1. Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority v. Birla Suprer Bulk Terminal (Now a Unit of Ultra Tech Cement Limited
Acts
Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act, 1966
Interpretation of Statues - Rule of interpretation says that a statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted, which can be seen from the preamble of an Act.
The question to be considered in this regard is whether KIAD Act is a special enactment and KTCP Act a general Act and whether the maxim ‘Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant’ is applicable as held by the High Court. Rule of interpretation says that a statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted, which can be seen from the preamble of an Act. As discussed earlier, as per the preamble of the KIAD Act, it is an Act to make special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein. KTCP Act on the other hand, as we have pointed out earlier, was enacted to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. Thus, considering the legislative intent of the two enactments, it is seen that there is nothing in the KIAD Act to destroy the authority of the Appellant which has its own assigned role to perform under the provisions of the KTCP Act. Considering the object and purpose for which both the Acts were enacted, there is no inconsistency or overlapping between the two enactments and the power of authorities constituted under the Acts. As the areas of operation of KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different, there is no question of applicability of the maxim Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant. [Para 32]
Interpretation of Statues - If there are two possible interpretations of an enactment, one should avoid the construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the broader interpretation. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by the court should be to secure that object.
The Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act is entrusted with the functions of granting approval for any development on the land within its jurisdiction including the land acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. Per contra, the enactment of KIAD Act is to make special provision for securing the establishment of the industrial area in the State and for that purpose to establish Industrial Areas Development Board. The provisions of both the Acts make the intention of the legislature very clear. As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that if there are two possible interpretations of an enactment, one should avoid the construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the broader interpretation. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by the court should be to secure that object. In so far as the “industrial area” allotted by KIADB, the interpretation given by the High Court to the provisions of KTCP Act would render the existence of the Planning Authority like the appellant to futility. While on the one hand, the High Court has directed the first respondent to obtain permission from the Planning Authority under KTCP Act and that the appellantAuthority to scrutinise those plans only to ensure that they are in conformity with the Regulations etc. At the same time, the High Court is saying that the appellant-Authority cannot collect the betterment fees. In our considered view, such findings are contradictory to each other and cannot be sustained. [Para 30]
Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961 (Karnataka) - Ss. 18, 76 (M) - Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act, 1966 (Karnataka) - S. 47 - Recovery of a fee in certain cases of permission for change in the use of land or building - Effect of provisions inconsistent with other laws.
By careful reading of the provisions of both the Acts, it is seen that the object of KIAD Act is to make special provisions for securing the establishments of industrial areas in the State and to generally promote the establishment and orderly development of the industries. On the other hand, KTCP Act is for regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State. Both the Acts i.e. KIAD Act and KTCP Act operate in different fields. Considering the objects of both the enactments, we find that there is no merit in the plea of the fifth respondent that once a land is acquired for the purpose of industries under the KIAD Act and made over to the Board, the use of the land becomes ‘use for industrial purpose’ and no further permission for change of use of land by KTCP or any other authority is required. [Para 22]
The High Court, in our view, ignored the important provisions of KTCP i.e. Sections 14 and 15 regarding the development act and the development activities including the industrial areas fall within the scope of the appellant-Authority and that the first respondent while obtaining the approval from the appellant-Authority for its plan is bound to pay the betterment charges, road cess and other charges as per the laws. The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition filed by the first respondent and the Division Bench erred in reversing the same and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. [Para 36]
The following points arise for determination in this appeal:-
(i) Whether the High Court was right in holding that Sections 14, 15 and 18 of the KTCP Act are not applicable when the lands are declared as industrial areas under Section 3 of KIAD Act and the payment of betterment fees for the purported development works under the provisions of the KTCP Act does not arise?
(ii) When the areas of operation of KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different with different aims and objectives, whether the High Court was right in saying that the principle of interpretation of Special Act prevails over the General Law is applicable?
Case Number : C.A. No. 9684 of 2011 27-11-2018
Petitioner's Advocate : (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta
Respondent's Advocate : Bharat Sangal
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi
2. Palani v. State of Tamil Nadu
Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 148, 435 r/w. 149 IPC & Ss. 302 r/w. 149.
Evidence Law - alleged variance between the medical and ocular evidence - Oral evidence has to get primacy and the medical evidence is basically opinionative and that the medical evidence states that the injury could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The testimony of the eye witness cannot be thrown out on the ground of inconsistency.
When the opinion given is not inconsistent with the probability of the case, the court cannot discard the credible direct evidence otherwise the administration of justice is to depend on the opinionative evidence of medical expert. The medical jurisprudence is not an exact science with precision; but merely opinionative. In the case in hand, the contradictions pointed out between the oral and medical evidence are not so grave in nature that can prove fatal to the prosecution case. [Para 14]
Criminal Procedure - FIR - Delay - Even a long delay can be condoned if the witness has no motive for falsely implicating the accused.
Delay in setting the law into motion by lodging the complaint is normally viewed by the courts in suspicion because there is possibility of concoction of evidence against the accused. In such cases, it becomes necessary for the prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay in registration of FIR. But there may be cases where the delay in registration of FIR is inevitable and the same has to be considered. Even a long delay can be condoned if the witness has no motive for falsely implicating the accused. [Para 18]
Evidence Law - Motive - Existence or non-existence of.
Where the case of the prosecution is based on the evidence of eye witnesses, the existence or non-existence of motive, sufficiency or insufficiency of motive will not play such a major role as in the case which is based on circumstantial evidence. If the prosecution is able to prove its case or motive, it will be a corroborative piece of evidence; but if the prosecution had not been able to prove its case or motive or the motive suggested is too slender, that will not be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. When other evidence against the accused is clear and cogent as in the present case, absence of motive or insufficiency of motive is of no importance. [Para 20]
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1100 of 2009 27-11-2018
Petitioner's Advocate : S. Gowthaman
Respondent's Advocate : M. Yogesh Kanna
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi
3. Ram Ji v. State of Punjab
High Court set aside the judgment passed by the trial Court and altered the conviction and sentence against the appellant—accused from an offence under Section 304 Part II, IPC to that of under Section 302, IPC.
Held:- The entire occurrence had taken place not at the spur of the moment. It can also be said that the appellant, stated to be holding the post of SPO, was not ignorant but well aware of the fact that the death of S was likely to ensue, for the beatings he received. After careful consideration of the facts of the case, we are of the considered opinion that the circumstances concluding the guilt of the appellant are clearly established. In other words, from the established facts and circumstances, the only inference that could be drawn is that the High Court has not committed any error of law in convicting and sentencing the accused for an offence under Section 302, IPC. Therefore, we are in agreement with the judgment of the High Court and do not find any merit in these appeals.
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1479 of 2011 27-11-2018
Respondent's Advocate : Jaspreet Gogia
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. V. Ramana, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. V. Ramana
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