Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Only Requirement for Determining the Compensation is that it must be 'Just' [CASE LAW]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - Ss. 168 & 173 - the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

Hon'ble Salil Kumar Rai, J.

DELIVERED ON 20.12.2018

FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 180 of 2005

Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bhairo Prasad & Others

Counsel for Appellant :- Amaresh Sinha Counsel for Respondent :- Ram Singh

Heard the counsel for the parties.

The present appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Act, 1988') against the judgment and award dated 26.10.2004 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/District Judge, Kaushambi in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 19A of 2002 whereby the Tribunal has awarded a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- to the claimant. A crossobjection has also been filed by the claimant seeking enhancement of compensation and this Court vide its order dated 3.2.2017 condoned the delay in filing the cross-objection.

Therefore, the cross-examination has also been heard on merits along with the appeal.

Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 19A of 2002 was filed by the claimant-respondent no. 1 claiming a compensation of Rs.2,09,500/- for the death of his son Sri Virendra Kumar Sonkar on 14.11.2001 in an accident caused due to rash and negligent driving of Vehicle No. U.P. 72-B/8551 (hereinafter referred to as, 'Vehicle') which was owned by respondent no. 3 and was insured with the appellant. Claimant is the father of the deceased. In column 7 of the claim petition, the parents of the deceased, i.e., the claimant-respondent no. 1 and the mother of the deceased were shown as dependants of the deceased. In column 6 of the claim petition, the claimant had stated the annual income of the deceased to be Rs.15,000/- per annum on the basis of para 6 of the II Schedule of the Act, 1988. It was alleged in the claim petition that on the date of his death, the deceased was 18-19 years old. The appellant as well as the owner of the vehicle filed their written statements denying their liability to pay any compensation. In the claim petition, the Tribunal framed Issues regarding factum of accident, negligence of the driver of the vehicle in causing the accident, the inter se liability of the defendants, i.e., the owner of the vehicle and the appellant-Insurance Company to pay compensation and the amount of compensation payable to the claimant. In its impugned award, the Tribunal decided the issues relating to factum of accident and the negligence of the driver of the vehicle in favour of the claimant and held that Sri Virendra Kumar Sonkar died on 14.11.2001 in an accident caused due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle. The Tribunal held the Insurance Company, i.e., the appellant liable to pay compensation to the claimants, because on the date of accident, the vehicle was insured with the appellant and the driver of the vehicle had a valid driving license. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of 15 on the basis of the age of the parents of the deceased and held the notional income of the deceased to be Rs.20,000/- per annum and consequently awarded a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- to the claimants after deducting 1/3 as personal expenses of the deceased. The Tribunal did not award any compensation to the claimant for funeral expenses, loss of love and affection, loss of estate or loss of consortium. In the present appeal, the Insurance Company has challenged the award only on the ground that the compensation awarded to the claimants is excessive and arbitrary and the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal, i.e., 8% per annum calculated from the date of filing the claim petition is also arbitrary. It was argued by the counsel for the appellant that, in column 6 of the claim petition, the claimant had stated the income of the deceased to be Rs.15,000/- per annum and, therefore, the Tribunal had acted arbitrarily in determining the compensation on the basis of a notional income of Rs.20,000/- per annum. It was also argued by the counsel for the appellant that the deceased was a bachelor and, therefore, while determining the multiplicand 50% should have been deducted as personal expenses from the notional income of the deceased and the Tribunal had erred in deducting only 1/3 as personal expenses of the deceased. It was argued that in view of the aforesaid, the award of the Tribunal is liable to be modified by reducing the compensation payable to the claimant.

Rebutting the argument of the counsel for the appellant, the counsel for the claimant has argued that the income of the deceased was stated to be Rs.15,000/- per annum in column 6 of the claim petition on the basis of the notional income provided in paragraph 6 of the IInd Schedule. It was argued by the counsel for the claimant that under Section 168 of the Act, 1988, the Tribunal is required to hold an inquiry into the claim and award just compensation and the compensation payable to the claimants would not be reduced because a lesser amount was claimed as compensation in the claim petition. In support of his cross-objection, the counsel for the claimant has argued that from the evidence on record it was proved that, at the time of his death, the deceased was earning Rs.5,000/- per month and, therefore, the Tribunal had acted arbitrarily in determining compensation on the basis of a notional income of Rs.20,000/- per annum. It was also argued by the counsel for the claimant that the multiplier had to be decided considering the age of the deceased and not the age of the parents of the deceased. It was further argued that the Tribunal had also erred in not awarding any amount to the claimant for funeral expenses and loss of estate as well as for loss of love and affection. It was further argued by the counsel for the claimant that the claimant was entitled to an interest of 12% per annum on the compensation amount and the award of the Tribunal awarding merely 8% per annum as interest is liable to be modified. In support of his contention, the counsel for the claimant has relied on Mishri Lal Yadav and Another Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others (2018) 2 T.A.C. 434(All.), Gajraj Singh and Another Vs. Pawan Kumar and Another (2018) 3 T.A.C. 822 (All.), Raj Rani and Others Vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (2009) 4 T.A.C.385(S.C.), Munna Lal Jain and Another Vs. Vipin Kumar Sharma and Others (2015) 3 T.A.C. 1(S.C.), Sanobanu Nazirbhai Mirza and Others Vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service (2013) 4 T.A.C. 369 (S.C.), Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another (2009) 2 T.A.C. 677 (S.C.), National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay Sethi and Others (2017) 4 T.A.C. 673 (S.C.) and Vinay Kumar Agarwal and another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others (2010) 3 AWC 2908 (LB).

I have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties and also perused the lower court records. It is not disputed that, at the time of his death, the deceased was 18-19 years old and a bachelor. The deceased had passed his Intermediate examinations in second division and was an undergraduate student. The claimant, i.e., the father of the deceased, deposed before the tribunal as PW-1 and it is evident from his testimony that the claimant is a fruit vendor. In his testimony, the claimant had stated that the deceased was earning Rs.3,000/- per month by giving tuitions. In his testimony as PW-1, the claimant has not stated the particulars, i.e., the age group and class, of the students who were taught by the deceased and of the subjects taught by the deceased. No person who allegedly took tuitions from the deceased was produced as a witness to corroborate the testimony of the claimant. The sole testimony of the claimant, as PW-1, can not be relied upon to hold that the deceased was earning Rs.3000/- by working as a private tutor. There is no other evidence on record to show that, at the time of his death, the deceased was employed and earning. The tribunal has rightly held that there was no reliable evidence regarding the employment and earnings of the deceased and therefore compensation had to be determined on the basis of some notional income of the deceased. The counsel for the claimant has not referred to any evidence which could prove that the deceased was earning Rs. 5000/- p.m. Thus it is held that, at the time of accident, the deceased was unemployed and not earning and the argument of the counsel of the claimant that compensation should be determined taking the income of the deceased as Rs. 5000/- p.m. is rejected. The notional income of the deceased and the consequential compensation payable to the claimant is decided later on in the judgement. Before considering the rival submissions of the counsel for the parties relating to the quantum of compensation, it would be relevant to note that the claim petition was filed only by the father of the deceased. However, in column 7 of the claim petition, the mother of the deceased is also shown as a dependant of the deceased. Under Section 166 (4) of the Act, 1988, a Claim Tribunal is required to treat a report of any accident forwarded to it under Section 158 (6) of the Act, 1988 as an application for compensation under the Act. Section 158 (6) of the Act, 1988 provides that as soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or reported under the said section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within 30 days from the date of recording of information or on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within 30 days of the receipt of such report, forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and the Insurer.

Section 166 (1) (c) & (d) of the Act, 1988 provide that where death has resulted from an accident, an application for compensation can be filed by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or by any agent duly authorized by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased.

Proviso to Section 166 (1) of the Act, 1988 provides that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. Evidently under the Act, 1988, a legal representative of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under the Act, 1988 even if he had not filed a claim petition and the Tribunal would consider the report under Section 158 (6) of the Act, 1988 as an application for compensation under the Act. It is also evident that if a claim petition is filed by one of the legal representatives of the deceased, the claim petition shall be treated to have been filed on behalf of and for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. In Nagappa vs Gurudayal Singh & Ors. 2003 (2) SCC 274, the Supreme Court in paragraph no. 10 of the judgment held that the only limitation or restriction on the power of a Tribunal to award compensation is that the compensation awarded should be a just compensation and there was no other limitation or restriction on the power of the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, I have proceeded to decide the appeal and the cross-objection treating the claim petition to have been filed by the father of the deceased on his own behalf and for his own benefit as well as on behalf of and for the benefit of the mother of the deceased.

Section 168 (1) of the Act, 1988 provides that a Claim Tribunal, on receipt of an application for compensation, shall hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just. The dispute in the present appeal, as in most cases of compensation filed under the Act, 1988, relates to what would be a just compensation on the facts of the case. The rival submissions of the counsel for the parties pertains to the notional income of the deceased while determining the multiplicand, i.e., whether the notional income of the deceased would be limited because of the pleadings in the claim petition made on the basis of notional income prescribed in the IInd Schedule and the multiplier to be applied to the said multiplicand as well as the different heads under which the claimants were entitled to compensation for the death of their son and the amount of compensation to which they were entitled under the different heads. Before deciding the aforesaid issues, it would be appropriate to refer to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this High Court regarding the issues involved in the present appeal.

In Nagappa (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that under the Act, 1988, the Tribunal is required to determine just compensation from the evidence brought on record despite the fact that the claimant had not precisely stated the amount of damages or compensation which he was entitled to and under the Act, 1988, there was no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. The observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph Nos. 7, 10 and 13 are relevant for the purposes and are reproduced below: 

“7. Firstly, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, (hereinafter referred to as "the MV Act”) there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal/court considers that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is - it should be 'Just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the M.V. Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the proviso to sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation. The other important part of the said Section is sub-section (4) which provides that "the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act." Hence, the Claims Tribunal in an appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed.

10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to "make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just". Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.

13. Hence, as stated earlier, it is for the Tribunal to determine just compensation from the evidence which is brought on record despite the fact that the claimant has not precisely stated the amount of damages of compensation which he is entitled to. If the evidence on record justifies passing of such award, the claim cannot be rejected solely on the ground that the claimant has restricted his claim…..” (emphasis added) 

In Raj Rani & Ors. vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. 2009 (13) SCC 654, the Supreme Court while reiterating the law laid down in Nagappa (supra) held that rules of pleadings or evidence are not to be necessarily followed in proceedings under the Act, 1988. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Raj Rani (supra) that under the Act, 1988, it was the duty of the Court to award just compensation and the Courts shall endeavor to award just compensation irrespective of the fact as to whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant or not. The observations of the Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 13 of its judgment in Raj Rani (supra) are relevant and reproduced below: 

“13. Mr Nanda may be correct to some extent that for the purpose of computation of the total amount of compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the future prospect may not be of much relevance. But in a case where claim petition has been filed in terms of Section 166 of the Act, the same would, in our opinion, be a relevant factor. Mr Nanda may also be correct that this aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court.

However, keeping in view the fact that such a contention had all along been raised by the claimants even before the Tribunal and evidences have not been adduced in respect thereof on their behalf, it is difficult to ignore the said contention of the appellants. It is not necessary in a proceeding under the Motor Vehicles Act to go by any rules of pleadings or evidence. Section 168 of the Act speaks about grant of just compensation. The court's duty being to award just compensation, it will try to arrive at the said finding irrespective of the fact as to whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant or not.” (emphasis added) 

The principle of law that emerges from the judgments of the Supreme Court in Nagappa (supra) and Raj Rani (supra) is that determination of just compensation under Section 168 of Act, 1988 is governed by the evidence in the case and not by the pleadings of the claimant.

Lack of uniformity and inconsistency in the awards passed by the Tribunals under the Act, 1988 has frequently engaged the attention of the Courts. Inconsistency and lack of uniformity not only leads to unpredictability in adjudication but may also lead to arbitrariness in determining compensation. It was to remove the unpredictability and arbitrariness in determining compensation that the Supreme Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation vs Susamma Thomas (Mrs) & Ors. 1994 (2) SCC 176 held that the multiplier method should be applied while determining the compensation payable under the Act, 1988 as the multiplier method introduces uniformity, consistency and predictability regarding assessment of compensation. But even after the judgment of the Supreme Court in Susamma Thomas (supra), there was variance in the awards of tribunals because of uncertainty in selection of multiplier and the factors relevant to decide the multiplicand as well as compensation to be awarded under the conventional heads. It was uncertain as to whether the multiplier was to be selected on the basis of the age of the deceased or the on the basis of the age of the dependants and whether the multiplier prescribed in the Second Schedule of the Act, 1988 was also to be followed while determining compensation under Section 166 of the Act, 1988. Similarly, there was uncertainty regarding the addition of future prospects in the income of the deceased and deduction for personal expenses of the deceased while determining the multiplicand and consequently the compensation payable in a particular case.

The multiplier to be applied in a case falling under Section 166 of Act, 1988 was authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 42 of its judgement in Sarla Verma (Smt) & Ors. vs Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr. 2009 (6) SCC 121 wherein the Supreme Court held that for the age groups of 15-20 and 21-25 years the operative multiplier would be 18 reduced by one unit for every five years decided on the basis of the age of the deceased. In Sarla Verma (supra), the Supreme Court also held that while determining the multiplicand, future prospects should be added to the salary of the deceased where the deceased was a salaried employee with provision for annual increment, etc. but where the deceased was self employed or on a fixed salary without provision for increments etc., the courts should usually take only the actual income of the deceased at the time of his death while determining the multiplicand. In the aforesaid case the Supreme Court also laid down the norms to be followed for deducting the personal expenses of the deceased from his established income and the deductions depended on the marital status of the deceased and the number of family members dependant on him. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, 50% was to be deducted as personal and living expenses of the deceased. I am not referring to deductions against personal expenses where the deceased was married because the same is not relevant for deciding the present case. In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs Pranay Sethi & Ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680, the Supreme Court approved the multiplier laid down in Sarla Verma (supra) and held that the multiplier was to be decided on the basis of the age of the deceased and not on the basis of the age of the dependents. The Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra) also approved the norms laid down in Sarla Verma (supra) regarding deductions against personal expenses. In Pranay Sethi (supra), the Supreme Court further held that if the deceased was selfemployed and below the age of 40 years, while determining the multiplicand 40% should be added as future prospects to the established income of the deceased. In Pranay Sethi (supra) the Supreme Court also provided that Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- should be awarded under the conventional heads, i.e. for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses respectively. Lately in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1546, the Supreme Court held that where parents had lost their minor child or unmarried son or daughter, the parents were entitled to be compensated for loss of Filial Consortium. In Magma General (supra), the Supreme Court awarded Rs. 40,000/- [the amount specified in Pranay Sethi (supra) for loss of consortium] to each of the parent of the deceased separately. In M. Mansoor & Anr. vs United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. 2013 (15) SCC 603, the Supreme Court awarded Rs. 50,000 as compensation to each of the parent of the deceased for loss of love and affection due to the death of their son. In Magma General (supra), the High court had awarded a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- to the parents of the deceased, i.e., Rs.50,000/- to each of the parent, and the amount awarded by the High court was maintained by the Supreme Court.

So far as deciding the multiplicand in a particular case is concerned, there is no problem where the deceased was a salaried employee or where his income was proved by the income tax returns or by the salary certificate issued by the employer. However, the tribunals are frequently called upon to determine compensation in cases where the deceased was unemployed and had no income prior to the accident. In such cases, the multiplicand can be determined only on the basis of some notional income of the deceased. Any exercise to determine the notional income of a person who was unemployed and had no income prior to the accident is beset with difficulties because of numerous unforseen factors involved in such assessment. The Second Schedule to Act, 1988, cannot be applied while determining compensation under Section 166 of the Act, 1988 and it would be futile to even attempt to lay down any universal rule to decide the notional income of the deceased applicable in different cases. The notional income of the deceased will depend on his family background and educational qualifications as well as on other factors which cannot be identified beforehand. The notional income would obviously be higher in cases where the deceased had a professional degree or was enrolled in a professional course, e.g., medicine and engineering. There will be some guess work in determining the notional income which must be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards. The controversy in the present case is regarding the accepted legal standards in a case where the deceased was 18-19 years old, unemployed and an undergraduate not enrolled in a course for any professional degree. The counsel for the appellant has referred to a Division Bench judgement of this court in Mishri Lal Yadav (supra) to support his argument that, in the present case, the notional income of the deceased should have been assessed on the basis of minimum wages payable to an unskilled labour. In the aforesaid case, it was not disputed that the deceased, at the time of accident, was employed in a sweet meat shop and was studying for his graduate degree. In the present case, the deceased was unemployed. However, if a person of an employable age is employed the employer would have to pay him at least the minimum wages prescribed under the relevant statute and notifications. Thus, on the basis of Mishri Lal Yadav (supra) it is held that where the deceased, at the time of accident, was of a legally employable age and not studying for any professional degree and possessed no technical degree, then even though he was unemployed at the time of accident, the notional income of the deceased cannot be less than the minimum wages payable to an unskilled labour.

So far as the arguments of the counsel for the parties regarding rate of interest payable on the award is concerned, it is sufficient to note that the tribunal has awarded a reasonable rate of interest.

In view of the law stated above, the facts relevant to decide the present appeal are that, at the time of accident, the deceased was major (18-19 years old), was of an employable age but unemployed and an undergraduate not possessing a professional or technical degree. The deceased was a bachelor and his parents have been shown as dependants in the claim petition.

In light of the facts and law stated above it is held as follows:- 

(1) The contention of the counsel for the appellant that the multiplicand in the present case had to be determined on the pleadings of the claimant, i.e., on the basis that the notional income of the deceased was Rs.15,000/- per annum as provided in the IInd Schedule to the Act, 1988 and the multiplicand can not be determined on a higher notional income is against the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nagappa (supra) and Raj Rani (supra) and is thus rejected.

(2) The notional income of the deceased has to be determined on the basis of the minimum wages payable to an unskilled labour in 2001, i.e., the year when the accident occurred. It is not disputed that in 2001, the minimum wages payable to an unskilled labour in the State of Uttar Pradesh was Rs.100/- per day. Thus the notional income of the deceased would be Rs.3,000/- per month, i.e., Rs. 36,000/- per annum.

(3) 40% has to be added as future prospects while determining the multiplicand as, at the time of accident, the deceased was below the age of 40 years.

(4) The deceased was a bachelor and survived by both the parents, therefore, while determining the multiplicand, 50% is to be deducted from the notional income of the deceased as his personal expenses.

(5) The deceased was 18-19 years old and, therefore, a multiplier of 18 has to be applied while determining the compensation payable to the legal representatives of the deceased.

(6) The parents of the deceased are also entitled to be compensated for loss of Filial Consortium, loss of love and affection, loss of estate and funeral expenses in accordance with the judgement of the Supreme Court in Mansoor Ahmad (supra), Pranay Sethi (Supra) and Magma General (supra).

In light of the aforesaid, the compensation amount payable to the legal representatives, i.e., the parents of the deceased is computed as follows:- 

(i) Income of the deceased - i.e. Rs.36,000/- per annum.

(ii) Future Prospects - Rs. 14,400/-

(iii) Total income of the deceased (adding i and ii) = Rs.50,400/- .

(iv) 50% deduction towards personal expenditure = 25,200/-.

(v) Thus the multiplicand (iii-iv) = Rs.25,200/-.

(vi) Multiplier = 18 (vii) Loss of future income/dependency - Rs.25,200 x 18 = Rs. 4,53,600/-.

(viii) Loss of love and affection = Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs.50,000/- to each of the parents of the deceased) 

(ix) Loss of Filial Consortium = Rs.80,000/- (Rs.40,000/- to each of the parents of the deceased).

(x) Loss of estate = Rs.15,000/-.

(xi) Funeral expenses = Rs.15000/-.

Total compensation awarded = Rs.6,63,600/-.

The amount computed by this Court shall carry the same interest as awarded by the Tribunal vide its impugned award dated 26.10.2004.

In view of the aforesaid, it is held that the claimant is entitled to a compensation of Rs.6,63,600/- along with 8% simple interest calculated from the date of filing the claim petition. The award dated 26.10.2004 passed by the Tribunal is modified as stated above.

The Tribunal had awarded a compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- to the claimant/legal representatives of the deceased and by virtue of the interim order dated 20.1.2005 passed by this court, the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant in the Tribunal. The balance amount/excess amount as awarded by this Court in the present appeal shall be deposited by the appellant in the Tribunal within three months.

The amount so deposited by the appellant under the order of this Court as well as under the order dated 20.1.2005 passed by this Court in the present appeal shall be deposited by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kaushambi in the highest interest bearing fixed deposit schemes either of the post office or of any nationalized bank. The receipts of the fixed deposit shall be handed over to the claimant/legal representatives of the deceased who shall be entitled to withdraw the maturity amount when the fixed deposits mature. The maturity amount shall be credited by the bank/post office in any savings account held by the claimant/legal representatives of the deceased singly. The concerned bank or post office shall not permit any loan or advance against the fixed deposits made in favour of the claimant/legal representatives of the deceased. The Tribunal, while depositing the amount in any fixed deposit scheme, shall communicate the directions issued by this Court to the concerned bank/post office.

With the aforesaid directions and observations, the appeal is dismissed and the cross-objection is allowed. Parties shall bear their own cost.

Office is directed to remit the lower court records to the tribunal within three weeks.