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Passive Euthanasia in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution of India

The language employed in the constitutional provision should be liberally construed, for such provision can never remain static. It is because stasticity would mar the core which is not the intent.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 215 OF 2005
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) ...Petitioner(s)
Versus
Union of India and Another …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, CJI [for himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.]



S. No.
Heading
A.
B.
C.
D.

D.1
D.2
D.3
D.4
E.
F.
G.
H.
Euthanasia : International Position

H.1
U.K. Decisions:
H.1.1
H.1.2
H.2
H.3
H.4
H.5
H.6
I
J.
K.
Passive Euthanasia in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution.
K.1
Individual Dignity as a facet of Article 21
L
Right of self-determination and individual autonomy
M.
Social morality, medical ethicality and State interest
N.
Submissions of the States
O.
Submissions of the Intervenor (Society for the Right to Die with Diginity)
P.
Advance Directive/Advance Care Directive/ Advance Medical Directive

(a)
Who can execute the Advance Directive and how
(b)
What should it contain?
(c)
How should it be recorded and preserved
(d)
When and by whom can it be given effect to
(e)
What if permission is refused by the Medical Board
(f)
Revocation or inapplicability of Advance Directive
Q.
Conclusions in seriatim

K. Passive Euthanasia in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution:


137. We have to restrict our deliberation to the issue whether euthanasia can come within the ambit and sweep of Article 21. Article 21 reads as follows:-

―21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.



138. The word ‗liberty‘ is the sense and realization of choice of the attributes associated with the said choice; and the term ‗life‘ is the aspiration to possess the same in a dignified manner. The two are intrinsically interlinked. Liberty impels an individual to change and life welcomes the change and the movement. Life does not intend to live sans liberty as it would be, in all possibility, a meaningless survival. There is no doubt that no fundamental right is absolute, but any restraint imposed on liberty has to be reasonable. Individual liberty aids in developing one‘s growth of mind and assert individuality. She/he may not be in a position to rule others but individually, she/he has the authority over the body and mind. The liberty of personal sovereignty over body and mind strengthens the faculties in a person. It helps in their cultivation. Roscoe Pound, in one of his lectures, has aptly said:-

―… although we think socially, we must still think of individual interests, and of that greatest of all claims which a human being may make, the claim to assert his individuality, to exercise freely the will and the reason which God has given him. We must emphasize the social interest in the moral and social life of the individual, but we must remember that it is the life of a free-willing being.

139. Liberty allows freedom of speech, association and dissemination without which the society may face hurdles in attaining the requisite maturity. History is replete with narratives how the thoughts of individuals, though not accepted by the contemporaneous society, later on gained not only acceptance but also respect. One may not agree with Kantian rigorism, but one must appreciate that without the said doctrine, there could not have been dissemination of further humanistic principles. There is a danger in discouraging free thinking and curtailing the power of imagination. Holmes in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 US 525, 568 (1923) has observed:-

―It is merely an example of doing what you want to do, embodied in the word ―liberty.

140. The concept of liberty perceives a hazard when it feels it is likely to become hollow. This necessarily means that there would be liberty available to individuals subject to permissible legal restraint and it should be made clear that in that restraint, free ideas cannot be imprisoned by some kind of unknown terror. Liberty cannot be a slave because it constitutes the essential marrow of life and that is how we intend to understand the conception of liberty when we read it in association with the term ‗life‘ as used in Article 21 of the Constitution. The great American playwright Tennessee Williams has said:-

―To be free is to have achieved your life.



141. Life as envisaged under Article 21 has been very broadly understood by this Court. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others, (1983) 1 SCC 124 the Court has held that the expression ―life does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. The expression ‗life‘ has a much wider meaning and, therefore, where the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect the reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilization which make life worth living would be jeopardized and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedures.

142. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 Krishna Iyer J., in his own inimitable style, states that among the great guaranteed rights, life and liberty are the first among equals carrying a universal connotation cardinal to a decent human order and protected by constitutional armour. Once liberty under Article 21 is viewed in a truncated manner, several other freedoms fade out automatically. To sum up, personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person. Travel makes liberty worthwhile. ‗Life‘ is a terrestrial opportunity for unfolding personality, rising to higher status, moving to fresh woods and reaching out to reality which makes our earthly journey a true fulfilment – not a tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing, but a fine frenzy rolling between heaven and earth. The spirit of man is at the root of Article 21. In the absence of liberty, other freedoms are frozen.

143. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy and others, AIR 2000 SC 2083 : (2000) 5 SCC 712 this Court held that right to life is one of the basic human rights and it is guaranteed to every person by Article 21 of the Constitution and not even the State has the authority to violate that right. A prisoner, whether a convict or under-trial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in jail, he continues to enjoy all his fundamental rights including the right to life guaranteed to him under the Constitution. The Court further ruled that on being convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law, prisoners still retain the residue of constitutional rights.

144. Having said so, we are required to advert to the issue whether passive euthanasia can only be conceived of through legislation or this Court can, for the present, provide for the same. We have already explained that the ratio laid down in Gian Kaur does not convey that the introduction of passive euthanasia can only be by legislation. In Aruna Shanbaug, the two-Judge Bench has placed reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment in Gian Kaur to lay down the guidelines. If, eventually, we arrive at the conclusion that passive euthanasia comes within the sweep of Article 21 of the Constitution, we have no iota of doubt that this Court can lay down the guidelines.

145. We may clearly state here that the interpretation of the Constitution, especially fundamental rights, has to be dynamic and it is only such interpretative dynamism that breathes life into the written words. As far as Article 21 is concerned, it is imperative to mention that dynamism can, of course, infuse life into life and liberty as used in the said Article.



146. In this regard, we may reproduce a couple of paragraphs from Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, (1986) 3 SCC 156. They read as under:-

―25. The story of mankind is punctuated by progress and retrogression. Empires have risen and crashed into the dust of history. Civilizations have nourished, reached their peak and passed away. In the year 1625, Carew, C.J., while delivering the opinion of the House of Lords in Re the Earldom of Oxford in a dispute relating to the descent of that Earldom, said:

―... and yet time hath his revolution, there must be a period and an end of all temporal things, finis rerum, an end of names and dignities, and whatsoever is terrene....

The cycle of change and experiment, rise and fall, growth and decay, and of progress and retrogression recurs endlessly in the history of man and the history of civilization. T.S. Eliot in the First Chorus from ―The Rock said:

―O perpetual revolution of configured stars,
O perpetual recurrence of determined seasons,
O world of spring and autumn, birth and dying;
The endless cycle of idea and action,
Endless invention, endless experiment.

26. The law exists to serve the needs of the society which is governed by it. If the law is to play its allotted role of serving the needs of the society, it must reflect the ideas and ideologies of that society. It must keep time with the heartbeats of the society and with the needs and aspirations of the people. As the society changes, the law cannot remain immutable. The early nineteenth century essayist and wit, Sydney Smith, said: ―When I hear any man talk of an unalterable law, I am convinced that he is an unalterable fool. The law must, therefore, in a changing society march in tune with the changed ideas and ideologies

[Emphasis added]

147. We approve the view in the aforesaid passages. Having approved the aforesaid principle, we are obliged to state that the fundamental rights in their connotative expanse are bound to engulf certain rights which really flow from the same. In M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of India and others, (2006) 8 SCC 212 the Constitution Bench has ruled:-

―19. The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It sets out principles for an expanding future and is intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. Therefore, a purposive rather than a strict literal approach to the interpretation should be adopted. A constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that a constitutional provision does not get fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges.

And again:-

―29. … constitutionalism is about limits and aspirations. According to Justice Brennan, interpretation of the Constitution as a written text is concerned with aspirations and fundamental principles. In his article titled ―Challenge to the Living Constitution by Herman Belz, the author says that the Constitution embodies aspiration to social justice, brotherhood and human dignity. It is a text which contains fundamental principles. …

148. In this context, we may make a reference to a three- Judge Bench decision in V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and others, (1979) 1 SCC 308 wherein the majority, while dealing with Section 35(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961, stated:-

―8. … we may note that words grow in content with time and circumstance, that phrases are flexible in semantics, that the printed text is a set of vessels into which the court may pour appropriate judicial meaning. That statute is sick which is allergic to change in sense which the times demand and the text does not countermand. That court is superficial which stops with the cognitive and declines the creative function of construction. So, we take the view that 'quarrying' more meaning is permissible out of Section 35(3) and the appeal provisions, in the brooding background of social justice, sanctified by Article 38, and of free legal aid enshrined by Article 39A of the Constitution.

The learned Judges went on to say:-

―11. … Judicial 'Legisputation' to borrow a telling phrase of J. Cohen, is not legislation but application of a given legislation to new or unforeseen needs and situations broadly falling within the statutory provision. In that sense, 'interpretation is inescapably a kind of legislation' (The Interpretation and Application of Statutes, Read Dickerson, p. 238). Ibid. p. 238. This is not legislation stricto sensu but application, and is within the court's province. 

149. The aforesaid authorities clearly show the power that falls within the province of the Court. The language employed in the constitutional provision should be liberally construed, for such provision can never remain static. It is because stasticity would mar the core which is not the intent.

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