Striking off the Defence in Proceedings Relating to Matrimonial Disputes; Ambit & Scope of [JUDGMENT]
Striking off the defence is a drastic action especially in proceedings relating to matrimonial disputes. An order striking off the defence has tremendous impact on the fate of the litigation and the rights of the parties. It renders the party defenceless. The ambit and scope of the power of the court in that regard arise for consideration in this appeal.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT
ERNAKULAM
C.K.ABDUL REHIM & R.NARAYANA PISHARADI, JJ.
Mat.Appeal No.598 of 2016
Mat.Appeal No.598 of 2016
Dated this the 11th day of July, 2018
(AGAINST THE
ORDER/JUDGMENT IN OP 706/2013 OF FAMILY COURT, OTTAPPALAM)
APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS
SHAFI AND ANOTHER
BY
ADVS.SRI.T.C.SURESH MENON SRI.P.S.APPU SRI.A.R.NIMOD
RESPONDENT/PETITIONER
RAIHANATH
BY
ADV. SRI.P.JAYARAM
J U D G M E N T
R.
Narayana Pisharadi, J
Striking
off the defence is a drastic action especially in proceedings relating to
matrimonial disputes. An order striking off the defence has tremendous impact
on the fate of the litigation and the rights of the parties. It renders the
party defenceless. The ambit and scope of the power of the court in that regard
arise for consideration in this appeal.
2. The
appellants are the husband and his father. The respondent is the wife. She
filed O.P.No.706 of 2013 in the Family Court, Ottapalam against her husband and
his father seeking a decree for return of her gold ornaments and also claiming
past maintenance. The appellants filed objections to the claim raised by her.
Meanwhile, she filed an application as I.A.No.745 of 2014, claiming interim
maintenance for her and two minor children from the husband. As per the order
dated 20.3.2015 passed in that application, the Family Court directed the
husband to pay interim monthly maintenance at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per month
to the wife and Rs.1,000/- per month to each of the two minor children and also
litigation expenses of Rs.3,000/-. Alleging that the husband failed to comply
with the aforesaid order for payment of maintenance, the wife filed an application
as I.A.No.123 of 2016 to strike off the defence of her husband and his father
in O.P.No.706 of 2013. As per the order dated 11.2.2016 in that application,
the Family Court struck out the defence of the husband and his father in
O.P.No.706 of 2013. Thereafter,
as per the impugned judgment dated 26.2.2016, the Family Court directed the
husband and his father to return 60 sovereigns of gold ornaments and
Rs.1,50,000/- to the wife or to pay her Rs.16,50,000/-. The husband was also
directed to pay a total amount of Rs.4,36,000/- to the wife towards past maintenance.
The appellants have challenged this judgment in this appeal.
3. We
have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and also the respondent.
4.
Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the order of the lower
court striking out the defence of the appellants in O.P.No.706 of 2013 is
illegal and improper. Learned counsel would contend that the Family Court
should have taken note of the fact that the husband was regularly paying the amount
of maintenance ordered to be paid by him to the wife in other proceedings filed
by her and that the Court should have adjusted the amount so paid towards the
amount of maintenance ordered to be paid by him in O.P.No.706 of 2013. Per
contra, the learned counsel for
the respondent has contended that the appellants did not pay any amount in compliance
with the order passed by the Family Court in I.A.No.745 of 2014 and therefore,
the lower court was perfectly justified in passing an order striking out the
defence of the appellants in the main petition.
5. The
appellants have not challenged in this appeal the order passed by the lower
court granting maintenance to the wife and two minor children. But, they have challenged
the order passed by the lower court in I.A.No.123 of 2016 striking off their defence
in the main petition.
6.
True, the appellants did not challenge the order passed by the lower court in
the application I.A.No.123 of 2016 to strike out their defence as and when that
order was passed by the court. But, the fact that they did not challenge the
aforesaid order then will not preclude or prevent them from challenging it in
the appeal filed against the final order or judgment passed by the court in the
main petition. If the rule is that at every stage of the litigation, a decision
not appealed shall be held to be finally decided, precluding the party from
challenging it in the appeal filed against the final order or judgment, it will
become necessary for a litigant against whom an interlocutory order is passed,
to approach the higher court for redress of his grievances, every time when
such order is passed against him. Very
often, though the interlocutory order is passed against a party, the final
order may be passed in his favour. Repeated recourse to the higher courts in
respect of every interlocutory order alleged to have been wrongly made or
passed would cause delay in the progress of the litigation. This mischief can
be avoided or prevented when a party is given the right to challenge the
correctness of any interlocutory order, which had not been appealed from but
which has affected the decision of the case, in the appeal filed against the
final order or judgment. An
interlocutory order, which is not challenged in appeal or revision or by way of
other remedies, can be challenged in the appeal filed against the final
judgment or order. A party to a proceeding before a subordinate court is not
obliged to question every order passed therein before a superior court as and
when the same is passed. A party is not bound to appeal against every interlocutory
order which is a step in the procedure that leads up to a final decision. He
can wait till the proceeding terminates and final decision is rendered therein.
On being aggrieved by the final decision, when he challenges it before the
superior court, he can also canvass the correctness of any order passed by the subordinate
court, if the same has affected the final decision (See Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorjin Debi: AIR 1960 SC 941).
7. As
noticed earlier, the application I.A.No.123 of 2016 was filed by the wife for
striking out the defence of the appellants on the ground that they did not
comply with the order passed against them in I.A.No.745 of 2014 directing them
to pay interim maintenance to her and the children. The first appellant had
filed objection to the application I.A.No.123 of 2016. He stated in the
objection that he has been regularly paying the interim maintenance. He further
stated that he has been paying the maintenance in C.M.P.No. 267 of 2014 pending
before the Family Court. He also stated that he has also been regularly paying
the amount of maintenance in M.C.No.62 of 2012 filed by the respondent under
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act in the Magistrate's Court
concerned.
8. Learned
counsel for the appellants would contend that the Family Court should have
adjusted the amount paid by the husband in other proceedings initiated against
him by the wife towards the maintenance ordered to be paid by him in O.P.No.706
of 2013. Learned counsel would rely upon the decision in Sudeep Chaudhary v. Radha Chaudhary (AIR 1999 SC 536) in support of this contention. The Apex Court
has held in this decision that the amount awarded under Section 125 Cr.P.C for
maintenance is adjustable against the amount awarded in the matrimonial
proceedings.
9. The
challenge made by the appellants to the order passed by the lower court
I.A.No.123 of 2016 on the basis of the decision in Sudeep Chaudhary (supra) is without any merit. In the first place,
no specific plea was raised by the husband in the objection filed by him to the
aforesaid application that the amount paid by him towards maintenance in other
proceedings was liable to be adjusted towards the amount of maintenance ordered
to be paid by him in O.P.No.706 of 2013. In the second place, even assuming
that even without such a specific plea the lower court was bound to adjust the
amount paid by the husband in other proceedings towards the amount of maintenance
ordered to be paid by him in O.P.No.706 of 2013, it was incumbent upon the
husband to furnish before the Family Court the details of the payments made by
him in other proceedings. The objection filed by the appellants did not contain
the details of payments made in M.C.No.62 of 2012 in the Magistrate's Court
concerned. In the absence of the details of payment of amount allegedly made by
the appellants in a proceedings which were pending in another court and in the absence
of proof of such payments, the Family Court could not have made any adjustment
as pleaded by the appellants.
10.
It is mentioned in the objection filed by the appellants to the application
I.A.No.123 of 2016 that the husband has been paying the maintenance in
C.M.P.No.267 of 2014 pending before the Family Court. It is not known what was
the relief prayed for in C.M.P.No.267 of 2014. In the memorandum of appeal, no mention
is made about any proceedings in C.M.P.No.267 of 2014. Nothing is also
mentioned in the memorandum of appeal with regard to M.C.No.62 of 2012 which
was pending in the Magistrate's Court. On the other hand, mention is made in
the memorandum of appeal about M.C.No.12 of 2013 pending before the Family
Court and payment made by the appellants in that proceedings. But, in the
objection filed by the appellants to the application I.A.No.123 of 2016,
nothing is mentioned about M.C.No.12 of 2013 pending before the Family Court
and payments allegedly made by the appellants in that proceedings.
11. At
any rate, in the absence of details being furnished to the Family Court
regarding payments towards maintenance allegedly made by the appellants in
other proceedings and in the absence proof of such payments, the lower court
was justified in finding that the appellants failed to comply with the order passed
by it in I.A.No.745 of 2014.
12. The
power of the court under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') to strike out the defence can be
exercised only in the specific circumstances mentioned therein. Unless any of
the circumstances which are referred to in Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code are
present, the court cannot strike off the defence in exercise of the power under
that provision. But, outside the provisions contained Order 6 Rule 16 of the
Code, the court has inherent power to strike off defence. A court is meant to
do justice and it is intended to be an effective adjudicator of disputes. Then,
it must inevitably be clothed with necessary power to deal with situations
which may arise where the court must have power to strike off defence so that
the people will continue to repose faith in the system and resort to lawful means
which are provided by the courts. It is for the purpose of preserving its power
and effectiveness that the courts have recognized inherent power to strike off
the defence (See Jayasree v. Vivekanandan : 2012 (2) KHC 199 : 2012 (2) KLT 249).
13.
There is inherent power in the court to pass such orders as are necessary for
the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.
Section 151 of the Code saves the inherent powers of the court and, in exercise
of that power, the court can strike off the defence in deserving cases for meeting
the ends of justice. If a party to a proceedings before the court has wilfully
disobeyed the orders of the court, the court can strike off the defence.
Striking off the defence of the spouse, who does not honour the order of the
court, is the instant relief that can be granted to the opposite party. The court
cannot be a mute spectator watching flagrant disobedience of the interim orders
passed by it showing its helplessness in instant implementation of such orders.
Law is not that powerless. If the husband has wilfully failed to make payment
of maintenance and litigation expenses to the wife, his defence can be struck
out in exercise of the powers under Section 151 of the Code.
14. The
considerations which weigh with the court in an application under Order 6 Rule
16 of the Code and in a case of exercise of inherent power are completely
different. True, in the instant case, the application for striking out the
defence was made by the wife under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code. But it is well
settled that the omission to refer to the correct provision of law which is the
source of power of the court, or the mentioning of a wrong provision, will not
by itself render an order invalid or illegal. Law is well settled that it is
the substance and not the form which is to be looked into by a court of law
while deciding any lis and appropriate relief to a party shall not be withheld
on the technical ground that the nomenclature of an application has been made
wrongly. Non-mentioning or wrong mentioning of provision of law would not be of
any relevance, if the court has the requisite jurisdiction to pass an order
(See Nagappa v. Muralidhar
: AIR 2008 SC 2010). Mentioning
of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of any provision of law would, by itself,
be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise
vested in it in law. Wile exercising its power, the court will merely consider
whether it has the source to exercise such power or not (See Kumaradasan Nair v. IRIC Sohan: AIR 2009 SC 1333). If an authority has a power under the law, merely
because while exercising that power the source of power is not specifically
referred to or a reference is made to a wrong provision of law, that by itself
does not vitiate the exercise of power so long as the power does exist and can
be traced to a source available in law (See N.Mani
v. Sangeetha Theatre: (2004) 12 SCC 278 and
Ram Sunder Ram v. Union of India : (2007) 13
SCC 255).
15. In
the instant case, there was no material produced by the appellants before the
lower court to prove that they had paid the amount of maintenance and
litigation expenses and complied with the order passed by the court in
I.A.No.745 of 2014. Then, the lower court could have only come to the conclusion
that they flouted the orders of the court without any reasonable cause. In the
said circumstances, we are of the view that the Family Court was perfectly
justified in passing an order to strike off the defence of the appellants.
16. The
judgment of the Family Court is not challenged on any other ground. However,
learned counsel for the appellants submitted that they are ready to deposit
half of the amount of maintenance ordered to be paid by the husband as per the decree
and on that condition the order passed by the lower court to strike off the
defence may be set aside and the decree may also be set aside. We are inclined
to accept this submission. As per the decree, the total amount ordered to be
paid towards maintenance comes to Rs.4,36,000/-. Half of this amount comes to
Rs.2,18,000/-. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that they have
paid Rs.70,000/- in the execution petition and this amount may be adjusted
towards the amount that shall be deposited by them. But, we find that in the
order dated 05.04.2018 in E.A.No.22 of 2018, the lower court has noted that the
amount paid by the appellants in the execution petition is only Rs.20,000/-. If
we order that the appellants shall deposit half of the decree amount of
maintenance and that the amount paid by them in the execution petition shall be
adjusted towards the half amount, there is chance of disputes being raised in
the lower court regarding the exact amount paid by the appellants in the
execution petition and it may also create the basis for starting another round
of litigation between the parties. In
order to avoid such a situation, we deem it proper to direct the first
appellant to deposit a definite sum in the lower court towards maintenance
payable to the respondent and the minor children. Considering the facts and circumstances
of the case, we find that it is just and reasonable to direct the first
appellant to deposit an amount of Rs.1,80,000/- in the Family Court.
17. In
the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order dated 11.2.2016 in
I.A.No.123 of 2016 in O.P.No.706 of 2013 on the file of the Family Court,
Ottapalam and also the judgment of that court in O.P.No.706 of 2013 on the
condition that the first appellant shall deposit Rs.1,80,000/-(Rupees one lakh
and eighty thousand rupees) in that court within one month from today, towards
the maintenance of the respondent and the minor children. On deposit of the
amount, O.P.No.706 of 2013 shall stand restored to file and the Family Court
shall dispose of it in accordance with law at the earliest. The respondent is
at liberty to withdraw the amount. Needless to say, on failure of the first
appellant to deposit the aforesaid amount as directed above within the
stipulated period, the decree passed against the appellants in O.P.No.706 of
2013 shall subsist and the respondent will be at liberty to execute the decree.
The proceedings in execution of the decree in O.P.No.706 of 2013 on the file of
the Family Court, Ottapalam shall stand stayed for a period of one month from
today. The parties shall suffer their respective costs in the appeal.
