1. Management of the Barara Co-Operative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Limited v. Workman Pratap Singh, AIR 2019 SC 228
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - S. 25-H - In order to attract the provisions of Section 25(H) of the ID Act, it must be proved by the workman that firstly, he was the "retrenched employee" and secondly, his ex-employer has decided to fill up the vacancies in their set up and, therefore, he is entitled to claim preference over those persons, who have applied against such vacancies for a job while seeking re-employment in the services.
Citations : 2019 ICO 1 : 2019 (1) SCALE 60 : JT 2019 (1) SC 7
Case Number : C.A. No. 7 of 2019 02-01-2019
Advocates : Vipin Kumar Jai
Advocates : Vipin Kumar Jai
2. State of Jharkhand v. Surendra Kumar Srivastava, AIR 2019 SC 231
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - O. 39, R. 1 - Electricity Act, 2003 - S. 67(3) - In the event that Respondents No. 1 to 3 are able to establish their title and possession to any part of the property utilised for the Electricity Sub-station, they would be entitled to compensation for any damage, detriment or inconvenience caused, in accordance with Section 67(3) of the Electricity Act, 2003, and/or any other law for the time being in force. The Electricity Sub-station is complete in all respects and ready to be energised, as per the documentary evidence placed before the Court. The overriding public interest of providing electricity to the local populace would far outweigh the alleged interest of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3.
Citations : 2019 ICO 2 : 2019 (1 ) SCALE 140 : JT 2019 (1) SC 334
Case Number : C.A. No. 21 of 2019 03-01-2019
Advocates : Devashish Bharuka
Advocates : Devashish Bharuka
3. Ku Bhawana v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 238
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1978 (Maharashtra ) - S. 16(1)(2) - Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (Maharashtra) - Rr. 12 (3), 2(j)(k), 9 - the Appellant was entered into service as an untrained teacher falling in category 'F' and the 5th Respondent was a trained teacher falling in category 'C' at the time of entry into service and the Appellant became a trained teacher on qualifying B.Ed examination after entry of the 5th Respondent into service on 19th September, 1997. The 5th Respondent was a member of category 'C' at the very inception of appointment and the Appellant became a member of category 'C' later on acquiring the B.Ed. qualification which indisputedly she acquired after entry of the 5th Respondent into service. As such, she could not have claimed seniority over the 5th Respondent in category 'C' of Schedule F annexed to Rule 12 of Rules, 1981, this what has been held by the High Court under the impugned judgment. Therefore, find no substance in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
Citations : 2019 ICO 3 : 2019 (1) SCALE 148 : JT 2019 (1) SC 92
Case Number : C.A. No. 11934 of 2018 04-01-2019
Advocates : Pawanshree Agrawal
Advocates : Pawanshree Agrawal
4. Badri Vishal Pandey v. Rajesh Mittal, AIR 2019 SC 289
Contempt of Court Act, 1971 - S. 2(b) - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Uttar Pradesh) - Ss. 6Q, 6N - Order of the Court cannot be interpreted on the basis of the impressions which may be drawn by the Petitioners. there is no direction in the order passed by this Court to reinstate the Petitioners or to place them in minimum or regular pay scale. The contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of impressions, when the order of the Court does not contain any direction for reinstatement or for grant of regular pay scale. The contempt would be made out when there is wilful disobedience to the orders of this Court. Since the Order of this Court is not of reinstatement, the Petitioners under the garb of the contempt petition cannot seek reinstatement, when nothing was granted by this Court.
Citations : 2019 ICO 5 : 2019 (1) SCALE 155
Case Number : Con.P.(C) No. 817 of 2018, Con.P.(C) No. 309 of 2016, S.L.P.(C) No. 4470 of 2014, Con.P.(C) No. 1290 of 2018, Con.P.(C) No. 860 of 2016, S.L.P. (C) No. 3540 of 2015, Con.P.(C) No. 1291 of 2018, Con.P.(C) No. 861 of 2016, S.L.P. (C) No. 3542 of 2015 04-01-2019
Advocates : Prashant Bhushan
Advocates : Prashant Bhushan
5. State of Uttarakhand v. Raj Kumar, AIR 2019 SC 310
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Sections 11 A & 25 F - Respondent claimed to have worked as daily wager hardly for a period of one year or so in PWD of the State; Secondly, he had no right to claim regularization; Thirdly, he had no right to continue as daily wager and lastly, the dispute was raised by the Respondent (workman) almost after 25 years of the alleged termination before the Labour Court. It would be just, proper and reasonable to award lump sum monetary compensation to the Respondent in full and final satisfaction of his claim of re-instatement and other consequential benefits by taking recourse to the powers Under Section 11-A of the Act.
Citations : 2019 ICO 6 : 2019 (1) SCALE 206 : JT 2019 (1) SC 196
Case Number : C.A. No. 124 & 125 of 2019 07-01-2019
Advocates : Vishwa Pal Singh
Advocates : Vishwa Pal Singh
6. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kalyan Singh, AIR 2019 SC 312
Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 - Section 482 - Penal Code, 1860 - Ss. 307, 294 & 34 - the High Court has committed a grave error in quashing the criminal proceedings for the offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code solely on the ground that the original Complainant and the Accused have settled the dispute. Despite any settlement between the Complainant on the one hand and the Accused on the other, the criminal proceedings for the offences Under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be quashed, as the offence Under Section 307 is a non-compoundable offence. Under the circumstance, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings against the original Accused for the offences Under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Referred to : Gulab Das v. State of M.P., 2011 (12) SCALE 625 : 2011 ICO 1546
Citations : 2019 ICO 7 : 2019 (1) SCALE 165 : JT 2019 (1) SC 150
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 14 of 2019 04-01-2019
Advocates : C.D. Singh, Malini Poduval
Advocates : C.D. Singh, Malini Poduval
7. Champa Lal Dhakar v. Naval Singh Rajput, AIR 2019 SC 314
Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 - S. 240 - Penal Code, 1860 - S. 307 - Attempt to murder - the complainant sustained injuries on the nose and fracture of the nasal bone was found. That the case may fall within the grievous hurt, but it cannot be said that even, prima facie, a case is made out for the offence Under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. Considering the material/evidence on record and the medical certificate and the injuries sustained by the complainant, it cannot be said that the intention of the Accused was to cause death of the complainant. Therefore, as rightly observed by the High Court, a charge Under Section 325/149 ought to have been framed. Therefore, the High Court has not committed any error in setting aside the order passed by the trial Court insofar as framing the charge Under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
Citations : 2019 ICO 8 : 2019 (1) SCALE 163 : JT 2019 (1) SC 43
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1931 of 2009 04-01-2019
Advocates : Anil Shrivastav, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj
Advocates : Anil Shrivastav, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj
8. Monu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2019 SC 316
Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 - S. 482 - the Single Judge ought to have first set out the brief facts of the case with a view to understand the factual matrix and then should have examined the challenge made to the proceedings in the light of the principles of law laid down by this Court on the question involved with a view to record the findings on the grounds urged by the Appellant as to whether any case for interference therein is made out or not. We find that the aforementioned exercise was not done by the High Court while passing an unreasoned impugned order, which does not disclose any application of mind to the case. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur with such casual disposal of the application by the High Court and feel inclined to set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High Court (Single Judge) with a request to decide the application afresh on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the aforementioned observations. Having formed an opinion to remand the case in the light of our reasoning mentioned above, we do not consider it proper to go into the merits of the case. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for its decision on merits uninfluenced by any of our observations in this order.
Citations : 2019 ICO 9 : 2019 (1) SCALE 209 : JT 2019 (1) SC 187
Bench : Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Justice R Subhash Reddy
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 21 of 2019 07-01-2019
Advocates : Vivek Gupta
Advocates : Vivek Gupta
9. Ravi Agrawal v. Union of India, AIR 2019 SC 318
Constitution of India - Art. 14 - Income-tax Act, 1961 - S. 80 DD - Section 80DD of the Act is a provision made by the Parliament under the Act in order to give incentive to the persons whose dependants are persons with disability. Incentive is to give such persons concessions in income tax by allowing deductions of the amount specified in Section 80DD of the Act in case such parents/guardians of dependants with disability take insurance policies of the nature specified in this provision. Purpose is to encourage these parents/guardians to make regular payments for the benefit of dependants with disability. In that sense, the Legislature, in its wisdom thought it appropriate to allow deductions in respect of such contribution made by the parent/guardian in the form of premium paid in respect of such insurance policies. Of course, this deduction is admissible only when conditions stipulated therein are satisfied.
Insofar as insurance policy is concerned, it incorporates a condition (which is impugned in the present writ petition) to the effect that the amount shall not be given to he handicapped persons during the lifetime of the parent/guardian/life assured. This is in conformity with Section 80DD(2)(b) of the Act.
To some extent, the grievance of the Petitioner may be justified in this behalf in the plea that when there is a need to get these funds even for the benefit of handicapped persons, that will not be given to such a person only because of the reason that the assured who is a parent/guardian is still alive. This would happen even when the entire premium towards the said policy has been paid. The policy does not have maturity claim. Thus, after making the entire premium for number of years, i.e. during the duration of the policy, the amount would still remain with the LIC. That may be so. However, the purpose behind such a policy is altogether different. As noted from the provisions of Section 80DD as well as from the explanatory memorandum of the Finance Bill, 1998, by which this provision was added, the purpose is to secure the future of the persons suffering from disability, namely, after the death of the parent/guardian. The presumption is that during his/her lifetime, the parent/guardian would take care of his/her handicapped child.
Further, such a benefit of deduction from income for the purposes of tax is admissible subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 80DD of the Act. The Legislature has provided the condition that amount/annuity under the policy is to be released only after the death of the person assured. This is the legislative mandate. There is no challenge to this provision. The prayer is that Section 80DD of the Act be suitably amended. This Court cannot give a direction to the Parliament to amend or make a statutory provision in a specified manner. The Court can only determine, in exercise of its power of judicial review, as to whether such a provision passes the muster of the Constitutional Scheme. Though, there is no specific prayer in this behalf, but in the body of writ petition, argument of discrimination is raised. Here, we find that the Respondents have been able to successfully demonstrate that the main provision is based on reasonable classification, which as a valid rational behind it and there is a specific objective sought to be achieved thereby.
Constitution of India - Art. 32 - Income-tax Act, 1961 - S. 80 DD - The Petitioner may be justified in pointing out that there could be harsh cases where handicapped persons may need the payment on annuity or lumpsum basis even during the lifetime of their parents/guardians. For example, where guardian has become very old but is still alive, though he is not able to earn any longer or he may be a person who was in service and has retired from the said service and is not having any source of income. In such cases, it may be difficult for such a parent/guardian to take care of the medical needs of his/her disabled child. Even when he/she has paid full premium, the handicapped person is not able to receive any annuity only because the parent/guardian of such handicapped person is still alive. There may be many other such situations. However, it is for the Legislature to take care of these aspects and to provide suitable provision by making necessary amendments in Section 80DD of the Act. In fact, the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also felt that like other police holders, Jeevan Aadhar policy should also be allowed to mature after 55 years of age of the proposer and the annuity amount should be disbursed through the LLCs or National Trust. In the aforesaid circumstances, we dispose of this writ petition by urging upon Respondent No. 1 to have a relook into this provision by taking into consideration all the aspects, including those highlighted by the Court in this judgment, and explore the possibility of making suitable amendments.
Citations : 2019 ICO 10 : 2019 (1) SCALE 111 : JT 2019 (1) SC 11
Case Number : W.P.(C) No. 1107 of 2017 03-01-2019
Insofar as insurance policy is concerned, it incorporates a condition (which is impugned in the present writ petition) to the effect that the amount shall not be given to he handicapped persons during the lifetime of the parent/guardian/life assured. This is in conformity with Section 80DD(2)(b) of the Act.
To some extent, the grievance of the Petitioner may be justified in this behalf in the plea that when there is a need to get these funds even for the benefit of handicapped persons, that will not be given to such a person only because of the reason that the assured who is a parent/guardian is still alive. This would happen even when the entire premium towards the said policy has been paid. The policy does not have maturity claim. Thus, after making the entire premium for number of years, i.e. during the duration of the policy, the amount would still remain with the LIC. That may be so. However, the purpose behind such a policy is altogether different. As noted from the provisions of Section 80DD as well as from the explanatory memorandum of the Finance Bill, 1998, by which this provision was added, the purpose is to secure the future of the persons suffering from disability, namely, after the death of the parent/guardian. The presumption is that during his/her lifetime, the parent/guardian would take care of his/her handicapped child.
Further, such a benefit of deduction from income for the purposes of tax is admissible subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 80DD of the Act. The Legislature has provided the condition that amount/annuity under the policy is to be released only after the death of the person assured. This is the legislative mandate. There is no challenge to this provision. The prayer is that Section 80DD of the Act be suitably amended. This Court cannot give a direction to the Parliament to amend or make a statutory provision in a specified manner. The Court can only determine, in exercise of its power of judicial review, as to whether such a provision passes the muster of the Constitutional Scheme. Though, there is no specific prayer in this behalf, but in the body of writ petition, argument of discrimination is raised. Here, we find that the Respondents have been able to successfully demonstrate that the main provision is based on reasonable classification, which as a valid rational behind it and there is a specific objective sought to be achieved thereby.
Constitution of India - Art. 32 - Income-tax Act, 1961 - S. 80 DD - The Petitioner may be justified in pointing out that there could be harsh cases where handicapped persons may need the payment on annuity or lumpsum basis even during the lifetime of their parents/guardians. For example, where guardian has become very old but is still alive, though he is not able to earn any longer or he may be a person who was in service and has retired from the said service and is not having any source of income. In such cases, it may be difficult for such a parent/guardian to take care of the medical needs of his/her disabled child. Even when he/she has paid full premium, the handicapped person is not able to receive any annuity only because the parent/guardian of such handicapped person is still alive. There may be many other such situations. However, it is for the Legislature to take care of these aspects and to provide suitable provision by making necessary amendments in Section 80DD of the Act. In fact, the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities has also felt that like other police holders, Jeevan Aadhar policy should also be allowed to mature after 55 years of age of the proposer and the annuity amount should be disbursed through the LLCs or National Trust. In the aforesaid circumstances, we dispose of this writ petition by urging upon Respondent No. 1 to have a relook into this provision by taking into consideration all the aspects, including those highlighted by the Court in this judgment, and explore the possibility of making suitable amendments.
Citations : 2019 ICO 10 : 2019 (1) SCALE 111 : JT 2019 (1) SC 11
Case Number : W.P.(C) No. 1107 of 2017 03-01-2019
Bench : Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri, Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice S Abdul Nazeer
10. Additional Commissioner (Legal) Commercial Taxes Rajasthan v. Lohiya Agencies, AIR 2019 SC 345
Tax Law - Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (Rajasthan) - ‘Gypsum’ (calcium sulphate dihydrate – CaSO4.2H2O) - the amended Entry 56 of Schedule IV of the RVAT, read as ‘gypsum in all its forms’, would include ‘gypsum board’ under the term ‘all its forms’.
Citations : 2019 ICO 15 : 2019 (1 ) SCALE 277
Case Number : C.A. No. 180 of 2019, C.A. No. 181 of 2019, C.A. No. 182 of 2019, C.A. No. 183 of 2019, C.A. No. 184 of 2019, C.A. No. 185 of 2019, C.A. No. 186 of 2019 08-01-2019
Bench : Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice K M Joseph
Petitioner's Advocate : Milind Kumar