Section 197 Cr.P.C. - Object of Sanction is to Guard against Vexatious Proceedings against Public Servant [Case Law]
Code of Criminal Procedure - S. 197 - Prosecution of Judges and public servants - it was not and cannot be a part of the official duty of petitioner to commit offences under section 407/409/420/120-B RPC with regard to misappropriation of Government cements meant for construction of quarters of ITBP, after hatching criminal conspiracy with others accused.
The provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. are exception to the general rule as laid down in Section 190 regarding taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate and require prior sanction of the appropriate authority. The object of sanction is to guard against vexatious proceedings against public servant. For claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused that there is reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge of official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in the dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of the official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnished only the occasions or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required.
HIGH COURT OF
JAMMU AND KASHMIR AT JAMMU
Coram: Hon‟ble
Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar Gupta, Judge.
CRMC No. 205/2014, IA No.
234/2014
Date of order: 30.11.2018
Dinesh Kumar Vs. State of J&K
and others
Appearing
counsel: For
Petitioner (s) : Mr. Sachin Gupta, Advocate. For Respondent (s) : Mr. Suneel
Malhotra, Dy. AG.
1. Through the
instant petition filed under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(hereinafter for short, Cr.P.C), petitioner seeks quashing of order dated 31.10.2013,
passed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Jammu, by virtue of which,
order dated 17.11.2012 passed by the Forest Magistrate, JMIC, Jammu, has been
set aside and learned trial court was directed to proceed against the
petitioner/accused in accordance with law.
2. The case of the
petitioner is that the order dated 31.10.2013 passed by the learned Principal
Session Judge, Jammu, is not in accordance with law and that there was no
sanction as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C. therefore, the court of learned
Forest Magistrate, JMIC, Jammu was right in discharging the petitioner/accused.
It is further contended that Revisional Court has not heard the petitioner
before passing the impugned order, as such, the above said order passed by the
Session Judge is not in accordance with law.
3. I have
considered the contentions of counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Counsel for petitioner has reiterated the grounds taken in memo of revision
petition; whereas counsel for respondent has supported the order impugned.
Counsel for petitioner has relied upon 2006 (4) SCC 584 case titled Sankaran
Moitra vs Sadhna Das & Anr.
4. The prosecution
case in brief is that on 28.01.2010, Police Station, Channi Himmat received
information from reliable sources that at Sector No. 3, Channi Himmat, Jammu,
accused-Vishal Chadha and Jaspreet Singh have kept a lot of Government cement
in Kachha Shed and are using it for the construction of private house. On this
information, an FIR No.18/2010 for the offences under section 407 and 409 120-B
RPC came to be registered against the accused-Vishal Chadha, a Private
Contractor in CPWD and Jaspreet Singh, a Government employee. After conclusion
of the investigation, offences under Sections 407, 409, 420, 120-B RPC were
found proved against them. During the investigation, it was found that Jaspreet
Singh was constructing a house and Vishal Chahda, a private contractor was
constructing quarters of ITBP for which he was allotted 1500 bags of Government
Cement from Hoshiarpur. This cement was loaded in two trucks, on 08.01.2010 and
09.01.2010, out of which 1200 bags of cement reached the ITBP and 300 bags of
cement were unloaded in the plot of accused Jaspreet Singh at Channi Himmat,
Jammu and out of which 120 bags of cement were used in construction before the
Police raided. The empty bags of cement have also been destroyed. The
involvement of Junior Engineer, Dinesh Kumar was found proved because he issued
a false report and submitted the same to the CPWD store. The Court below where
the challan was presented, after hearing the arguments discharged the
accused/petitioner. The concluding portion of order dated 17.11.2012 reads as
under:-
“No doubt the
authorities mentioned supra are clear that court is not to work as mere
spectator and has to apply judicial mind while considering that whether prima
facie case is made out or not and whether gives occasion of some suspicion or
it has given grave suspicion against accused persons, but it all depends and
differ from case to case. Lot of documents have been placed on record by the
prosecution which show that Vishal Chadha was allotted work of quarters for
ITBP for which he was sanctioned government cement and lot of cement has been
seized from the site of construction of accused No. 1 and all these facts are
matter of proof which can only be proved by way of evidence at this stage,
accused No. 1 and 2 cannot be discharged as prima facie commission of offence
for above said offences and prima facie case is made out against them. Now
coming to the accused No. 3. Section 197 Cr.P.C. is relevant which deals with
prosecution of Public servant and same is reproduced herein below:
“Section-197
Prosecution of Judges and public servants-(1) When any person who is judge
within the meaning of section 19 of the Ranbir Penal Code or when any
Magistrate, or when any public servant who is not removable from his office
save by or with the sanction of the State Government or the Government of India,
is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, no court shall take
cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction.
(a) in the case
of persons employed in connection with the affairs of the Union of the
Government of India and
(b) in the case
of persons employed in connection with the affairs of the State, of the
Government.
(2) The
Government of India or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine
the person by whom the manner in which the offence of offences for which, the
prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted and
may specify the Court before which the trail is to be held.”
As authority
mentioned supra i.e. AIR 2006 SC 1599 clearly says that sanction under section
197 (1) is necessary for the prosecution. As such, accused No. 3 is discharged,
as the Challan has not been produced after obtaining sanction for prosecution
as per Section 197 Cr.P.C. Accused No. 1 and 2 are charged with offence U/Ss
420,407,409,120-B RPC. Charge sheets prepared separately and made part of the
file. Charges read over and explained to accused No. 1 and 2 who pleaded not
guilty and claimed trial of the case. As such, prosecution is directed to lead
evidence in support of its case on the next date of hearing. Prosecution if
wants to summon witnesses through this court, it shall file list of witnesses
within seven days. For further proceedings put up on 17.01.2013.”
5. A revision
petition was preferred by the State against the aforesaid order dated
17.11.2012 and learned Principal Session Judge, Jammu by virtue of order dated
31.10.2013 has set aside the said order and directed trial court to proceed
against the petitioner/accused under law.
6. The concluding
paras of the aforesaid order read as under:-
“15. In an
identical case reported as Harihar Prasad, etc. v. State of Bihar (1972(3) SCC
89) the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made the following observation: As far as the
offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B, read with
Section 409, Indian Penal Code is concerned and also Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, they cannot be said to be of the
nature mentioned in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it
shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his
official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal
misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is, therefore, no bar.
16. The
respondent being a public servant knowing fully well that the other accused
have misappropriated the cement, instead of taking any action against them,
issued the certificate that the cement had been received in the government
store. It is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his
official duties to commit such type of offence. In such case, the sanction
under Section 197 of the Code is, therefore, not required.
17. While the
question whether an offence was committed in the course of official duty or
under colour of office, cannot be answered hypothetically, and depends on the
facts of each case. One broad test for this purpose, first deduced by
Varadachariar J. of the Federal Court in Hori Ram v. Emperor, 1939 FCR 159 is
generally applied with advantage. It was held that in a case under Section 409,
Indian Penal Code, the official capacity is material only in connection with
the „entrustment‟ and does not necessarily enter into the later act of
misappropriation or conversion, which, is the act complained of.
18. In the light
of all that has been said above, I am of the opinion that on the facts of the
present case, sanction of the appropriate Government was not necessary for the
prosecution of the respondent for an offence under Sections 409/120-B, Ranbir
Penal Code, because the alleged act of criminal misappropriation complained of
was not committed by him while he was acting or purporting to act in the
discharge of his official duty, the commission of the offence having no direct
connection or inseparable link with his duties as public servants. At the most
the official status of the respondent provided the other accused with an
opportunity or occasion to commit the alleged criminal act. A misappropriation
cannot be committed while professing to act in an official capacity. A person
may even be ostensibly acting in discharge of his official duty, but even while
so acting if he is actually misappropriating, it cannot be said that part of
his conduct is in any way related to the duty he is expected to discharge. An
act which is contrary to the very duties of a public servant cannot be said to
be one in discharge of his official duty. Misappropriation by its very nature
does not agree with the functions of a public servant and being an act which is
contrary to his very duties, cannot be said to be one in discharge of his
official duty. An offence which arises out of the abuse of official position
could never be said to require a sanction for prosecution for it.
19. For the
foregoing reasons, the impugned order is not legally sustainable and therefore
set aside. The learned trial court shall proceed against the respondent in
accordance with law. The record of the learned trial court be sent back. The
file shall be consigned to the records.”
7. I have given my
thoughtful consideration to whole aspects of the matter and gone through the
law on subject.
8. The only
question to be decided in this petition is, as to whether protection of section
197 Cr.P.C. was available to the petitioner-accused in the facts and
circumstances of the case being public servant.
9. Section 197
Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
“197.
Prosecution of Judges and public servants.- (1) When any person who is Judge
within the meaning of Section 19 of the Ranbir Penal Code or when any
Magistrate, or when any public Servant who is not removable from his office
save by- or with the sanction of the State Government or the Government of
India, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, no Court
shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction- (a) in
the case of persons employed in connection with the affairs of the Union, of
the Government of India ; and (b) in the case of persons employed in connection
with the affairs of the State, of the Government.
(2) The
Government of India or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine
the person by whom, the manner in which the offence or offences for which, the
prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and
may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held].
10. The provisions
of Section 197 Cr.P.C. are exception to the general rule as laid down in
Section 190 regarding taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate and
require prior sanction of the appropriate authority. The object of sanction is
to guard against vexatious proceedings against public servant.
11. For claiming
protection under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused
that there is reasonable connection between the act complained of and the
discharge of official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge
of official duty as well as in the dereliction of it. For invoking protection
under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be
such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of the official duty,
but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of
those duties, the official status furnished only the occasions or opportunity
for the acts, then no sanction would be required.
12. In the case of Satwant
Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266, a constitution bench of Supreme
Court has held as under:
"It appears
to us to be clear that some offences cannot by their very nature be regarded as
having been committed by public servants while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of their official duty. For instance, acceptance of a bribe, an
offence punishable under s.161 of IPC, is one of them and the offence of
cheating or abetment thereof is another... where a public servant commits the
offence of cheating or abets another so to cheat, the offence committed by him
is not one while he is acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty, as such offences have no necessary connection between them and
the performance of the duties of a public servant, the official status furnishing
only the occasion or opportunity for the commission of the offences...... ...the Act of
cheating or abetment thereof has no reasonable connection with the discharge of
official duty. The act must bear such relation to the duty that the public
servant could lay a reasonable but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he
did it in the course of the performance of his duty."
13. Likewise in the
case of State of Himachal Pradesh vs. M. P. Gupta, AIR 2004 SC 730, the
Supreme Court observed that:
"To put it
shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his
official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal
misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is, therefore, no bar."
14. In the case of Prakash
Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, (2007) 1 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held
that:
"49. Great
emphasis has been led on certain decisions of this Court to show that even in
relation to offences punishable under Sections 467 and 468 sanction is
necessary. The foundation of the position has reference to some offences in
Rakesh Kumar Mishra's case. That decision has no relevance because ultimately
this Court has held that the absence of search warrant was intricately with the
making of search and the allegations about alleged offences had their matrix on
the absence of search warrant and other circumstances had a determinative role
in the issue. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. Reference
to a particular sentence in the context of the factual scenario cannot be read
out of context.
50. The offence
of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections
467, 468, 471 and 120B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be
regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or
purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status
only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence."
15. The Apex Court
in the case of State of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh, AIR 2009 SC (suppl) 1615,
held that:
“5. Such being
the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any
offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act
in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean?
'Official' according to dictionary, means pertaining to an office, and official
act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official
capacity. In B. Saha and Ors. v. M.S. Kochar (1979 (4) SCC 177) it was held :
(SCC pp. 184-185 Para 17)
"The words 'any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his
official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code are capable of a narrow
as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly,
the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an
official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these
words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence,
committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is
performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these
words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence
committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official
duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an Act
constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official
duty will require sanction for prosecution and the said provision."
6. Use of the
expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been
done by the public in the course of his service and that it should have been in
discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend its protective cover to
every act or emission done by a public servant in service but restricts its
scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public
servant in discharge of official duty.
7. It has been
widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which
are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of
office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been
done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission
must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official
in nature. The Section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining
its applicability to any act or mission in course of service. Its operation has
to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once
any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in
discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction so
far its official nature is concerned. For instance a public servant is not
entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the Section has to
be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner. But once it is established
that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty
then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the
objective of the Section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire
purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall
stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have
to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction
may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service
but not in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is
not attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant
in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this
Court in Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari (AIR 1956 SC 44) thus"
"The
offence alleged to have been committed (by the accused) must have something to
do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official
duty...there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge
of official duty the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused
could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he
did it in the course of the performance of his duty."
8. If on facts,
therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the
accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then the
Act must be held as official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code
cannot be disputed.
9. In S.A.
Venkataraman v. The State (AIR 1958 SC 107) and in C.R. Bansi v. The State of
Maharashtra(1970 (3) SCC 537) this Court has held that :
"There is
nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that
previous sanction was necessary before a Court could take cognizance of the
offences mentioned therein in the case of a person who had ceased to be a
public servant at the time the Court was asked to take congizance, although he
had been such a person at the time the offence was committed."
10. That apart,
the contention of the respondent that for offences under Sections 406 and 409
read with Section 120-B of IPC sanction under Section 197 of the Code is a
condition precedent for launching the prosecution is equally fallacious. This
Court has stated the legal position in S.R. Munnipalli v. State of Bombay (1955
(1) SCR 1177) and in Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu (1955 RD-SC 9) that it is
not every offence committed by a public servant, which requires sanction for
prosecution under Section 197 of the Code, nor even every act done by him while
he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. Following the
above legal position it was held in Harihar Prasad etc. v. State of Bihar (1972
(3) SCC 89) as follows :
"As far as
the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B, read with
Section 409, Indian Penal Code is concerned and also Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, they cannot be said to be of the
nature mentioned in Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it
shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his
official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal
misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is, therefore, no bar."
11.
Above views are reiterated in State of Kerala v. Padmanabhan Nair (1999 (5) SCC
690). Both Amrik Singh (supra) and S.R. Munnipalli (supra) were noted in that
case. Sections 467, 468 and 471, IPC relate to forgery of valuable security,
Will etc; forgery for purpose of cheating and using as genuine a forged
document respectively. It is no part of the duty of a public servant while
discharging his official duties to commit forgery of the type covered by the
aforesaid offences. Want of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is,
therefore, no bar.
12.
This position was highlighted in State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta (2004 (2) SCC
349)."
16.
Placing reliance upon the judgments mentioned above, I am of the considered
opinion that it was not and cannot be a part of the official duty of petitioner
to commit offences under section 407/409/420/120-B RPC with regard to
misappropriation of Government cements meant for construction of quarters of
ITBP, after hatching criminal conspiracy with others accused. The law cited by
petitioner is not applicable in present set of circumstances of case.
17.
In view of above, this petition is dismissed. The order of Principal
Sessions Judge, Jammu, is upheld. Stay, if any, is vacated. Trial court to
proceed with the matter under law. Copy of this order along with records be
sent to trial court.
Comments
Post a Comment