Dignity of an individual has been internationally recognized as an important facet of human rights in the year 1948 itself with the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human dignity not only finds place in the Preamble of this important document but also in Article 1 of the same.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 215 OF 2005
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) ...Petitioner(s)
Versus
Union of India and Another …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.]
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K.1 Individual Dignity as a facet of Article 21:
150. Dignity of an individual
has been internationally recognized as an important facet of human rights in
the year 1948 itself with the enactment of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Human dignity not only finds place in the Preamble of this important
document but also in Article 1 of the same. It is well known that the
principles set out in UDHR are of paramount importance and are given utmost
weightage while interpreting human rights all over the world. The first and
foremost responsibility fixed upon the State is the protection of human dignity
without which any other right would fall apart. Justice Brennan in his book The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification has referred to the Constitution as "a
sparkling vision of the supremacy of the human dignity of every
individual."
151. In fact, in the case of Christine
Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, [2002] ECHR 588 the European Court of
Human Rights, speaking in the context of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, has gone to the extent of stating that
"the very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human
freedom". In the South African case of S v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 O' Regan J. stated in the Constitutional Court
that "without dignity, human life is substantially diminished."
152. Having noted the
aforesaid, it is worthy to note that our Court has expanded the spectrum of
Article 21. In the latest nine-Judge Bench decision in K.S.
Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others, (2017)
10 SCC 1 dignity has been reaffirmed to be a component under the said
fundamental right. Human dignity is beyond definition. It may at times defy
description. To some, it may seem to be in the world of abstraction and some
may even perversely treat it as an attribute of egotism or accentuated
eccentricity. This feeling may come from the roots of absolute cynicism. But
what really matters is that life without dignity is like a sound that is not
heard. Dignity speaks, it has its sound, it is natural and human. It is a combination
of thought and feeling, and, as stated earlier, it deserves respect even when
the person is dead and described as a ‗body‘. That is why, the Constitution
Bench in M. Nagaraj (supra) lays down:-
―….It is the duty of the State not only to
protect the human dignity but to facilitate it by taking positive steps in that
direction. No exact definition of human dignity exists. It refers to the
intrinsic value of every human being, which is to be respected. It cannot be taken
away. It cannot give (sic be given). It simply is. Every human being has
dignity by virtue of his existence. …‖
153. The concept and value of
dignity requires further elaboration since we are treating it as an
inextricable facet of right to life that respects all human rights that a
person enjoys. Life is basically self-assertion. In the life of a person, conflict
and dilemma are expected to be normal phenomena. Oliver Wendell Holmes, in one
of his addresses, quoted a line from a Latin poet who had uttered the message,
―Death plucks my ear and says, Live- I am coming‖. That is the significance
of living. But when a patient really does not know if he/she is living till
death visits him/her and there is constant suffering without any hope of
living, should one be allowed to wait? Should she/he be cursed to die as life
gradually ebbs out from her/his being? Should she/he live because of innovative
medical technology or, for that matter, should he/she continue to live with the
support system as people around him/her think that science in its progressive
invention may bring about an innovative method of cure? To put it differently,
should he/she be ―guinea pig‖ for some kind of experiment?
The answer has to be an emphatic ―No‖ because such futile
waiting mars the pristine concept of life, corrodes the essence of dignity and
erodes the fact of eventual choice which is pivotal to privacy. Recently, in K.S.
Puttaswamy (supra), one of us (Dr. Chandrachud J.), while speaking about life
and dignity, has observed:-
―118. Life is precious in itself. But life is
worth living because of the freedoms which enable each individual to live life
as it should be lived. The best decisions on how life should be lived are
entrusted to the individual. They are continuously shaped by the social milieu
in which individuals exist. The duty of the State is to safeguard the ability
to take decisions — the autonomy of the individual — and not to dictate those
decisions. ―Life‖ within the meaning of
Article 21 is not confined to the integrity of the physical body. The right
comprehends one‘s being in its fullest sense. That which facilitates the fulfilment
of life is as much within the protection of the guarantee of life.
119. To live is to live with dignity. The
draftsmen of the Constitution defined their vision of the society in which
constitutional values would be attained by emphasising, among other freedoms,
liberty and dignity. So fundamental is dignity that it permeates the core of
the rights guaranteed to the individual by Part III. Dignity is the core which
unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve
for each individual the dignity of existence. Privacy with its attendant values
assures dignity to the individual and it is only when life can be enjoyed with
dignity can liberty be of true substance. Privacy ensures the fulfilment of
dignity and is a core value which the protection of life and liberty is
intended to achieve.‖
154. In Mehmood
Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, (2012)
8 SCC 1 a two-Judge Bench held
thus:-
―Albert Schweitzer, highlighting on Glory of
Life, pronounced with conviction and humility, "the reverence of life
offers me my fundamental principle on morality". The aforesaid expression
may appear to be an individualistic expression of a great personality, but,
when it is understood in the complete sense, it really denotes, in its
conceptual essentiality, and connotes, in its macrocosm, the fundamental
perception of a thinker about the respect that life commands. The reverence of
life is insegragably associated with the dignity of a human being who is basically
divine, not servile. A human personality is endowed with potential infinity and
it blossoms when dignity is sustained. The sustenance of such dignity has to be
the superlative concern of every sensitive soul. The essence of dignity can never
be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for that matter, 'a brief candle',
or 'a hollow bubble'. The spark of life gets more resplendent when man is treated
with dignity sans humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an honourable
life which is a splendid gift of "creative intelligence"‖
155. The aforesaid authority
emphasizes the seminal value of life that is inherent in the concept of life.
Dignity does not recognize or accept any nexus with the status or station in
life. The singular principle that it pleasantly gets beholden to is the integral
human right of a person. Law gladly takes cognizance of the fact that dignity
is the most sacred possession of a man. And the said possession neither loses
its sanctity in the process of dying nor evaporates when death occurs. In this context,
reference to a passage from Vikas Yadav
v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2016) 9 SCC 541 is note worthy. The two
Judge Bench of this Court, while dealing with the imposition of a fixed term
sentence under Section 302 IPC, took note of the fact that the High Court had
observed the magnitude of vengeance of the accused and the extent to which they
had gone to destroy the body of the deceased. Keeping in view the findings of
the High Court, this Court stated:-
―From the evidence brought on record as well
as the analysis made by the High Court, it is demonstrable about the criminal
proclivity of the accused persons, for they have neither the respect for human
life nor did they have any concern for the dignity of a dead person. They had
deliberately comatosed the feeling that even in death a person has dignity and
when one is dead deserves to be treated with dignity. That is the basic human
right. The brutality that has been displayed by the accused persons clearly exposes
the depraved state of mind.‖
The aforesaid passage shows the pedestal on
which the Court has placed the dignity of an individual.
156. Reiterating that dignity
is the most fundamental aspect of right to life, it has been held in the celebrated
case of Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981)
1 SCC 608:-
"We think that the right to life includes
the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely,
the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter
and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-self in diverse forms,
freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course,
the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the
extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of
the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right
to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression
of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity
would constitute deprivation protanto of this right to live and it would have
to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law
which stands the test of other fundamental rights. Now obviously, any form of
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human
dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this
view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure
prescribed by law, but no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to
such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test
of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional
and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. It would thus be seen that
there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."
157. In National
Legal Services Authority v. Union of India and others, (2014)
5 SCC 438 the Apex Court has held that there is a growing recognition that
the true measure of development of a nation is not economic growth; it is human
dignity.
158. In Shabnam v.
Union of India and another, (2015)
6 SCC 702 it has been further held that:-
"This right to human dignity has many elements.
First and foremost, human dignity is the dignity of each human being 'as a
human being'. Another element, which needs to be highlighted, in the context of
the present case, is that human dignity is infringed if a person's life,
physical or mental welfare is armed. It is in this sense torture, humiliation,
forced labour, etc. all infringe on human dignity.‖
159. In Gian Kaur (supra), the Constitution
Bench indicates acceleration of the conclusion of the process of death which has
commenced and this indication, as observed by us, allows room for expansion. In the said case, the
Court was primarily concerned with the question of constitutional validity of
Sections 306 and 309 of IPC. The Court was conscious of the fact that the debate
on euthanasia was not relevant for deciding the question under consideration.
The Court, however, in no uncertain terms expounded that the word
"life" in Article 21 has been construed as life with human dignity
and it takes within its ambit the "right to die with dignity" being
part of the "right to live with dignity". Further, the "right
to live with human dignity" would mean existence of such a right upto the
end of natural life which would include the right to live a dignified life upto
the point of death including the dignified procedure of death. While adverting
to the situation of a dying man who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative
state where he may be permitted to terminate it by a premature extinction of
his life, the Court observed that the said category of cases may fall within
the ambit of "right to die with dignity" as part of the right to live
with dignity when death due to the termination of natural life is certain and
imminent and the process of natural death has commenced, for these are not
cases of extinguishing life but only of accelerating the conclusion of the process
of natural death which has already commenced. The sequitur of this exposition
is that there is little doubt that a dying man who is terminally ill or in a
persistent vegetative state can make a choice of premature extinction of his
life as being a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. If that choice is guaranteed
being part of Article 21, there is no necessity of any legislation for effectuating
that fundamental right and more so his natural human right. Indeed, that right
cannot be an absolute right but subject to regulatory measures to be prescribed
by a suitable legislation which, however, must be reasonable restrictions and
in the interests of the general public. In the context of the issue under
consideration, we must make it clear that as part of the right to die with
dignity in case of a dying man who is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state,
only passive euthanasia would come within the ambit of Article 21 and not the
one which would fall within the description of active euthanasia in which
positive steps are taken either by the treating physician or some other person.
That is because the right to die with dignity is an intrinsic facet of Article
21. The concept that has been
touched deserves to be concretised, the thought has to be realized. It has to
be viewed from various angles, namely, legal permissibility, social and ethical
ethos and medical values.
160. The purpose of saying so
is only to highlight that the law must take cognizance of the changing society
and march in consonance with the developing concepts. The need of the present
has to be served with the interpretative process of law. However, it is to be
seen how much strength and sanction can be drawn from the Constitution to
consummate the changing ideology and convert it into a reality. The immediate
needs are required to be addressed through the process of interpretation by the
Court unless the same totally falls outside the constitutional framework or the
constitutional interpretation fails to recognize such dynamism. The
Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur, as stated earlier,
distinguishes attempt to suicide and abetment of suicide from acceleration of
the process of natural death which has commenced. The authorities, we have
noted from other jurisdictions, have observed the distinctions between the
administration of lethal injection or certain medicines to cause painless death
and nonadministration of certain treatment which can prolong the life in cases
where the process of dying that has commenced is not reversible or withdrawal
of the treatment that has been given to the patient because of the absolute
absence of possibility of saving the life. To explicate, the first part relates
to an overt act whereas the second one would come within the sphere of informed
consent and authorized omission. The omission of such a nature will not invite
any criminal liability if such action is guided by certain safeguards. The
concept is based on non-prolongation of life where there is no cure for the
state the patient is in and he, under no circumstances, would have liked to
have such a degrading state. The words ―no cure‖ have to be understood to
convey that the patient remains in the same state of pain and suffering or the
dying process is delayed by means of taking recourse to modern medical technology.
It is a state where the treating physicians and the family members know fully
well that the treatment is administered only to procrastinate the continuum of
breath of the individual and the patient is not even aware that he is breathing.
Life is measured by artificial heartbeats and the patient has to go through
this undignified state which is imposed on him. The dignity of life is denied
to him as there is no other choice but to suffer an avoidable protracted treatment
thereby thus indubitably casting a cloud and creating a dent in his right to
live with dignity and face death with dignity, which is a preserved concept of bodily
autonomy and right to privacy. In such a stage, he has no old memories or any
future hopes but he is in a state of misery which nobody ever desires to have.
Some may also silently think that death, the inevitable factum of life, cannot
be invited. To meet such situations, the Court has a duty to interpret Article
21 in a further dynamic manner and it has to be stated without any trace of
doubt that the right to life with dignity has to include the smoothening of the
process of dying when the person is in a vegetative state or is living
exclusively by the administration of artificial aid that prolongs the life by
arresting the dignified and inevitable process of dying. Here, the issue of
choice also comes in. Thus analysed, we are disposed to think that such a right
would come within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution.
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