below deserves to be set aside.

8. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General would argue that the judgments rendered by learned Courts below are based upon the correct appreciation of evidence and passed strictly in accordance with law, therefore, the same call for no interference.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case.

9. At the outset, it may be observed that the revisionary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and this Court would only interfere in case the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced by examining the material placed on record with a view to ascertain that the judgments so rendered by the learned Courts below are not perverse and are based on the correct appreciation of evidence on record. This Court would definitely interfere in case it comes to the conclusion that there is a failure of justice and misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure or where the sentence awarded is not correct. After all, it is the salutary duty of this Court to prevent the abuse of justice or miscarriage of justice or/and correct irregularities, incorrectness committed by the inferior Criminal Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. This Court has very limited revisionary jurisdiction as held by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 50 of 2011, titled as Rajinder Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 13.9.2017, wherein the scope of criminal revision has been delineated in the following manner:- 

“In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another, AIR 1973 SC 799, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice.

In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu, AIR 1979, SC 663, the Hon’ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973, SC 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that “judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system”.

In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad, AIR 1986, SC 1436, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that High Court “committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence” as in its revisional jurisdiction it was “not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact”.

In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh, AIR 1986 SC 1721, the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following terms: 

“It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope.” 

In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath, AIR 1991, SC 26, Hon’ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant.

In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu, AIR 1993, SC 1126 = II (1992) CCR 458 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence.

In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath AIR 1994 SC 26 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 

“It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint.” 

In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another, AIR 1997 SC 2485 = II (1997) CCR 109 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 ; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968, SC 707; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu, AIR 1975, SC 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when “there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice”.

In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999) 2 SCC 452, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “

In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 

In State of A.P. vs. Rajagopala Rao (2000) 10 SCC 338, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 

“The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment.” 

10. Having set out the legal parameters for exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it cannot be denied that in case findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse then obviously this Court would be entitled to interfere with the findings so recorded.

11. In order to see whether the findings as recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse, it is necessary to refer to the material evidence that has come on record.

12. PW1 Ajeet Singh is the complainant/injured and deposed that on 09.07.2001 at about 9:00 p.m. he went to the shop of the petitioner-Madan Kumar to purchase eggs at place Baroi. The petitioners closed the shutter of the shop and switched off the light and thereafter gave blow on his right eye and his eye sight was damaged. The injury was also inflicted on his right hand. S/Shri Vpin Kumar and Surjit Singh who had come to purchase sugar there, after hearing his cry, rescued him from the clutches of the petitioners. He stated that he was beaten by the petitioners with stones and stick. Thereafter, he reported the matter to the police on next day vide daily diary Ext.PW1/A.

13. PW2-Surjit Singh is the brother of the complainant/ injured who stated that he went to the shop of his brother at about 9:30 p.m. on 09.07.2001 and found his brother was not there but the shop was open. Thereafter, he came to know that quarrel had taken place in the shop of the petitioner - Madan Kumar where he alongwith his brother had given beatings to the complainant inside the shop. He saw the injury over the eye of his brother and at that time he was accompanied with Onkar and Vipin who had come to deliver the meal in their shop. This witness claimed that the shutter of the shop of petitioner-Madan Kumar was closed and the light therein was turned off. Even though there were lights in the other shops in the market.

14. PW3- Ram Krishan has proved the recovery of Danda Ext.P1 which he claimed to have been produced by the petitioner-Madan Kumar which was taken into possession vide memo Ext. PW3/A.

15. PW4 C. Kuldeep Singh is witness to the daily diary rapat Ext. PW1/A in which the matter was reported by the complainant to the police.

16. PW5 Vipin Chand stated that he found injuries over the mouth of the complainant but had not witnessed the incident whereby beatings had been administered to the complainant by the petitioners. Since, this witness did not support the case of the prosecution, he was accordingly declared hostile and thereafter cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor.

17. PW6 Ins. Surender Singh proved the final report.

18. PW 7 Dr. Raman Puri had medically examined the complainant and proved MLC Ex.PA and opined that the nature of injuries were grievous as there was permanent blindness in one of the eyes of the complainant.

19. PW8 HC Hansraj, Investigating Officer got the injured medical examination and prepared the spot map Ext.PW7/B and also took into possession danda Ex.PA vide seizure memo Ex.PW3/A. This witness also proved FIR Ext.PW7/A.

20. PW9 Dr. Poonam Gupta opined that the injuries on the person of complainant were grievous as per observation Ext. PW9/A.

21. PW10 Dr. veena Pathiyareh, Medical Officer had examined the complainant and proved on record the injuries on the person of the complainant.

22. This in entirety is the evidence led by the prosecution whereas the petitioners led no evidence in their defence.

23. Now, adverting to the question whether findings recorded by learned Courts below are said to be perverse, it would be noticed that the petitioners had raised following points before the learned Courts below which, in fact, have been reiterated even before this Court:- 

i) Delay in lodging of FIR 

ii) No independent witnesses and witnesses examined were interested witnesses or related witnesses.

iii) Material contradictions in the version of the complainant as well as others prosecution witnesses. 

Point No. (i) 

24. It is more than settled that delay in lodging of FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discarding the delay in lodging FIR would put the Court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered for the delay and if offered whether it is satisfactory or not.

25. In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Gian Chand, 2001(6) SCC 71, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the similar question observed as under:- 

“12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case.” 

26. In Ravinder Kumar and Anr. vs. State of Punjab, 2001 (7) SCC 690, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:- 

“14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquility of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident.

15. We are not providing an exhaustive catalogue of instances which could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our efforts is to try to point out that the stale demand made in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the gkround of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the causes for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. (Vide Zahoor v. State of U.P. 1991 SCC (Cri) 678, Tara Singh v. State of Punjab 1991 SCC (Cri) 710 and Jamna v. State of U.P. 1994 SCC (Cri 348). In Tara Singh v. State of Punjab 1991 SCC (Cri) 710 the court made the following observations: 

“4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report.” 

27. There can be no hard and fast rule that any delay in lodging FIR would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful, as was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amar Singh vs. Balwinder Singh and Anr. 2003 (2) SCC 518.

28. Judged in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the complainant had sustained grievous injuries and it is established on record that because of such injuries he is not able to see from that eye.

29. It is vehemently argued by Mr. N.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioners that the case instituted against the petitioners is absolutely false as the conduct of the complainant as also his brother after the so-called incident is not only unnatural, unusual but highly improbable and is not in accord with the acceptable human behaviour. It makes the presence of PW2 highly suspicious. Had the complainant, in fact, been beaten in a horrendous manner as alleged, then the first and foremost thing which the complainant, and if not the complainant, then his brother PW2 would have to rush to the nearest hospital and thereafter report the matter to the police.

30. Lastly, it is argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the Court should be sloth in accepting the testimonies of the relatives, who claimed to have been eye- witnesses in the incident or to have arrived at the scene of occurrence immediately of its happening, in view of the propensity to readily indulge in false implication.

31. I have considered the said submission and find that no doubt the complainant was not immediately taken to the hospital and this could be something, which could be termed unusual to an extent but would not make such behaviour suspicious or unnatural so as to discredit their versions put-forth in this case, more particularly, when the injuries on the person of PW1 have been duly proved on record.

32. That apart, it has specifically come in the statement of the complainant that on account of the fact it being night time and on account of his having sustained grievous injuries, he was not in a position to immediately report to the police and went to the police station in the next morning. The delay in lodging the FIR has not resulted in embellishment or exaggeration and cannot be said to be a creature of an after thought because the injuries on the person of the complainant has been proved and speaks volume against the conduct of the petitioners. The records clearly establish that the version put-forth by the complainant is not a coloured one nor he gave exaggeration on account of incident or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation held with his brother or anyone else. 

Point No.(ii) 

33. At the outset, it is more than settled that a witness in normally to be considered as independent unless he/she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused to which to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprits and falsely implicate an innocent person. How the testimonies of interested/inimical witnesses witnesses are to be appreciated has been succinctly dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yogesh Singh vs. Mahabeer Singh 2017 (11) SCC 195, wherein it was observed as under:- 

24. On the issue of appreciation of evidence of interested witnesses, Dalip Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1953 AIR(SC) 364 , is one of the earliest cases on the point. In that case, it was held as follows: 

"A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth." 

25. Similarly, in Piara Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, 1977 AIR(SC) 2274 , this Court held: "It is well settled that the evidence of interested or inimical witnesses is to be scrutinised with care but cannot be rejected merely on the ground of being a partisan evidence. If on a perusal of the evidence the Court is satisfied that the evidence is creditworthy there is no bar in the Court relying on the said evidence." 

26. In Hari Obula Reddy and Ors. Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 1981 3 SCC 675, a three-judge Bench of this Court observed: 

".. it is well settled that interested evidence is not necessarily unreliable evidence. Even partisanship by itself is not a valid ground for discrediting or rejecting sworn testimony. Nor can it be laid down as an invariable rule that interested evidence can never form the basis of conviction unless corroborated to a material extent in material particulars by independent evidence. All that is necessary is that the evidence of interested witnesses should be subjected to careful scrutiny and accepted with caution. If on such scrutiny, the interested testimony is found to be intrinsically reliable or inherently probable, it may, by itself, be sufficient, in the circumstances of the particular case, to base a conviction thereon." 

27. Again, in Ramashish Rai Vs. Jagdish Singh, 2005 10 SCC 498, the following observations were made by this Court: 

"The requirement of law is that the testimony of inimical witnesses has to be considered with caution. If otherwise the witnesses are true and reliable their testimony cannot be thrown out on the threshold by branding them as inimical witnesses. By now, it is well-settled principle of law that enmity is a double-edged sword. It can be a ground for false implication. It also can be a ground for assault. Therefore, a duty is cast upon the court to examine the testimony of inimical witnesses with due caution and diligence." 

28. A survey of the judicial pronouncements of this Court on this point leads to the inescapable conclusion that the evidence of a closely related witnesses is required to be carefully scrutinised and appreciated before any conclusion is made to rest upon it, regarding the convict/accused in a given case. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to the deceased. In case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied upon. (See Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar, 2001 7 SCC 318; State of U.P. Vs. Jagdeo Singh, 2003 1 SCC 456; Bhagalool Lodh & Anr. Vs. State of U.P., 2011 13 SCC 206; Dahari & Ors. Vs. State of U. P., 2012 10 SCC 256; Raju @ Balachandran & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2012 12 SCC 701; Gangabhavani Vs. Rayapati Venkat Reddy & Ors., 2013 15 SCC 298; Jodhan Vs. State of M. P., 2015 11 SCC 52).

34. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is with respect to non-association of a person who could have been independent witness and was concededly present at the spot at the time of the alleged occurrence and, therefore, not only adverse inference is required to be drawn against the prosecution story but this fact in itself would establish and prove the falsity of the case.

35. No doubt, I have considered the said submission and there can be no quarrel with the proposition if a material witness, who could unfold the genesis of the incident or is an essential part of the prosecution case has not, convincingly brought to the fore or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been settled or made good by examining a witness, who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed to be suffering from deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the Court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined it would not have supported the prosecution case. However, on the other hand, if already overwhelming evidence is available and examination of other witnesses would only be a repetition or duplication of the evidence already adduced, non-examination of such other witnesses may not be material. In such a case, the Court has to scrutinise the worth of the evidence adduced. The Court may ask itself – whether in the given facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and if so whether such witness was available to be examined and yet was being withheld from the Court. If the answer to be positive then only a question of drawing adverse inference may arise. If the witnesses already examined are reliable and the testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable, then the Court can safely act upon, uninfluenced by the factum of non-examination of other witnesses. It is the quality not the quantity of evidence that matter.

36. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that PW2 is no doubt brother of the complainant, but his presence on the spot at the time so stated by him is duly proved on record.

Therefore, the mere fact that he happens to be the brother of the complainant would not in any manner create a doubt or dent the prosecution story. Therefore, in the given circumstances, it was not at all necessary to examine any other witness. Moreover, this question has already been gone into and dealt with in detail by the learned Courts below and the findings so recorded are based upon correct appreciation of the evidence available on record.

Point No. (iii) 

37. Now, adverting to the plea of contradictions, not only this point being gone into detail by the learned Courts below but even otherwise it is well settled that in every case there was bound to be some exaggerations, embellishments or improvements, which at time could even be deliberate. There was bound to be slight exaggeration but then the Court is required to sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimonies of the witnesses. Total repulsion of evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. If this element is satisfied and to inspire the confidence in the mind of the Court to accept the stated evidence though not, however, in absence of the same, exaggerations, embellishments and improvements in evidence need not to be discarded if it is corroborated material aspect by the other evidence on record.

38. As regards the instant case, there is hardly any socalled contradiction in the case as the injuries inflicted by the petitioners which are grievous in nature stand duly proved in the testimonies of PW7, PW9 and PW10 and the present case unlike the other is not based on the basis of oral testimonies of the witnesses.

39. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that the judgments of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Courts below are based on correct appreciation of the evidence and, therefore, cannot be termed to be perverse and, thus, liable to be upheld.

40. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.

41. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently argue that both the petitioners have no criminal history and are first time offenders and if, in case they are sentenced to undergo imprisonment, they will not only suffer social stigma, loss of reputation, but even their families would be put to undue hardship.

42. I have considered the said submission but I am unable to accept the same for the simple reason that it has been duly proved on record that on account of the injuries inflicted by the petitioners, the complainant has been rendered blind by one eye for his entire life. Even otherwise as against the prescribed punishment, which may extend to 7 years and fine, I noticed that the maximum sentence of imprisonment as imposed upon the petitioners is only one year and fine of Rs.1000/- and in default payment of fine the petitioners have been directed to undergo simple imprisonment for further period of two months each.

Accordingly, the prayer so made for releasing the petitioners on probation is rejected.