Section 167 - No new trial for improper admission or rejection of evidence - The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that, independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the rejected evidence had been received, it ought not to have varied the decision.
This Section is substantially consistent with modern English Rule that a new trial shall not be granted on the ground of improper admission or rejection of the evidence unless in the opinion of the Court some substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has been occasioned thereby. This Section 167 of the Evidence Act in substance is one of the many applications of that principle, which is at the root of modern legislation respecting judicial procedure, namely, that if legal technicalities cannot be wholly excluded, they shall at least be prevented from materially impending the course of judicial proceedings, and the attainment of that substantial justice which is their only aim, (See Woodroffe, 9th Edn. 1051).
Other applications of this principle are to be found in Section 99 of the Code and in Section 537 of the (Old) Criminal Procedure Code and Section 464 and 465 of Cr.P.C. 1973. Section 99 of the Code is to the effect that no decree shall be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction.
The present Section 167 of the Evidence Act in fact contains similar provisions that no decree shall be varied or judgment reversed simply on the ground of improper admission or rejection of any evidence, if it could be shown that irrespective of the evidence admitted or rejected, there was other sufficient evidence on the record which, if taken into account, warrants findings recorded by the courts below.
Scope of Section 167 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Improper admission or rejection of evidence is not by itself a ground for reversal of a decision, if there is other evidence to support it. Where admissible evidence has been improperly rejected or inadmissible evidence has been admitted by the Judge, such improper reception or rejection of evidence shall not of itself be a ground for new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, unless substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice has been thereby occasioned; or, in other words, if the Court considers that after leaving aside the evidence that has been improperly admitted, there was enough evidence on the record to justify the decision of the lower court, or that if the rejected evidence were admitted the decision ought not have been affected thereby, no Court of appeal should set it aside.
An objection to the proper admission of evidence is material only if it can be shown that the exclusion of evidence improperly admitted is fatal to the decision. A finding will not, therefore, be disturbed if, throwing aside the evidence which ought not to have been admitted, there, still remains sufficient evidence to support the finding. Under Section 167 of the Evidence Act, the improper admission of evidence is not in itself ground for a new trial or reversal of decision, if independently of the evidence of improperly admitted there is sufficient evidence to justify the decision.
COMMENTS
The appellate Court must apply its own mind to the evidence and after discarding what has been improperly admitted decide whether what is left is sufficient to justify the verdict. If the appellate Court does not think that the admissible evidence in the case is sufficient to justify the verdict, then it will not affirm the verdict and may adopt the course of ordering a new trial or take whatever other course is open to it. But the appellate Court, if satisfied that there is sufficient admissible evidence to justify the verdict, is plainly entitled to uphold it. Abdul Rahim v. King Emperor, 48 BLR 473
Rules of procedure are not by themselves an end but the means to achieve the ends of justice. Rules of procedure are tools forged to achieve justice and are not hurdles to obstruct the pathway to justice. Construction of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and prevents its miscarriage by enabling the Court to do justice in myriad situations, all of which cannot be envisaged, acting within the limits of the permissible construction, must be preferred to that which is rigid and negatives the cause of justice. The reason is obvious. Procedure is meant to subserve and not rule the cause of justice. Where the outcome and fairness of the procedure adopted is not doubted and the essentials of the prescribed procedure have been followed, there is no reason to discard the result simply because certain details which have not prejudicially affected the result have been inadvertently omitted in a particular case. In our view, this appears to be the pragmatic approach which needs to be adopted while construing a purely procedural provision. Otherwise, rules of procedure will become the mistress instead of remaining the handmaid of justice, contrary to the role attributed to it in our legal system. Owners & Parties v. Fernandeo Lopez, AIR 1989 SC 2206
Rules and Regulations are intended to be the handmaid and not the mistress of the law, and that in criminal proceedings it is of the utmost importance that a decision just, and reasonable on the merits should not be disturbed because in the course of the proceedings some flaw can be detected that is not fundamental and which is not proved to have worked injustice to the accused, although it may constitute a breach of the rules of criminal procedure. Emperor v. Ermanali, AIR 1930 Cal. 212 (FB)(Para 33)
The learned Magistrate committed a grave error in examining the accused person without his request and against his protest, to prove a fact which the prosecution should have established by other evidence. That, however, no ground to quash the entire proceedings, Section 167, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides inter alia that improper admission of evidence shall not be ground of itself for a new trial or reversal of any decision in any case, if it shall appear to the Court before which such objection is raised that independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision. The question whether the prosecution was sustainable or the conviction was rightly made has therefore to be examined eschewing altogether the evidence furnished by the accused while under examination as a court witness. John v. Sherthali Muncipality, AIR 1959 Ker. 323
Reported Cases on S. 167 Evidence Act
- Babulal v. Mohammad Sharif, AIR 1996 MP 147 : 1996 (0) MPLJ 461
- Krishna Kumar Agrawal v. Jai Kumar Jain, 1995 (2) BLJR 1152
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