It is Difficult to Accept the expression ‘Chief Justice’ as ‘Collegium’ for the Purpose of Allocating Matters [A.K. Sikri J.]
It is difficult to accept the prayer of the petitioner that the expression ‘Chief Justice’ appearing in the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 be read as ‘Collegium’ of five senior most Judges for the purpose of allocating the matters.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION
(A.K. SIKRI) (ASHOK BHUSHAN) JJ.
JULY 06, 2018
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 789 OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF DIARY NO.
12405 OF 2018)
SHANTI BHUSHAN
.....PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR AND
ANOTHER .....RESPONDENT(S)
J
U D G M E N T
A.K.SIKRI,
J.
The
name of respondent No.2 is deleted from the array of parties, inasmuch as,
having regard to the nature of submissions made during hearing, which would be
taken note of at the appropriate place, respondent No.2 is not a necessary
party.
2. The
petitioner herein, who is a senior advocate practicing in this Court and enjoys
credible reputation in the profession as well as in public, has filed this writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In this writ petition,
he seeks this Court to clarify the administrative authority of the Chief
Justice of India (for short, the ‘Chief Justice’) as the Master of Roster and
for laying down the procedure and principles to be followed in preparing the Roster
for allocation of cases.
3. It may be
mentioned at the outset that the petition acknowledges and accepts the legal
principles that the Chief Justice is the “Master of Roster”
and has the authority to allocate the cases to different Benches/Judges of the
Supreme Court. It is also conceded that adherence to this principle, namely,
the Chief Justice is the Master of Roster, is essentially to maintain judicial discipline
and decorum. It is also stated that the Chief Justice is first among equals,
meaning thereby all Judges of the Supreme Court are equal with same judicial
power, with Chief Justice as the senior most Judge. At the same time, it is
contended that this power is not to be used to assert any superior authority by
the Chief Justice and the power is to be exercised in a manner that is fair,
just and transparent. As the Master of Roster, it is also conceded that it is
the Chief Justice who has to decide as to which Bench will hear a particular
case. The apprehension expressed is that keeping in view the predisposition of
particular Judges, the Chief Justice may assign cases to those Judges to achieve
a predetermined outcome. This calls for, according to the petitioner, devising
a more rational and transparent system of listing and re-allocation of the matters
to avoid any such possibilities. As per the petitioner, the matters need to be
listed by strictly following the provisions of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’). These Rules, no doubt, empower the
Chief Justice to allocate certain cases by exercising his discretionary power.
The petitioner submits that in order to ensure that such a discretion is
exercised in a fair manner, the expression ‘Chief Justice’ should
be interpreted to mean ‘Collegium’
of first five Judges of the Supreme
Court, as held by this Court in Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record Association and Others v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 (famously known as the “Second Judges’ case”). On the aforesaid edifice, the petitioner has prayed for
the following directions:
“(a) That
this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of declaration or a writ in
the nature of declaration or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
holding and declaring that listing of matters must strictly adhere to the
Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and Handbook on Practice and Procedure and Office Procedure,
subject to the following clarification: i)
The words ‘Chief Justice of India’ must be deemed to mean a collegium of 5
senior judges of this Hon’ble Court.
(b)
That this Hon’ble court may be pleased to issue a writ of declaration of a writ
in the nature of declaration or any other appropriate writ, order or direction
holding and declaring that the consultation by the Registry Officials
for listing purposes, if any with the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India must
include consultation with such number of senior-most judges as this Hon’ble court
may fix in the interest of justice.
(c)
That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of prohibition or a writ
in the nature of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction prohibiting
the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India and concerned respondents from listing any
matter contrary to the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and Handbook on Practice and
Procedure and Office Procedure or picking and choosing Benches for the purpose
of listing contrary thereto, with the above modification of replacing ‘Chief
Justice of India’ with the collegium of 5 senior most judges of this Hon’ble Court.
(d)
That this Hon’ble Court may Clarify that when matters are mentioned for urgent
hearing/listing, only a date/time of hearing would be fixed but the Bench to hear
the matter would be determined in accordance with the Rules.
(e)
That this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief
as may be deemed fit in the facts and circumstances of the case and as may be required
in the interests of justice.”
4. Mr.
Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted
that in certain cases, instances whereof are given in the writ petition, the
manner in which matters are allocated to certain Benches reflect that either
there was no strict adherence to the Rules or the transparency was lacking. He,
however, at the outset, made it clear that the petitioner does not seek to
question the validity of any judicial orders and/or judgments which have been
rendered in those cases or in other cases. The petition is confined to the
scope and ambit of the powers of the Chief Justice in listing matters and to
seek declaration that the power must be exercised lawfully and on objective
consideration, thereby eschewing any subjective considerations. The entire
thrust of his submissions was, therefore, to suggest the ways and means for
achieving the same. In this behalf, he advanced the following propositions:
(a)
Constitution of India expressly confers powers on the Supreme Court under
Article 145 to make Rules “for
regulating generally the practice and procedure of the court” with the approval of the President. Such Rules may
include, ‘rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals and other matters
pertaining to appeals including the time within which appeals to the Courts are
to be entered’. Sub-Articles (2) and (3) thereunder fix minimum number of
judges to sit for any purpose including for deciding a case involving
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or a
Reference under Article 143.
Article
124 establishes and constitutes the Supreme Court by providing, ‘there shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting
of a Chief Justice and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number of
not more than seven other Judges (original)’.
Thus,
the expression ‘Supreme
Court’ includes the Chief Justice
and other Judges of the Court. The power to frame Rules under Article 145 is,
therefore, conferred upon the entire Court, which power includes power to frame
the Roster and direct hearing/ listing of matters.
(b)
Thus, although the Chief Justice is the Master of the Roll under the
convention, the Constitution has departed from the conventional Scheme to
confer power upon the supreme Court.
(c)
The expression ‘Chief
Justice’ has been interpreted by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in S.P. Gupta v.
Union of India and Another, (1981) Supp. SCC 87 (known as the “First Judges’ case”) to mean a ‘Collegium’. This was
done to ensure a guard against the absolute power being conferred upon the
Chief Justice alone. It was observed in the said judgment as follows:
“31...We are all human beings with our own likes and dislikes,
our own predelictions and prejudices and our mind is not so comprehensive as to
be able to take in all aspects of a question at one time and moreover
sometimes, the information on which we base our judgments may be incorrect or
inadequate and our judgment may also sometimes be imperceptibly influenced by
extraneous or irrelevant considerations. It may also be noticed that it is not
difficult to find reasons to justify what our bias or predeliction or
inclination impels us to do. It is for this reason that we think it is unwise
to entrust power in any significant or sensitive area to a single individual, howsoever
high or important may be the office which he is occupying.
There must be checks and controls in the exercise of every power, particularly
when it is a power to make important and crucial appointments and it must be exercisable
by plurality of hands rather than be vested in a single individual...”
This principle has been subsequently followed by this
Court in the Second and Third Judges’ case.
The
interpretation so canvassed by this Court must equally apply in respect of the
power, if any, exclusively claimed by the Chief Justice as the Master of the
Roster. It is well settled that in a statute a particular expression must
receive the same and consistent meaning.
(d)
Functions as ‘framing
of Roster’ and ‘listing of important and sensitive matters’ are extremely crucial and cannot be left to the sole
discretion of the Chief Justice as per the law laid down in the First Judges’ case. In any case, such exclusive discretion is anathema
to the constitutional scheme. It is, therefore, imperative that the expression ‘Chief Justice’ must mean the Supreme Court or, as held by this Court in series of
judgments, the ‘Collegium’
of five senior most judges, to
provide appropriate checks and balances against any possible abuse.
(e)
The Rules framed under Article 145 of the Constitution confer powers on the
Registrar under Order III Rules 7 and 8 to deal with preparation of lists and
fixing of hearings of petitions, which would include appropriate listings. The
matters be listed strictly as per these Rules.
5. To put it
pithily, the submission is that once the Rules are framed, matters should be
listed and fixed for hearing as per the provisions, particularly Order III
Rules 7 and 8, thereof. Further, in any case, the expression ‘Chief Justice’ has to assign the meaning by reading it as a ‘Collegium’ so
that important and sensitive matters are assigned to particular Benches by the Collegium
of five senior most Judges, including the Chief Justice.
6. Mr. Dave
elaborated the aforesaid submissions by arguing that fairness in action was the
hallmark of any administrative power and while exercising the power as a Master
of Roster in allocating a Bench to hear particular kind of cases, the Chief
Justice performs his function in an administrative capacity. He also submitted
that applicability of the principle of bias is to be judged by applying the
test of reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a party, as held in the
case of Ranjit
Thakur v. Union of India and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 611. It was
emphasised that the Constitution of India has created an independent judiciary
which is vested with the power of judicial review to
determine the legality of administrative actions and, thus, it becomes the
solemn duty of the judiciary to keep the organs of the State within the limits
of the power conferred by the Constitution by exercising the power of judicial
review which is the sentinel on the qui vive. When such an
important task is assigned to the judiciary, power of listing the cases has to
be exercised in a fair and transparent manner so as to instill confidence in
the public at large that the matter shall be decided by the Court (or for that
matter, by a particular Bench) strictly on legal principles to ensure that Rule
of Law, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, prevails.
In this context, it was argued that the power to allocate the cases should not
be with one individual and this could be taken care of by applying the
principle laid down in the Second Judges’ case
wherein, while laying down the foundation of the Collegium system
for the appointment of Judges, it was held:
“427.
It is, therefore, realistic that there has to be room for discretionary
authority within the operation of the rule of law, even though it has to be
reduced to the minimum extent necessary for proper governance; and within the area
of discretionary authority, the existence of proper guidelines or norms of
general application excludes any arbitrary exercise of discretionary authority.
In such a situation, the exercise of discretionary authority in its application
to individuals, according to proper guidelines or norms, further reduces the
area of discretion; but to that extent discretionary authority has to be given
to make the system workable. A further check in that limited sphere is provided
by the conferment of the discretionary authority not to one individual but to a
body of men, requiring the final decision to be taken after full interaction
and effective consultation between themselves, to ensure projection of all
likely points of view and procuring the element of plurality in the final
decision with the benefit of the collective wisdom of all those involved in the
process. The conferment of this discretionary authority in the highest functionaries
is a further check in the same direction. The constitutional scheme excludes
the scope of absolute power in any one individual. Such a construction of the provisions
also, therefore, matches the constitutional scheme and the constitutional
purpose for which these provisions were enacted.
xx
xx xx
450. It is obvious, that the provision for consultation with the Chief
Justice of India and, in the case of the High Courts, with the Chief Justice of
the High Court, was introduced because of the realisation that the Chief
Justice is best equipped to know and assess the worth of the candidate, and his
suitability for appointment as a superior Judge; and it was also necessary to
eliminate political influence even at the stage of the initial appointment of a
Judge, since the provisions for securing his independence after appointment
were alone not sufficient for an independent judiciary. At the same time, the
phraseology used indicated that giving absolute discretion or the power of veto
to the Chief Justice of India as an individual in the matter of appointments
was not considered desirable, so that there should remain some power with the
executive to be exercised as a check, whenever necessary. The indication is,
that in the choice of a candidate suitable for appointment, the opinion of the
Chief Justice of India should have the greatest weight; the selection should be
made as a result of a participatory consultative process in which the executive
should have power to act as a mere check on the exercise of power by the Chief Justice
of India, to achieve the constitutional purpose. Thus, the executive element in
the appointment process is reduced to the minimum and any political influence
is eliminated. It was for this reason that the word ‘consultation’ instead of ‘concurrence’
was used, but that was done merely to indicate that absolute discretion was not
given to anyone, not even to the Chief Justice of India as an individual, much
less to the executive, which earlier had absolute discretion under the
Government of India Acts.
xx
xx xx
466. It has to be borne in mind that the principle of non-arbitrariness
which is an essential attribute of the rule of law is all pervasive throughout
the Constitution; and an adjunct of this principle is the absence of absolute
power in one individual in any sphere of constitutional activity. The possibility
of intrusion of arbitrariness has to be kept in view, and eschewed, in
constitutional interpretation and, therefore, the meaning of the opinion of the
Chief Justice of India, in the context of primacy, must be ascertained. A homogenous
mixture, which accords with the constitutional purpose and its ethos, indicates
that it is the opinion of the judiciary ‘symbolised by the view of the Chief
Justice of India’ which is given greater significance or primacy in the matter
of appointments. In other words, the view of the Chief Justice of India is to
be expressed in the consultative process as truly reflective of the opinion of
the judiciary, which means that it must necessarily have the element of plurality
in its formation. In actual practice, this is how the Chief Justice of India
does, and is expected to function so that the final opinion expressed by him is
not merely his individual opinion, but the collective opinion formed after taking
into account the views of some other Judges who are traditionally associated
with this function.
xx
xx xx
468. The rule of law envisages the area of discretion to be the minimum,
requiring only the application of known principles or guidelines to ensure
non-arbitrariness, but to that limited extent, discretion is a pragmatic need. Conferring
discretion upon high functionaries and, whenever feasible, introducing the
element of plurality by requiring a collective decision, are further checks
against arbitrariness. This is how idealism and pragmatism are reconciled and
integrated, to make the system workable in a satisfactory manner. Entrustment
of the task of appointment of superior judges to high constitutional functionaries;
the greatest significance attached to the view of the Chief Justice of India,
who is best equipped to assess the true worth of the candidates for adjudging
their suitability; the opinion of the Chief Justice of India being the collective
opinion formed after taking into account the views of some of his colleagues;
and the executive being permitted to prevent an appointment considered to be unsuitable,
for strong reasons disclosed to the Chief Justice of India, provide the best
method, in the constitutional scheme, to achieve the constitutional purpose
without conferring absolute discretion or veto upon either the judiciary or the
executive, much less in any individual, be he the Chief Justice of India or the
Prime Minister.
xx
xx xx
480. The primacy of the judiciary in the matter of appointments and its
determinative nature in transfers introduces the judicial element in the
process, and is itself a sufficient justification for the absence of the need
for further judicial review of those decisions, which is ordinarily needed as a
check against possible executive excess or arbitrariness. Plurality of judges
in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, as indicated, is
another inbuilt check against the likelihood of arbitrariness or bias, even
subconsciously, of any individual. The judicial element being predominant in
the case of appointments, and decisive in transfers, as indicated, the need for
further judicial review, as in other executive actions, is eliminated.
The
reduction of the area of discretion to the minimum, the element of plurality of
judges in formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, effective
consultation in writing, and prevailing norms to regulate the area of
discretion are sufficient checks against arbitrariness.”
7. Mr. Dave also referred to the following observations of
Justice J.S. Verma (as His Lordship then was) in that very judgment:
“478. This opinion has to be formed in a pragmatic manner and
past practice based on convention is a safe guide. In matters relating to
appointments in the Supreme Court, the opinion given by the Chief Justice of
India in the consultative process has to be formed taking into account the
views of the two seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice of
India is also expected to ascertain the views of the senior-most Judge of the Supreme
Court whose opinion is likely to be significant in adjudging the suitability of
the candidate, by reason of the fact that he has come from the same High Court,
or otherwise. Article 124(2) is an indication that ascertainment of the views
of some other Judges of the Supreme Court is requisite. The object underlying
Article 124(2) is achieved in this manner as the Chief Justice of India
consults them for the formation of his opinion. This provision in Article 124(2)
is the basis for the existing convention which requires the Chief Justice of
India to consult some Judges of the Supreme Court before making his
recommendation.
This
ensures that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India is not merely his
individual opinion, but an opinion formed collectively by a body of men at the
apex level in the judiciary...” 8.
Learned senior counsel also relied upon paragraph 44 of the judgment in Special Reference No. 1 of
1998, (1998) 7 SCC 739 (popularly known as the “Third Judges’ case”)
wherein the Court answered the questions under Reference by clarifying as
follows:
“44. The questions posted by
the Reference are now answered, but we should emphasise that the answers should
be read in conjunction with the body of this opinion: xx xx xx 3. The Chief
Justice of India must make a recommendation to appoint a Judge of the Supreme Court
and to transfer a Chief Justice or puisne Judge of a High Court in consultation
with the four seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
Insofar
as an appointment to the High Court is concerned, the recommendation must be
made in consultation with the two seniormost puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
4. The Chief
Justice of India is not entitled to act solely in his individual capacity,
without consultation with other Judges of the Supreme Court, in respect of materials
and information conveyed by the Government of India for non-appointment of a
Judge recommended for appointment.”
9. Towing the
aforesaid line, Mr. Dave proceeded to argue that the modern trend in all robust
legal systems governed by democratic principles was to ensure that even
administrative powers of the Chief Justice must be shared with other senior
Judges so that the power is exercised properly and validly. In support, the learned
senior counsel referred to the system that prevails in the United Kingdom
Supreme Court, High Court of Australia (which is the apex court of that
country), Supreme Court of Canada, German Federal Court and even European Court
of Human Rights and European Court of Justice.
10. Mr.
Venugopal, learned Attorney General, in reply to the aforesaid arguments of the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has virtually accepted the legal
position to the effect that the Chief Justice is the ‘Master of Roster’ and in that capacity he also has the authority to allocate the
cases to different Benches/Judges of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the
grievance, essentially, of the petitioner was about the manner in which such a
power is being exercised. However, at the same time, the petitioner had also made
it clear that he was not questioning particular decisions rendered by
particular Benches which were assigned some of the important matters, pointed
out the learned Attorney General. He submitted that the substance of the
argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that in order to
ensure that the cases are assigned in a fair and transparent manner, the term ‘Chief Justice’ should be interpreted to mean ‘Collegium’ of five senior
most judges including the ‘Chief
Justice’. Response of the learned
Attorney General was that though such a mechanism, as a solution, was found out
by this Court in the judgments popularly known as Three Judges’ case(s) for appointment of Judges in the High Court as
well as in the Supreme Court, suggestion was totally impractical when it comes
to discharge of administrative duties by the ‘Chief Justice’ in his
capacity as the Master of Roster. Strongly refuting this suggestion, he argued
that such an interpretation was not only impractical, it would even result in a
chaos if day to day administrative work, including the task of constituting the
Benches and allocating cases to the Benches, is allowed to be undertaken by the
‘Collegium’. His submission was that such matters of constituting the
Benches and allocating cases to the respective Benches has to be left to the
sole discretion of the ‘Chief
Justice’ acting in his individual
capacity, for the smooth functioning of the Court, by reposing faith and trust
in the ‘Chief Justice’ who occupies the highest constitutional position in the
judiciary.
11. We have
bestowed serious consideration to the submissions made by the counsel on either
sides. It may also be clarified at the outset that this matter has not been
treated as adversarial in nature. This Court would also like to place on record
that it does not dispute the bona fides of the person like the petitioner, who enjoys
considerable respectability, in filing this petition. This Court has considered
the entire matter objectively and with great sense of responsibility. At the
same time, it also becomes our duty to decide the matter in accord with the
legal position that is contained in the Constitution and the Statutes and the
legal principles engrafted in the precedents of this Court having binding effect.
ROLE OF THE ‘ CHIEF JUSTICE ’ AS THE MASTER OF ROSTER
12.
There is no dispute, as mentioned above, that ‘Chief Justice’ is the Maser of Roster and has the authority to allocate the
cases to different Benches/Judges of the Supreme Court. The petitioner has been
candid in conceding to this legal position. He himself has gone to the extent
of stating in the petition that this principle that ‘Chief Justice’ is the Maser of Roster is essential to maintain judicial
discipline and decorum and also for the proper and efficient functioning of the
Court. Notwithstanding this concession, it would be imperative to explain this
legal position with little elaborations, also by referring to some of the
judgments of this Court which spell out the scope and ambit of such a power.
13. The
petitioner has himself, in the petition, referred to a three-Judge Bench in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand & Ors.5 held that the
Chief Justice of the High Court is the Maser of Roster and he alone has the
prerogative to constitute the Benches of the Court and allocate cases to the
Benches so constituted. The Court stated thus:
“59. From the preceding discussion the following broad conclusions
emerge. This, of course, is not to be treated as a summary of our judgment and
the conclusions should be read with the text of the judgment:
(1) That the
administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice alone. On
the judicial side, however, he is only the first amongst the equals.
(2)
That the Chief Justice is the master of the roster. He alone has the
prerogative to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to the
benches so constituted.
(3)
That the puisne Judges can only do that work as is allotted to them by the
Chief Justice or under his directions.
(4)
That till any determination made by the Chief Justice lasts, no Judge who is to
sit singly can sit in a Division Bench and no Division Bench can be split up by
the Judges constituting the bench themselves and one or both the Judges
constituting such bench sit singly and take up 5 (1998) 1 SCC 1 any other
kind of judicial business not otherwise assigned to them by or under the
directions of the Chief Justice.
(5)
That the Chief Justice can take cognizance of an application laid before him
under Rule 55 (supra) and refer a case to the larger bench for its disposal and
he can exercise this jurisdiction even in relation to a part-heard case.
(6)
That the puisne Judges cannot “pick and choose” any case pending in the High
Court and assign the same to himself or themselves for disposal without
appropriate orders of the Chief Justice.
(7)
That no Judge or Judges can give directions to the Registry for listing any
case before him or them which runs counter to the directions given by the Chief
Justice.”
14. The same principle in Prakash Chand’s case was applied as regards the power of the ‘Chief Justice’ and in the matter of Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms v. Union of India & Anr., (2018) 1 SCC 196 five Judge Bench
held:
“6. There can be no doubt that the
Chief Justice of India is the first amongst the equals, but definitely, he
exercises certain administrative powers and that is why in Prakash Chand [State
of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1] , it has been clearly stated that the
administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice alone.
The
same principle must apply proprio vigore as regards the power of the Chief
Justice of India. On the judicial side, he is only the first amongst the
equals. But, as far as the Roster is concerned, as has been stated by the three-Judge
Bench in Prakash Chand [State
of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1] , the Chief Justice is the Master of the Roster
and he alone has the prerogative to constitute the Benches of the Court and
allocate cases to the Benches so constituted.” Further, the Constitution Bench held:
“7.
The aforesaid position though stated as regards the High Court, we are
absolutely certain that the said principle is applicable to the Supreme Court.
We are disposed to think so. Unless such a position is clearly stated, there
will be utter confusion. Be it noted, this has been also the convention of this
Court, and the convention has been so because of the law. We have to make it
clear without any kind of hesitation that the convention is followed because of
the principles of law and because of judicial discipline and decorum. Once the
Chief Justice is stated to be the Master of the Roster, he alone has the
prerogative to constitute Benches. Needless to say, neither a two-Judge Bench
nor a three-Judge Bench can allocate the matter to themselves or direct the
composition for constitution of a Bench. To elaborate, there cannot be any
direction to the Chief Justice of India as to who shall be sitting on the Bench
or who shall take up the matter as that touches the composition of the Bench.
We reiterate such an order cannot be passed. It is not countenanced in law and
not permissible.
8. An
institution has to function within certain parameters and that is why there are
precedents, rules and conventions. As far as the composition of Benches is concerned,
we accept the principles stated in Prakash Chand [State of Rajasthan v. Prakash
Chand, (1998) 1 SCC 1] , which
were stated in the context of the High Court, and clearly state that the same
shall squarely apply to the Supreme Court and there cannot be any kind of command
or order directing the Chief Justice of India to constitute a particular
Bench.”
15. There is a reiteration of this
very legal position by another three Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Asok Pande v. Supreme Court of India through its Registrar and Ors; Writ Petition (Civil) No. 147 of 2018 decided on April 11, 2018
WHETHER
THE EXPRESSION ‘CHIEF JUSTICE’ IN THE SUPREME COURT RULES IS TO BE READ AS
‘COLLEGIUM’ OF FIRST FIVE JUDGES?
16. In this aforesaid backdrop, we have to consider the
principal submission of the petitioner viz. whether the expression ‘Chief Justice’
in the Supreme Court Rules is to be read as ‘Collegium’ of first five Judges?
As a corollary, whether power of constituting the Benches and listing the cases
be exercised by the Collegium and not the Chief Justice alone? That is the
entire edifice on which the petitioner’s case is built upon. To begin with, we
may remark that Asok Pande covers
this issue as well. That judgment was rendered in a writ petition filed by the
petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution wherein he had raised number of
grievances. Apart from some personal grievances raised in the said writ
petition pertaining to some proceedings in the Allahabad High Court, relief
which he had sought was for issuance of writ of mandamus to the first
respondent (Supreme Court of India) to evolve the set of procedure for
constituting the Benches and allotment of jurisdiction to different Benches of
the Supreme Court. In this behalf, he wanted that there should be a specific rule
in the Rules to the effect that the three Judge Bench in the Chief Justice’s
Court should consist of the Chief Justice and two senior-most Judges and also
that Rules be made to the effect that the Constitution Bench shall consist of
five senior-most Judges or three senior most Judges and two junior-most Judges.
Similar
mandamus was prayed for in respect of the Allahabad High Court to evolve
identical set of Rules with respect to formation of Benches.
17. While
negating the aforesaid relief claimed by the said petitioner, the Court took
note of the provisions of Article 145 of the Constitution which empowers the
Supreme Court to make Rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure
of the Court, including the matters specifically mentioned in clause (I) of
Article 145 of the Constitution, which Rules are to be made with the approval
of the President of India. The Court also referred to Order VI of the Rules.
This order deals with the constitution of division courts and powers of a
Single Judge. Rule 1 thereof provides that it is the Chief Justice who is to
nominate the Judges who would constitute a Bench to hear a case, appeal or matter.
Where
a reference is made to a larger Bench, the Bench making the reference is
required to refer the matter to the Chief Justice who will constitute the
Bench. Rule 1, thus, empowers the Chief Justice to constitute a Division Bench
as well as a larger Bench.
In
case where the reference is made by a Bench to a larger Bench, again, which
Judges will constitute the said Bench is left to the discretion of the Chief
Justice. It nowhere says that the members of the Bench making reference are to
be the members of the larger Bench as well. Likewise, Order XXXVIII of the
Rules deals with applications for enforcement of fundamental rights under
Article 32 of the Constitution. Rule 1 thereof mentions the manner in which a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is to be dealt with. Likewise,
Rule 12 deals with public interest litigation.
18. After
incorporating the aforesaid provisions, the Court referred to the three Judge Bench
judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan v.
Prakash Chand and Others, (1998) 1 SCC 1 as well as the Constitution
Bench judgment in Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms’s case, the relevant discussion in respect of which has
already been elucidated above. On that basis, the relief claimed by the said
writ petitioner was termed as ‘manifestly misconceived’ and
the discussion that ensued in this behalf reads as under:
“11. In view of this binding elucidation of the authority
of the Chief Justice of India, the relief which the petitioner seeks is
manifestly misconceived. For one thing, it is a well settled principle that no
mandamus can issue to direct a body or authority which is vested with a rule
making power to make rules or to make them in a particular manner. The Supreme
Court has been authorised under Article 145 to frame rules of procedure. A
mandamus of the nature sought cannot be issued. Similarly, the petitioner is
not entitled to seek a direction that Benches of this Court should
be constituted in a particular manner or, as he seeks, that there should be
separate divisions of this Court. The
former lies exclusively in the domain of the prerogative powers of the Chief
Justice.
12. Quite apart
from the fact that the relief sought is contrary to legal and constitutional
principle, there is a fundamental fallacy in the approach of the petitioner,
which must be set at rest. The petitioner seeks the establishment of a binding
precept under which a three judge Bench in the Court of the Chief Justice must
consist of the Chief Justice and his two senior-most colleagues alone while the
Constitution Bench should consist of five senior-most judges (or, as he
suggests, three ‘senior-most’ and two ‘junior-most’ judges). There is no
constitutional foundation on the basis of which such a suggestion can be
accepted. For
one thing, as we have noticed earlier, this would intrude into the exclusive
duty and authority of the Chief Justice to constitute benches and to allocate
cases to them. Moreover, the petitioner seems to harbour a misconception that
certain categories of cases or certain courts must consist only of the
senior-most in terms of appointment. Every Judge appointed to this Court under Article
124 of the Constitution is invested with the equal duty of adjudicating cases
which come to the Court and are assigned by the Chief Justice. Seniority in
terms of appointment has no bearing on which cases a Judge should hear. It is a
settled position that a judgment delivered by a Judge speaks for the court
(except in the case of a concurring or dissenting opinion). The Constitution
makes a stipulation in Article 124(3) for the appointment of Judges of the
Supreme Court from the High Courts, from the Bar and from amongst distinguished
jurists. Appointment to the Supreme Court is conditioned upon the fulfilment of
the qualifications prescribed for the holding of that office under Article
124(3). Once appointed, every Judge of the Court is entitled to and in fact,
duty bound, to hear such cases as are assigned by the Chief Justice. Judges
drawn from the High Courts are appointed to this Court after long years of
service. Members of the Bar who are elevated to this Court similarly are
possessed of wide and diverse experience gathered during the course of the
years of practise at the Bar. To suggest that any Judge would be more capable
of deciding particular cases or that certain categories of cases should be
assigned only to the senior-most among the Judges of the Supreme Court has no
foundation in principle or precedent. To hold otherwise would be to cast a
reflection on the competence and ability of other judges to deal with all cases
assigned by the Chief Justice notwithstanding the fact that they have fulfilled
the qualifications mandated by the Constitution for appointment to the office.”
(emphasis added)
19. On the
aforesaid analogy, the Court also rejected the prayer of the said petitioner in
regard to the constitution of Benches in the High Courts as well. Some of the
discussion in this behalf, which may be relevant for our purposes as well, is
reproduced below:
“14...The High
Courts periodically publish a roster of work under the authority of the Chief
Justice. The roster indicates the constitution of Benches, Division and Single.
The
roster will indicate the subject matter of the cases assigned to each bench.
Different High Courts have their own traditions in regard to the period for
which the published roster will continue, until a fresh roster is notified.
Individual
judges have their own strengths in terms of specialisation. The Chief Justice
of the High Court has to bear in mind the area of specialisation of each judge,
while deciding upon the allocation of work. However, specialisation is one of
several aspects which weigh with the Chief Justice. A newly appointed judge may
be rotated in a variety of assignments to enable the judge to acquire expertise
in diverse branches of law. Together with the need for specialisation, there is
a need for judges to have a broad-based understanding of diverse areas of law.
In deciding upon the allocation of work and the constitution of benches, Chief
Justices have to determine the number of benches which need to be assigned to a
particular subject matter keeping in view the inflow of work and arrears. The Chief
Justice of the High Court will have regard to factors such as the pendency of
cases in a given area, the need to dispose of the oldest cases, prioritising
criminal cases where the liberty of the subject is involved and the overall strength,
in terms of numbers, of the court. Different High Courts have assigned
priorities to certain categories of cases such as those involving senior
citizens, convicts who are in jail and women litigants. These priorities are considered
while preparing the roster. Impending retirements have to be borne in mind
since the assignment given to a judge who is due to demit office would have to be
entrusted to another Bench when the vacancy arises.
These
are some of the considerations which are borne in mind. The Chief Justice is
guided by the need to ensure the orderly functioning of the court and the
expeditious disposal of cases. The publication of the roster on the websites of
the High Courts provides notice to litigants and lawyers about the distribution
of judicial work under the authority of the Chief Justice. This Court was
constituted in 1950. In the preparation of the roster and in the distribution of
judicial work, some of the conventions which are adopted in the High Courts are
also relevant, subject to modifications having regard to institutional
requirements.”
20. The aforesaid
judgment of the three Judges’ Bench is a binding precedent. This judgment, in
no uncertain terms, holds that the ‘Chief Justice’ in
his individual capacity is the Master of Roster and it cannot read as Collegium
of first three or five Judges. Thus,
it is his prerogative to constitute the Benches and allocate the subjects which
would be dealt with by the respective Benches.
21. The
Constitution is silent on the role of the ‘Chief Justice’, Article 124 of the Constitution merely says that there shall be a Supreme Court of India consisting of Chief Justice of India and thirty other Judges. There is no
specific provision relating thereto either in the Constitution or even in any
other law. The legal position contained in the aforesaid judgments is based
upon healthy practice and sound conventions which have been developed over a
period of time and that stands engrafted in the Supreme Court Rules. In fact,
it is
dominated by two stereo-types. One, perpetuated by the common belief and widely
endorsed and accepted by all the stakeholders, is that the ‘Chief Justice’ occupies the role of ‘first among equals’.
The phrase ‘among
equals’ is generally relatable to the
judicial function designed to emphasise the fact that voices of the members of
a particular Bench, which may include ‘Chief Justice’, are given
equal weight and that in deciding cases, the opinion of the ‘Chief Justice’ also carries same weight and is no different from those of other
Members of the Bench. Thus, in a given case, there is a possibility that the
view of the ‘Chief
Justice’ may be a minority view and in
that eventuality, the outcome of case would be what majority decides. The word
‘first’ in the aforesaid expression signifies only the fact that
the ‘Chief Justice’ is the senior most Judge of the Court.
22. The second
stereotype is that being the ‘Chief Justice’ and
senior most Judge of the Court, he is empowered to exercise ‘leadership’ on
the Court. In this role, the ‘Chief Justice’ is expected
to be the spokesperson and representative of the judiciary in its dealings with
the Executive, Government and the Community. For this purpose, the ‘Chief Justice’ has a general responsibility to ensure that the Court promotes
change and reform as appropriate. The judicial reforms, which is a continuing process
in order to ensure that there is real access to justice, also becomes the moral
responsibility of the ‘Chief
Justice’. Such reforms in the
administration of justice are not limited to the judicial aspects (i.e. how the
cases need to be decided, case management and court management, speedy disposal
etc.) but also include reforms on the administrative side of the legal system
as well. Procedural reforms and implementation thereof is an integral part of
the judicial reform. The ultimate purpose is to dispense justice, which is the
highest and noblest virtue.
Again,
in this role, the ‘Chief
Justice’ gets the authority and responsibility
for the administration of the Court, which gives him the ultimate authority for
determining the distribution of judicial work load. In Indian context, this
power was given statutory recognition by Section 214(3) of the Government of
India Act, 1935 which reads as under:
“(2)
Rules made under this section may fix the minimum number of judges who are to
sit for any purpose, so however that no case shall be decided by less than
three judges: Provided that, if the Federal Legislature makes such provision as
is mentioned in this chapter for enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of the
court, the rules shall provide for the constitution of a special division of
the court for the purpose of deciding all cases which would have been within
the jurisdiction of the court even if its jurisdiction had not been so enlarged.
(3)
Subject to the provisions of any rules of court, the Chief Justice of India
shall determine what judges are to constitute any division of the court and
what judges are to sit for any purpose.”
23.
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is given the authority to frame Rules
for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court, including
various subjects as enumerated in sub-Article (1) of Article 145. Supreme Court
Rules, 2013 which have been framed in exercise of such a power empowered the
Chief Justice to constitute the Benches and list particular matters before such
Benches. Similar powers are conferred upon the Chief Justice of the High Courts
in the Rules framed by respective High Courts for regulating its procedure.
24. At the same
time, the power of the ‘Chief
Justice’ does not extend to regulate
the functioning of a particular Bench to decide cases assigned to him once the
cases are allocated to that Bench. A Bench comprising of puisne Judges exercise
its judicial function without interference from others, including the ‘Chief Justice’, as it is supposed to act according to law. Therefore, when a
particular matter is assigned to a particular Bench, that Bench acquires the complete
dominion over the case.
25.
From the aforesaid, it follows that the two most obvious functions of the ‘Chief Justice’ are to exercise judicial power as a Judge of the Court on equal
footing as others, being ‘among
equals’ and to assume
responsibility of the administration of the Court.
26. Keeping in
mind these postulates and the ratio of the aforesaid binding judgments, it is
difficult to accept the argument of the petitioner that the expression ‘Chief Justice’ is to be read as ‘Collegium’ consisting
of five senior-most Judges, including the Chief Justice. The judgments cited by
learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner are in the context of
Article 124 of the Constitution wherein the expression ‘Chief Justice’ was read as Collegium, after examining the Constitutional Scheme
and the objective behind such a provision meant for appointment of Judges. The
rationale provided in that context cannot be adopted while interpreting Article
145 of the Constitution, the purpose whereof is altogether different. We agree
with the submission of the learned Attorney General that the task of
constitution of Benches and allocation of specific cases to those Benches, can more
smoothly be performed by the Chief Justice and discharge of such a function by
the Collegium would be unworkable and also lead to many practical difficulties.
27.
As already taken note of above, the basis of this argument is the judgment of
this Court in Second Judges’ case
which laid the foundation of the Collegium system for the appointment of Judges.
The relevant passages from the said judgment, which are relied upon by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner, have already been extracted above.
The Court accepted that there has to be room for discretionary authority within
the operation of rule of law. At the same time, it was emphasised that such a
discretion should be reduced to minimum extent necessary for proper governance,
which can be achieved with the existence of proper guidelines or norms of
general application. In this hue, the Court deemed it proper that conferment of
the discretionary authority should not be with one individual but to a body of
men and, thus, evolved the system of Collegium whereby the Chief Justice will
have benefit of full interaction and effective consultation with other senior
Judges, to ensure projection of all likely points and procuring the element of
plurality in the final decision with the benefit of collective wisdom of all
those involved in the process. However, it needs to be emphasised that the aforesaid
resolution and concept of Collegium was innovated by judicial interpretation in
the context of appointment of Judges in the constitutional Courts, i.e. the
Supreme Court as well as the High Courts. It is also to be borne in mind that
as far as the Executive is concerned, it will have virtually no role in such appointments,
except the minimalist role specifically delineated in the judgment. This kind
of system which is devised for appointment of Judges cannot be replicated when
it comes to the role of the Chief Justice as Master of Roster. We have to keep
in mind that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Supreme Court of India, and
the Chief Justices of the High Courts, have to perform many other functions, on
administrative side, in their capacities as Chief Justices. Framing of the
Roster and constituting the Benches is one among them. In case the expression ‘Chief Justice’ is to be interpreted as ‘Collegium’, it would
be difficult to have smooth day to day functioning of the Supreme Court, or for
that matter the High Courts. We have already reproduced above that part of the
discussion from the judgment in Asok Pande which
took note of various factors that are to be kept in mind for preparing the
Roster and indicating the constitution of Benches. Moreover,
when it comes to assigning the cases to a particular Bench, it has to be
undertaken by the Chief Justice on daily basis in contrast with the meetings of
the Collegium for the purpose of appointment of Judges, which is infrequent.
Thus, meeting of Collegium for the purpose of assigning the cases to a
particular Bench on daily basis is clearly impracticable.
28. It is trite
that ratio of a judgment is what it decides and not what logically follows
therefrom. The observations in the three Judges’ case(s) are to be read in the context in which they are rendered.
Once that is kept in mind, we arrive at a conclusion that the ratio of those
judgments cannot be extended to read the expression ‘Chief Justice’, wherever it occurs, to mean the ‘Collegium’ of
the senior Judges.
29. The argument
of the learned counsel for the petitioner that function such as ‘framing the Roster’ and ‘listing
of important and sensitive matters’ are
extremely crucial and cannot be left to the sole discretion of the Chief
Justice is also met in Asok Pande, in the
following manner:
“15. Underlying
the submission that the constitution of Benches and the allocation of cases by
the Chief Justice must be regulated by a procedure cast in iron is the apprehension
that absent such a procedure the power will be exercised arbitrarily. In his
capacity as a Judge, the Chief Justice is primus inter pares:
the first among equals. In
the discharge of his other functions, the Chief Justice of India occupies a
position which is sui generis. Article 124(1) postulates that the Supreme Court
of India shall consist of a Chief Justice of India and other Judges. Article 146
reaffirms the position of the Chief Justice of India as the head of the
institution. From an institutional perspective the Chief Justice is placed at
the helm of the Supreme Court. In the allocation of cases and the constitution
of benches the Chief Justice has an exclusive prerogative. As a repository of
constitutional trust, the Chief Justice is an institution in himself. The
authority which is conferred upon the Chief Justice, it must be remembered, is
vested in a high constitutional functionary. The authority is entrusted to the
Chief Justice because such an entrustment of functions is necessary for the
efficient transaction of the administrative and judicial work of the Court. The
ultimate purpose behind the entrustment of authority to the Chief Justice is to
ensure that the Supreme Court is able to fulfil and discharge the
constitutional obligations which govern and provide the rationale for its
existence. The entrustment of functions to the Chief Justice as the head of the
institution, is with the purpose of securing the position of the Supreme Court
as an independent safeguard for the preservation of personal liberty. There
cannot be a presumption of mistrust. The oath of office demands nothing less.”
30. In this entire scheme, it needs to be highlighted that
the judiciary is assigned a pivotal role under the Constitution. In a
Constitution Bench judgment rendered only a day before, Judgment dated July 4, 2018 in Civil Appeal No. 2357 of 2017 titled Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India & Another with other connected appeals in the case of Government of NCT of Delhi
v. Union of India &
Another, the role of the
Court as final arbiter of the Constitution and upholder of the rule of law is
captured in the following words:
“4.
This Court, being the final arbiter of the Constitution, in such a situation,
has to enter into the process of interpretation with the new tools such as
constitutional pragmatism having due regard for sanctity of objectivity, realization
of the purpose in the truest sense by constantly reminding one and all about
the sacrosanctity of democratic structure as envisaged by our Constitution, elevation
of the precepts of constitutional trust and morality, and the solemn idea of
decentralization of power and, we must say, the ideas knock at the door to be
invited. The compulsive invitation is the warrant to sustain the values of democracy
in the prescribed framework of law. The aim is to see that in the ultimate
eventuate, the rule of law prevails
and the interpretative process allows the said idea its deserved space, for
when the rule of law is conferred its due status in the sphere of democracy, it
assumes significant credibility.
5. We would
like to call such a method of understanding “confluence of the idea and spirit
of the Constitution”, for it celebrates the grand idea behind the
constitutional structure founded on the cherished values of democracy.”
31. The Constitution makers, thus, reposed great trust in
the judiciary by assigning it the powers of judicial review of not only the administrative
acts of the Government/Executive but even the legislative acts of the
Legislature. In the process, judiciary discharges one of the most important
functions, namely, the administration of justice. It does so by upholding the
rule of law and, in the process, protecting the Constitution and the democracy.
Our Constitution guarantees free speech, fair trials, personal freedom,
personal privacy, equal treatment under the law, human dignity and liberal
democratic values. This bundle of non-negotiable rights and freedoms has to be
protected by the judiciary. For this reason, independence of judiciary is
treated as one of the basic features of the Constitution. Here, we may point out
four major aspects of judicial status or performance, which are: independence;
impartiality; fairness; and competence.
32.
Alexander M. Bickel had emphasised way back in 196211 that the judiciary
is the least dangerous branch as it has neither the purse nor the sword, by
reproducing following words of wisdom of Alexander Hamilton12:
“Whoever attentively considers the different departments
of power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from
each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be
least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses
the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only
commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of
the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.”
33. The judiciary
even without the sword or the purse, remains the guardian of the Constitution.
Its sole strength lies in the public confidence and the trust. A.S. Anand, J.
(as His Lordship then was, later the Chief Justice of India) highlighted this
aspect (though in the context of contempt jurisdiction of the Court) in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand & Ors., (1998) 1 SCC 1 in the following words:
“The virtue of humility in the Judges
and a constant awareness that investment of power in them is meant for 11 in his book ‘The Least Dangerous Branch’ 12 in the 78th Federalist, “The
Judges as Guardians of the Constitution”.
use in public
interest and to uphold the majesty of rule of law, would to a large extent
ensure self restraint in discharge of all judicial functions and preserve the independence
of judiciary. It needs no emphasis to say that all actions of a Judge must be
judicious in character.
Erosion of credibility of the judiciary, in the public mind, for
whatever reasons, is greatest threat to the independence of the judiciary. Eternal vigilance by the Judges to guard against any such
latent internal danger is, therefore, necessary, lest we "suffer from
self-inflicted mortal wounds". We must remember that the Constitution does
not give unlimited powers to any one including the Judge of all levels. The societal perception of Judges as being detached
and impartial referees is the greatest strength of the judiciary and every
member of the judiciary must ensure that this perception does not receive a set
back consciously or unconsciously.
Authenticity
of the judicial process rests on public confidence and public confidence rests
on legitimacy of judicial process. Sources of legitimacy are in the impersonal
application by the Judge of recognised objective principles which owe their
existence to a system as distinguished from subjective moods, predilections, emotions
and prejudices.”
34. We may also
quote the following passage from S.P. Gupta (per
Pathak, J.):
“While the administration of
justice draws its legal sanction from the Constitution, its credibility rests
in the faith of the people. Indispensable to that faith is the independence of the
judiciary. An Independent and impartial judiciary supplies the reason for the
judicial institution, it also gives character and content to the constitutional
milieu.”
35. In the same decision,
J.S. Verma, J. echoed the aforesaid sentiments with the following message:
“The role of the Judiciary under the Constitution is a
pious trust reposed by the people. The Constitution and the democratic-polity
thereunder shall not survive, the day Judiciary fails to justify the said
trust. If the Judiciary fails, the Constitution fails and the people might opt
for some other alternative.”
36. Thus,
the faith of the people is the bed-rock on which the edifice of judicial review
and efficacy of the adjudication are founded. Erosion
of credibility of the judiciary, in the public mind, for whatever reasons, is
greatest threat to the independence of the judiciary. We live in an age of
accountability. What is required of Judges is changing. Judgments of the Courts
are widely discussed, debated and even criticised. In this age of technology, open
society and liberal democracy coupled with varied nature of cases raising
complex issues which are decided by the Courts, including ‘hard cases’
any outcome whereof may be susceptible to criticism, as both views may appear
to be equally strong. In that sense, judiciary walks the tightrope of
independence. It has also become a regular feature that even laymen, who are constitutionally
illiterate, enter such debate and evaluate the outcomes influenced by their
emotions, rather than on legal or constitutional principles.
37. The world is
changing fast. However, the fundamental qualities which the public seek in a
Judge have remained the same, as these are eternal verities, which will never
change. These are wisdom, patience, a sense of practical reality, fairness and balance,
independence of mind and knowledge of law, moral courage or fortitude, and a
total commitment that justice should be administered according to law. At the
end of the day, it is the virtue of righteousness, impartiality, objectivity
and scholarship which a Judge commands to ensure respectability to his judgment.
38. In the
aforesaid backdrop, role of the ‘Chief Justice’ as
Master of Roster also assumes much significance. Each ‘Chief Justice’ performs his role by consultation and consensus, after taking into
account various factors including individual Judges’ interests and abilities,
their specialisation in a particular area, their capacity to handle particular
type of cases and many other relevant considerations. However, the exercise of
such a power with wisdom has to be left to the ‘Chief Justice’ who is given the prerogative of the ‘Master of the Roster’.
39. Mr. Dave had
referred to certain international practices, namely, the practices adopted by
the Apex Courts in other jurisdictions. We
may only record that the judicial systems in different countries have different
styles of functioning and the practices have been developed in various
countries keeping in view the structure of the Courts, For example, in U.S., all Judge of the Supreme Court sit as a Court and not in Benches.. Even the
procedural characteristics of litigation are different.
Therefore, system prevalent and developed in one jurisdiction cannot be
mechanically adopted by judicial system in other countries. At the same time,
there is no harm in adopting those healthy practices which have been developed
in foreign jurisdictions and which can be easily adopted because of their universal
application. After all, no system is fool-proof. There is always a scope for
improvement. Reforms in the administration of justice, whether on judicial side
or administratively, is a continuing process. We all learn from experiences and
strive to do better.
40. Of course,
it goes without saying that the matters need to be listed and assigned to the
Benches in accordance with the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and Handbook of
Practice and Procedure.
41. Having
regard to the aforesaid principles laid down in the binding precedents, it is
difficult to accept the prayer of the petitioner that the expression ‘Chief Justice’ appearing in the Supreme
Court Rules, 2013 be read as ‘Collegium’
of five senior most Judges for the purpose of allocating the matters. At the
same time, we feel that debate generated as a result has served its purpose. While
saying so, we have in mind the following words of Hon’ble Justice Tun Mohamed
Dzaiddin Abdullah, the then Chief Justice of Malaysia, Taken from Welcoming Address given by him in a workshop on “judicial accountability” organised by Commonwealth Lawyers’ Association in Kuala Lumpur in April, 2002:
“As judges, we are used to hearing, marshalling and evaluating
evidence.
In
fact, when it comes down to brass tacks, that is just what we judges are
perennially obliged to do throughout the better part of our life on the Bench.
Every decision we make is momentous, for it touches the lives and fortunes of other
people.
Thus
it is good, therefore from time to time, like today, and the next three days,
for us to take a hard look at ourselves so as to ensure that it is a
responsibility which we are discharging.”
42.
We conclude by extracting following message conveying deep meaning, written in
the ‘Introduction’ to the just released book authored by eminent lawyer Fali S.
Nariman, God Save the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Other Opinions:
“Second: Institutions created by our
Constitution, like the Supreme Court, are, and will always remain, greater than
the men and women for the time being in-charge. And this is why our Court will
always remain ‘Hon’ble’ as is the nine-judge Bench of the-more-than-two-hundred-year-old
Supreme Court of the United States, which is reminded by the Clerk of the Court
on each day that it sits (proclaimed in a loud voice before the justices take
their seats): “God save the United States and this Hon’ble Court”, and
Third:
As for the men and women on the Bench for the time being in-charge, one can
almost hear them say (as Edmund Burke had said in an election speech way back
in 1780):
“Applaud
us when we run; console us when we fall; cheer us when we recover; but let us
pass on-for God’s sake, let us pass on”.
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