Criminal P.C. 1973 - S.482 - Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 498A, 323, 504, 506 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Ss. 3, 4 - for
establishment of case of demand of dowry, that must co-relate with the marriage
or pre-marriage stage and not every demand made by the applicants after
marriage will come within the purview of dowry.
It may be to meet some other financial
scarcity or to meet some emergent family expenses. Therefore, allegation
levelled in the complaint for demand of dowry is not sustainable in the eye of
law. Secondly, so far as allegation against the applicants are concenred, that
is also absolutely in the teeth of law laid down by the Apex Court and it is
very much clear that there is no specific allegation against any of the
applicants and allegations are also levelled upon the applicants, who are even
not residing along with applicant No. 1. In fact, it is necessarily required to
make specific allegation against each and every applicants whose names are
mentioned in the complaint or FIR in the matrimonial cases which is absolutely
missing in this case. Therefore, in the light of facts and law laid down by the Apex Court, the allegation of dowry as well as harrasment is not sustainable. Accordingly, the proceeding of Case No. 3609/9 of 2004 (Rajeshwari Saxena vs. Shivendra Raizada and others), under sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P. Act, P.S. Katghar, District Moradabad is hereby quashed and the application is allowed.
Facts of the Case
In complaint dated 15.04.2004, it has been clearly stated that Rs. 80,000/- was demanded for maintenance of clinic and further in complaint, there is no specific allegation against any of the applicants except general and vague allegations, who are the family members i.e. applicant no.1-husband, applicant Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are brothers of the applicant-huband and applicant No. 7 is the father of applicant-husband and even some of the brothers of husband are not residing with him.
HIGH
COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Hon'ble
Neeraj Tiwari, J.
Delivered
On : 06.12.2018
APPLICATION
U/S 482 No. - 1046 of 2005
Shivendra
Raizada & Others v. State Of U.P. & Another
Counsel
for Applicant :- Amit Kumar
Srivastava Counsel for
Opposite Party :- Govt.
Advocate
Heard
learned counsel for the applicants, learned A.G.A. and perused the record.
Present
application under section 482 has been filed to quash the proceeding of case
No. 3606/9 of 2004 (Rajeshwari Saxena vs. Shivendra
Raizada and others), under sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P. Act,
P.S. Katghar, District Moradabad, pending in the court of Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Moradabad.
As
per office report dated 27.4.2005, notice to opposite party No. 2 has been
returned back after service.
Since
matter is pertaining to the year 2005, therefore, Court is proceeded to decide
the case on merits.
Brief
facts of the case are that a complaint dated 15.04.2004 has been filed before
CJM, Moradabad under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Which was registered as Case No.
3606/9 of 2004. It is alleged in the complaint that marriage of applicant No. 1
and opposite party No. 2 was solemnised as per hindu rights and rituals in the
month of January, 1999 and dowry was given to applicants and applicants were
not pleased with dowry and further demanded Rs. 80,000/- of dowry which was
refused by the opposite party. After
refusal, applicants have harrassed opposite party No. 2-wife and thrown her out
from their house. Statement of opposite party No. 2 has been recorded under
Section 200 Cr.P.C. and statement of PW-1 and PW-2 has also been recorded under
section 202 Cr.P.C before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Thereafter, learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate vide order date 20.05.2004 has summoned the applicants
under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P. Act.
Learned
counsel for the applicants submitted that in fact it is absolutely frivolous
complaint and learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has also passed the summoning
order without application of mind. No dowry was given by the father of the opposite
party No. 2 in the marriage and marriage was solemnised in a very simple
manner. In fact, opposite party No. 2 had always put pressure upon her
husband-applicant No. 1 to live separately from the family of applicants, but
when applicant No. 1 refused to live separately, she became annoyed and left
her matrimonial house in August, 2000 and since then she is living with her
parents at Moradabad. He further submitted that after every efforts for reconciliation,
when nothing positive has happened, applicant No. 1
and opposite party No. 2 had moved joint petition for divorce under Section
13(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before Judge, Family Court, Moradabad
which was registered as Hindu Marriage Petition No. 579 of 2002 dated
13.12.2002. It is also submitted that applicant No. 1 has given Stri Dhan and
other goods which was claimed by opposite party No. 2. It is next submitted that
ultimately the divorce petition was dismissed in default vide order dated 21.2.2004
due to absence of both the parties for which applicant No. 1 has moved
restoration application before Judge, Family Court, Moradabad and the same is
still pending.
Learned
counsel for the applicants further submitted that unfortunately applicant No. 1
had met with an accident on 21.04.2014 and his both legs got amputed. It is
also submitted that on merits, the complaint has no substance for the reason
that in the first paragraph of complaint dated 15.04.2004, it has been stated Rs.
80,000/- was demanded by the applicants for repairing of clinic. He has
contended that if any amount is demanded for certain purpose, it does not come
withint the purview of dowry in the light of law laid down by the Apex Court.
In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Apex
Court in the case of Appasaheb
vs. State of Maharashtra 2007 (57) ACC 544 decided on 05.01.2007 and another
judgment of Apex Court in the case of Vipin Jaiswal (A-I) Vs. State of A.P. 2013 (2) JIC
377 (SC) decided on
13.03.2013.
It
is further submitted that complaint was filed against all the family members
along with applicant No. 1-husband without any specific allegation upon either of
the applicants. It is next submitted that all applicants are not living
jointly, but are living separately at different places. In para 18 of affidavit
filed in support of application, he has stated that applicant No. 2 is employed
in Forest Department and posted at Dhanaura at the time of filing of complaint
and applicant No. 7 was practising lawyer of Nainital High Court, living at
Bareilly and presently practising at Supreme Court of India. For lodging
complaints or FIR against family members, there must be a specific allegation
against every person named and in present case, a vague allegation has been
made against all the family members. In support thereof, he has relied upon the
judgment of Preeti
Gupta and another Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2010) 7 SCC 667 decided on 13.08.2010, Geeta Mehrotra and another Vs.
State of U.P. and another (2012) 10 SCC 741 decided 17.10.2012 and Pritam Ashok Sadaphule and
others vs. State of Maharashtra and another 2015 (11) SCC 769 decided on 19.03.2015. Lastly, he prayed
that in the light of facts of the case and law laid down by the Apex Court, the
Court may please to allow the present application and quash the criminal proceedings.
Learned
A.G.A. has opposed the prayer made by learned counsel for the applicants and
submitted that in para-6 of the complaint, there is allegation of demand of Rs.
80,000/- and harrasing the opposite party No. 2.
I
have perused the records as well as judgments of Apex Court relied upon and
conisdered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.
In
complaint dated 15.04.2004, it has been clearly stated that Rs. 80,000/- was
demanded for maintenance of clinic and further in complaint, there is no
specific allegation against any of the applicants except general and vague
allegations, who are the family members i.e. applicant no.1-husband, applicant
Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 are brothers of the applicant-huband and applicant No. 7
is the father of applicant-husband and even some of the brothers of husband are
not residing with him.
The
Apex Court in the case of Appa
Sahab (Supra) has considered
the meaning of dowry and defined the same in light of Dowry Prohibition Act.
For ready reference, para 9 of the judgment is quoted below:-
“9. Two essential
ingredient of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are
(i) death of women is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances,
and (ii) women is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any
relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for "dowry".
The explanation appended to sub-section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that
"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961.
Section
2 of Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under :-
"2. Definition of
"dowry" - In this Act "dowry" means any property or
valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
(a)
by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the
parent of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to
the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage
in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dowry
or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (shariat)
applies.
In
view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property or
valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or
indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with
the marriage of the said parties. Therefore,
the giving or taking of property or valuable security must have some connection
with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking
of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential.
Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well
known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of
interpretation of Statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a
particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody
coversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have
a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that
particular meaning. (See Union of India v. Garware
Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and Chemicals and Fibres of India v. Union of
India, AIR (1997) SC 558). A demand for money on account of some financial
stringency or for meeting some urgent domestic expenses of for purchasing
manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally
understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show
that any demand for "dowry" as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money
for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential
ingredient of Section 304B IPC viz. demand
for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be
sustained.”
This judgment was also followed by the Apex Court in the case of Vipin Jaiswal (Supra) and relying upon the same, Court has
again taken the same view. Relevant paragraph No. 6 of the judgment is quoted
below:-
“6. We have perused the evidence of PW 1 and PW 4, the father and
mother of the deceased respectively. We find that PW 1 has stated that at the
time of marriage, gold, silver articles, ornaments, T.V., fridge and several
other household articles worth more than Rs.2,50,000/- were given to the
appellant and after the marriage, the deceased joined the appellant in his house
at Kagaziguda. He has, thereafter, stated that the appellant used to work in a
xerox cum type institute in Nampally and in the sixth month after marriage, the
deceased came to their house and told them that the appellant asked her to
bring Rs.50,000/- from them as he was intending to purchase a computer and set
up his own business. Similarly, PW4 has stated in her evidence that five months
after the marriage, the appellant sent her away to their house and when she questioned
her, she told that the appellant was demanding Rs.50,000/- and that the demand
for money is to purchase a computer to start his own business. Thus, the
evidence of PW1 and PW4 is that the demand of Rs.50,000/- by the appellant was
made six months after the marriage and that too for purchasing a computer to
start his own business. It is only with regard to this demand of Rs.50,000/-
that the Trial Court has recorded a finding of guilt against the appellant for
the offence under Section 304B, IPC and it is only in relation to this demand
of Rs.50,000/- for purchase of a computer to start a business made by the appellant
six months after the marriage that the High Court has also confirmed the
findings of the Trial Court with regard to guilt of the appellant under Section
304B, IPC. In our view, both the Trial Court and the High Court failed to
appreciate that the demand, if at all made by the appellant on the deceased for
purchasing a computer to start a business six months after the marriage, was
not in connection with the marriage and was not really a 'dowry demand' within
the meaning of Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. This Court has
held in Appasaheb & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra (2007) 9 SCC 721:
“In
view of the aforesaid definition of the word "dowry" any property or
valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or
indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with
the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving or taking of property
or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties
and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security
with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has
to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or
practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of Statute
that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction
and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or
transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the
words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of
India v. Garware Nylons Ltd., AIR (1996) SC 3509 and Chemicals and Fibers of
India v. Union of India, AIR (1997) SC 558).”
Apex Court, in the case Preeti Gupta (Supra) has also considered the cases where all
relatives have been implicated and clearly held that there should be specific
allegation against the applicants. Relevant paragraph Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
28, 29, 30 and 31 of the judgment are quoted below:-
“5. According to the
appellants, there was no specific allegation against both the appellants in the
complaint. Appellant
no.1 had been permanently residing with her husband at Navasari, Surat
(Gujarat) for the last more than seven years. She had never visited Mumbai during
the year 2007 and never stayed with respondent no.2 or her husband. Similarly,
appellant no.2, unmarried brother-in-law of the complainant has also been
permanently residing at Goregaon, Maharashtra. It
was asserted that there is no specific allegation in the entire complaint
against both the appellants.
6. The
statements of prosecution witnesses PW1 to PW4 were also recorded along with
the statement of the complainant. None of the prosecution witnesses had stated
anything against the appellants. These appellants had very clearly stated in
this appeal that they had never visited Ranchi. The appellants also stated that
they had never interfered with the internal affairs of the complainant and her
husband. According to them, there was no question of any interference because
the appellants had been living in different cities for a number of years.
7. It
was clearly alleged by the appellants that they had been falsely implicated in
this case. It was further stated that the complaint against the appellants was totally
without any basis or foundation. The appellants also asserted that even if all
the allegations incorporated in the complaint were taken to be true, even then
no offence could be made out against them. The
appellants had submitted that the High Court ought to have quashed this
complaint as far as both the appellants are concerned because there were no specific
allegations against the appellants and they ought not have been summoned.
8. In
the impugned judgment, while declining to exercise its inherent powers, the
High Court observed as under:
"In this context, I may again reiterate that
the acts relating to demand or subjecting to cruelty, as per the complaint
petition, have been committed at the place where the complainant was living
with her husband. However,
the complainant in her statement made under solemn affirmation has stated that
when she came to Ranchi on the occasion of Holi, all the accused persons came
and passed sarcastic remarks which in absence of actual wordings, according to the
learned counsel appearing for the petitioner could never be presumed to be an
act constituting offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code."
9.
In this appeal, both the appellants specifically asserted that they had never
visited Ranchi, therefore, the allegations that they made any sarcastic remarks
to the complainant had no basis or foundation as far as the appellants are
concerned.
10. The
complainant could not dispute that appellant no.1 was a permanent resident
living with her husband at Navasari, Surat, Gujarat for the last more than
seven years and the appellant no.2 was permanent resident of Goregaon,
Maharashtra. They had never spent any time with respondent no.2.
...................
28. We
have very carefully considered the averments of the complaint and the
statements of all the witnesses recorded at the time of the filing of the complaint.
There are no specific allegations against the appellants in the complaint and
none of the witnesses have alleged any role of both the appellants.
29. Admittedly,
appellant no.1 is a permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat and has been
living with her husband for more than seven years. Similarly, appellant no.2 is
a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharasthra. They have never visited the
place where the alleged incident had taken place. They had never lived with
respondent no.2 and her husband. Their implication in the complaint is meant to
harass and humiliate the husband's relatives. This seems to be the only basis
to file this complaint against the appellants. Permitting
the complainant to pursue this complaint would be an abuse of the process of
law.
30. It
is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is
rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this
court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent
and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society.
31. The
courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from section 498-A of
the Indian Penal Code which reads as under:-
"498-A. Husband or relative
of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.-- Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall
be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,
`cruelty' means:-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to
life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b)
harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or
any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
meet such demand."
32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these
complaints under section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over
trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of
such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive.
At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment
are also a matter of serious concern.
33. The
learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation
to ensure that the social fiber of family life is not ruined or demolished. They
must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be
reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed
either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the
Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and
should treat every complaint under section 498A as a basic human problem and
must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable
resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best
of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace and tranquility of the
society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint
should not lead to multiple cases.
34. Unfortunately,
at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are
not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can lead to
insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close
relations.
35. The
ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and
protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these
complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations
is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it
is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The
courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these
complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with
matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations
who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the
place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different
complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized
with great care and circumspection.
36. Experience
reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and
bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of
common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the
husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the
chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is
extremely long and painful.”
Again in the matter of Vipin Jaiswal (Supra), the
Court has taken the view that there should have been specific allegation of harrasment.
Relevant paragraph No. 7 of the judgment is quoted below:-
“7. In any case, to
hold an accused guilty of both the offences under Section 304B and 498A, IPC,
the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused. From the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses, and in particular PW1 and PW4, we find that they have
made general allegations of harassment by the appellant towards the deceased and
have not brought in evidence any specific acts of cruelty or harassment by the
appellant on the deceased. On the other hand, DW1 in his evidence has stated
that on 4.4.1999, the day when the incident occurred, he went to the nearby
temple along with his mother (A2) and his father (A3) went to the bazar to bring
ration and his wife (deceased) alone was present at the house and at about 1.00
p.m., they were informed by somebody that some smoke was coming out from their
house and their house was burning. Immediately
he and his mother rushed to their house and by that time there was a huge
gathering at the house and the police was also present. He and his family
members were arrested by the police and after one month they were released on
bail. What DW1 has further stated is relevant for the purpose of his defence and
is quoted hereinbelow:
“While cleaning our house we found a chit on our
dressing table. The said chit was written by my wife and it is in her handwriting
and it also contains her signature. Ex. D 19 is the said chit. I identified the
handwriting of my wife in Ex. D19 because my wife used to write chits for
purchasing of monthly provisions as such on tallying the said chit and Ex. D19
I came to know that it was written by my wife only. Immediately I took the Ex. D19
to the P.S. Mangalhat and asked them to receive but they refused to take the same.”
Again the Apex Court has considered in detail this matter in the case of Geeta Mehrotra (Supra) and came up with conclusion that Courts
must consider that there should be specific allegation against the family
members of the husband supported by the evidence. Relevant paragraph Nos. 25
and 28 of the judgement are quoted below:-
“25. However, we deem it appropriate
to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that
even if there are allegation of overt act indicating the complicity of the
members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be
unjustified but what we wish to emphasize by highlighting is that, if the FIR
as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against accused more so against
the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it
would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the
named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR
discloses specific allegations which would persuade the court to take
cognisance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who
are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of
the complainant-wife. It is the well settled principle laid down in cases too
numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an
offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing
the abuse of the process of law. Simultaneously,
the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing
specially in cases of matrimonial dispute whether the FIR in fact discloses
commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR
prima facie discloses a case of over-implication by involving the entire family
of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her
scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering
while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.
28. We,
therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings
initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR
does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any
offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation
that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of the
complainant-respondent No.2 without mentioning even a single incident against
them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when
they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant’s husband, we
are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings in so far as these
appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court
shall stand overruled. The
appeal accordingly is allowed.”
Apex Court in the case of Pritam Ashok Sadaphule (Supra) has also considered this issue and taken
the same view that there should be specific allegation against the applicants.
Relevant paragrap nos. 16 and 17 of the judgment are quoted below:-
16. What
needs to be taken into consideration is, the totality of the allegations
levelled by Respondent 2 against Appellants 2 to 5. Having perused the contents
of the first information report dated 6.3.2010, as also, the charge-sheet dated
27.7.2010, we felt that the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel
for the appellants, in that the allegations levelled against Appellants 2 to 5
were vague and omnibus, could not be seriously contested. It is therefore, that
we require the learned counsel representing Respondent 2, to point out from the
complaint dated 4.2.2010, the allegations levelled against Appellants 2 to 5.
On our asking, the learned counsel representing Rspondent 2 Hima Pritam Sadaphule,
invited our attention, to the contents of two paragraphs, from the complaint
dated 4.2.2010, which are being extracted hereunder:
“Subsequently on 8.6.2007,
myself and my husband Pritam Sahaphule came to Delhi and after some time we
went to Mumbai. I stayed more than a week. During this period, Pritam, his
father, mother, brother, sister i.e. the entire family tortured, humiliated and
harassed me to a great extent. I was beaten up by them for no reasons. They
asked me for money which I had to give. Subsequently, myself and Pritam came back
to Delhi and thereafter left for UK on 27.06.2007. In our stay at Delhi also,
Pritam's offensive behaviour towards me and my parents continued. Thereafter,
Pritam Sadaphule came back on 8.7.2008 to Delhi; we stayed together in my parents'
home for some time, then again same ill-treatment, harassment, emotional and
mental torture, humiliation was continue by Pritam Sadaphule.
Thereafter, he
took me to Goa for a week. There also he had beaten me with stick, abused me,
insulted me and threatened me several times. Subsequently we came back to Delhi
and same ill-treatment, harassment, emotional and mental torture, humiliation
to contact his family, Ashok Sadaphule, Satwashile Sadaphule, Pravin Sadaphule,
Preeti Sadaphule also abused me, humiliated me, harassed me, tortured me
emotionally and mentally and threatened me with dire consequneces. Thereafter,
myself and Pritam left for UK on 4.9.2008.”
17.
We have carefully perused the allegations pointed out by the learned counsel,
from the complaint of Respondent 2 Hima Pritam Sadaphule, dated 4.2.2010. There
can be no doubt whatsoever, that the allegations levelled against Appellants 2
to 5 do not justify any inference, which would lead to the conclusion, that they
could be held responsible, for an offence in the nature of Section 498-A of the
Penal Code. In the above view of the matter, we are satisffied in accepting the
prayer made in the instant appeal, with reference to Appellants 2 to 5, and to
order quashing of the first information report dated 6.3.2010, and the proceedings
that may have arisen therefrom, including the charge-sheet dated 27.7.2010.”
Now
in light of facts of this case and law laid down by the Apex Court, it is very
much clear that allegation of demand of Rs. 80,000/- does not come within the purview
of dowry as defined by the Apex Court and similarly allgations levelled against
the applicants are also not specific for issuance of summoning order or to put
them to face trial as held by Apex Court.
Considering
the facts and law laid down by the Apex Court, I am of the view that for
establishment of case of demand of dowry, that must co-relate with the marriage
or pre-marriage stage and not every demand made by the applicants after
marriage will come within the purview of dowry. It may be to meet some other financial
scarcity or to meet some emergent family expenses. Therefore,
allegation levelled in the complaint for demand of dowry is not sustainable in
the eye of law. Secondly, so far as allegation against the applicants are
concenred, that is also absolutely in the teeth of law laid down by the Apex
Court and it is very much clear that there is no specific allegation against
any of the applicants and allegations are also levelled upon the applicants, who
are even not residing along with applicant No. 1. In fact, it is necessarily
required to make specific allegation against each and evey applicants whose
names are mentioned in the complaint or FIR in the matrimonial cases which is
absolutely missing in this case.
Therefore,
in the light of facts and law laid down by the Apex Court, the allegation of
dowry as well as harrasment is not sustainable.
Accordingly,
the proceeding of Case No. 3609/9 of 2004 (Rajeshwari Saxena vs. Shivendra
Raizada and others), under sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3/4 D.P. Act,
P.S. Katghar, District Moradabad is hereby quashed and the application is allowed.

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