1. Rakesh Bakshi v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
Service Law - Eligibility of the candidates must be decided with reference to the qualification possessed as on the cut-off date and the qualification acquired later in point of time cannot make a candidate eligible.
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 570
Case Number : C.A. No. 235 - 236 of 2019 22-01-2019
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 570
Case Number : C.A. No. 235 - 236 of 2019 22-01-2019
Respondent's Advocate : M. Shoeb Alam
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.M. Joseph
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.M. Joseph
2. Leela Bai v. Seema Chouhan
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 - Workmen’s Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009 - Doctrine of “notional extension” - Rejection of their claim for compensation - Merely because the deceased was coming down the roof of the bus after having his meal, cannot be considered in isolation and interpreted so myopically to hold that he was off duty and therefore would not be entitled to compensation.
If the requirement of the deceased to stay with the bus was integrally connected with the efficiency of the service to be provided to the public by respondent no.1 and the deceased was not present at the bus terminal with the bus in his nature as a member of the public by choice, we see no reason why the doctrine of notional extension of the employment will not be applicable.
Citations : AIR 2019 SC 586 : JT 2019 (3) SC 133 : 2019 (1) SCALE 566
Case Number : C.A. No. 931 of 2019 22-01-2019
Case Number : C.A. No. 931 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Manjeet Chawla
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha
3. V. Surendra Mohan v. State of Tamil Nadu
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 - Prescription of disability to the extent of 40%-50% for recruitment for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) was valid and does not contravene any of the provisions of the Act, 1995 or any other statutory provision.
Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 419 : 2019 (1) SCALE 621
Case Number : C.A. No. 83 of 2019 22-01-2019
Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 419 : 2019 (1) SCALE 621
Case Number : C.A. No. 83 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Pooja Dhar
Respondent's Advocate : Rajesh Kumar
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.M. Joseph
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan
4. Mohammed Salim (d) Through Lrs. v. Shamsudeen (dead) Through Lrs.
Muslim law - there are three types of marriage—valid, irregular and void - A marriage may be valid (sahih), or irregular (fasid) or void from the beginning (batil).
Irrespective of the word used, the legal effect of a fasid marriage is that in case of consummation, though the wife is entitled to get dower, she is not entitled to inherit the properties of the husband. But the child born in that marriage is legitimate just like in the case of a valid marriage, and is entitled to inherit the property of the father.
Evidently, Muslim law clearly distinguishes between a valid marriage (sahih), void marriage (batil), and invalid/irregular marriage (fasid). Thus, it cannot be stated that a batil (void) marriage and a fasid (invalid/irregular) marriage are one and the same. The effect of a batil (void) marriage is that it is void ab initio and does not create any civil right or obligations between the parties. So also, the offspring of a void marriage are illegitimate (§ 205A of the 6th and 8th editions and §§ 205A of the 10th edition, and 266 of the 18th edition of Mulla). Therefore, the High Court correctly concluded that the marriage of Defendant No. 9 with Mohammed Ilias cannot be held to be a batil marriage but only a fasid marriage.
Muslim Law - A marriage between a Hindu woman and Muslim man is merely irregular and the issue from such wedlock is legitimate.
The marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or fireworshipper is neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage, but is merely an irregular (fasid) marriage. Any child born out of such wedlock (fasid marriage) is entitled to claim a share in his father’s property. It would not be out of place to emphasise at this juncture that since Hindus are idol worshippers, which includes worship of physical images/statues through offering of flowers, adornment, etc., it is clear that the marriage of a Hindu female with a Muslim male is not a regular or valid (sahih) marriage, but merely an irregular (fasid) marriage.
The trial Court and the High Court were justified in concluding that the plaintiff is the legitimate son of Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma, and is entitled to his share in the property as per law. The High Court was also justified in modifying the decree passed by the trial Court and awarding the appropriate share in favour of the plaintiff. No issue has been raised before us relating to the quantum of share. Accordingly, the appeal fails and stands dismissed.
Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 385 : 2019 (1) SCALE 575
Case Number : C.A. No. 5158 of 2013 22-01-2019
Irrespective of the word used, the legal effect of a fasid marriage is that in case of consummation, though the wife is entitled to get dower, she is not entitled to inherit the properties of the husband. But the child born in that marriage is legitimate just like in the case of a valid marriage, and is entitled to inherit the property of the father.
Evidently, Muslim law clearly distinguishes between a valid marriage (sahih), void marriage (batil), and invalid/irregular marriage (fasid). Thus, it cannot be stated that a batil (void) marriage and a fasid (invalid/irregular) marriage are one and the same. The effect of a batil (void) marriage is that it is void ab initio and does not create any civil right or obligations between the parties. So also, the offspring of a void marriage are illegitimate (§ 205A of the 6th and 8th editions and §§ 205A of the 10th edition, and 266 of the 18th edition of Mulla). Therefore, the High Court correctly concluded that the marriage of Defendant No. 9 with Mohammed Ilias cannot be held to be a batil marriage but only a fasid marriage.
Muslim Law - A marriage between a Hindu woman and Muslim man is merely irregular and the issue from such wedlock is legitimate.
The marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or fireworshipper is neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage, but is merely an irregular (fasid) marriage. Any child born out of such wedlock (fasid marriage) is entitled to claim a share in his father’s property. It would not be out of place to emphasise at this juncture that since Hindus are idol worshippers, which includes worship of physical images/statues through offering of flowers, adornment, etc., it is clear that the marriage of a Hindu female with a Muslim male is not a regular or valid (sahih) marriage, but merely an irregular (fasid) marriage.
The trial Court and the High Court were justified in concluding that the plaintiff is the legitimate son of Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma, and is entitled to his share in the property as per law. The High Court was also justified in modifying the decree passed by the trial Court and awarding the appropriate share in favour of the plaintiff. No issue has been raised before us relating to the quantum of share. Accordingly, the appeal fails and stands dismissed.
Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 385 : 2019 (1) SCALE 575
Case Number : C.A. No. 5158 of 2013 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : P.V. Dinesh
Respondent's Advocate : S.C. Patel
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 594
Case Number : Con.P. (Crl. ) No. 2 of 2012 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Mohd. Irshad Hanif
Respondent's Advocate : Dinesh Kumar Garg
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 638
Case Number : C.A. No. 903 - 930 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Yoginder Handoo
Respondent's Advocate : Saurabh Mishra
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri
It is clear from sub-section (2) of Section 3 that the extent of land comprised in private forests held by the owner under his personal cultivation is exempted from vesting, if the ceiling limit under the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not exceeded. Similarly, sub-section (3) of Section 3 does not apply in respect of so much of extent of private forests as is held by an owner under a valid registered document of title executed before the appointed day and intended for cultivation by him, if the ceiling limit under Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not exceeded. The appointed day for the purpose of Section 3 is 10.5.1971, which is clear from Section 2(a) of the KPF Act. [Para 9]
The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Section 3 - To bring the land under the exempted category, the claimant should hold the same as an owner and that it should be under his personal cultivation.
As noticed above, sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the KPF Act provides for the exemption of the private forest from vesting. It states that the land comprised in private forest held by an owner under his personal cultivation is exempted from vesting, if the ceiling limit under the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not exceeded. The land in question measures about 2 acres. It is not the case of the appellants that the land exceeds the ceiling limit under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The expression 'held by the owner under his personal cultivation' contained in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the KPF Act is crucial. To bring the land under the exempted category, the claimant should hold the same as an owner and that it should be under his personal cultivation. [Para 17]
Own - Meaning of - 'To own' is to have good legal title to hold and possess the property. Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition defines the word 'own' as 'to rightfully have or possess as property; to have legal title to'.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 4 - "conclusive proof" - The certificate issued by a competent Land Tribunal after finding that the tenant was in possession of the property as a cultivating tenant is a conclusive proof of possession as well.
In the instant case, the land in question is jenmam land. The Land Tribunal initiated suo motu proceedings under Rule 5 of the Land Reform Rules, after obtaining information that the cultivating tenant had been in possession, obviously on a report of the revenue inspector. It is evident from Section 74 of the Land Reforms Act that any tenancy after 01.04.1964 is prohibited. Any tenancy created after that date is invalid. The Land Tribunal initiating proceedings under Section 72B in favour of the cultivating tenant would be considering the possession of a tenant as on the said date which is far earlier than the KPF Act. Possession and title under the certificate of purchase have to relate back to a date prior to the date of vesting under the Land Reforms Act, i.e. 01.04.1964. Therefore, there is no question of vesting of the land in the Government under the KPF Act which has come into force subsequent to the date of Land Reforms Act. As noted above, the certificate of purchase issued under the Land Reforms Act is attributed with statutory conclusiveness as regards ownership/title under sub-section (2) of Section 72K.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 4 - "conclusive proof" - When the enactment enjoins that any evidence would be treated as a conclusive proof of certain factual situation or legal hypothesis, the law would forbid other evidence to be adduced for the purpose of contradicting or varying the aforesaid conclusiveness.
The certificate of purchase was issued by the Land Tribunal, under sub-section (1) of Section 72K. Sub-section (2) of Section 72K of the Land Reforms Act clearly states that the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) shall be a conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landlord and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates. Thus whatever right, title and interest, the landlord had in the land, has been assigned in favour of the respondent under the certificate of purchase. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the respondent is the owner of the land as he has legal title to hold the said land. As noticed above, the certificate is also a conclusive proof of the fact that the respondent has been in possession of the land as a cultivating tenant right from the date of vesting of the land under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In our view, the land in question is exempted from vesting in the State under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the KPF Act. [Para 18 & 21]
In the instant case, certificate of purchase has been issued in favour of the respondent after enquiry by the Land Tribunal. Though the State Government is not a party to this order, there was no bar for it to challenge this order under Section 102 of the Land Reforms Act. No appeal has been filed challenging the certificate of purchase either by the Government or by any other person. Thus, the certificate of purchase has become final. The respondent has established that he is the owner and in possession of the land on the appointed day on the basis of certificate of purchase and other materials placed on record. The appeals are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed without order as to costs.
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 588
Case Number : C.A. No. 10075 - 10076 / 2014 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : C.K. Sasi
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer
The High Court has relied on the local inspection report dated 08.06.1998, wherein it was clear that the schedule property is under cultivation. The Village Officer had marked one portion shaded and other portion unshaded, and it was stated that the property with green shade was cultivated with cashew and the property unshaded was cultivated with rubber and cashew trees. It was found that cashew trees and rubber plantation therein were more than 30 to 40 years old. It was also found that the schedule property is not covered by Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 and that it is not a part of the forest. The Court found that no forest trees are found in the schedule property. The Court, on appreciation of the materials on record, recorded a finding of fact that the schedule property is not a private forest as defined under the KPF Act. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed without order as to costs.
Citations : JT 2019 (2) SC 479 : 2019 (1) SCALE 586
Case Number : C.A. No. 10563 of 2014 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : C.K. Sasi
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer
Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 394 : 2019 (1) SCALE 583
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 118 - 119 / 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Lawyer S Knit & Co
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. R. Shah
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 598
Case Number : C.A. No. 937 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Anagha S. Desai
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 718
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1941 of 2010 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Rekha Pandey
Respondent's Advocate : M. Yogesh Kanna
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheswari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
Rules 26 and 27 clearly refer to a pre-admission scenario as is clear from a plain reading of Rules 26 and 27, which make it clear that the notice contained in Form No. 6 has to be served in not less than 14 days before the date of hearing. Hence, the expression “was admitted” in Form No. 6 only means that notice has been issued in the winding up petition which is then “fixed for hearing before the Company Judge” on a certain day. [Para 16]
The resultant position in law is that, as a first step, when the Code was enacted, only winding up petitions, where no notice under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules was served, were to be transferred to the NCLT and treated as petitions under the Code. However, on a working of the Code, the Government realized that parallel proceedings in the High Courts as well as before the adjudicating authority in the Code would stultify the objective sought to be achieved by the Code, which is to resuscitate the corporate debtors who are in the red. In accordance with this objective, the Rules kept being amended, until finally Section 434 was itself substituted in 2018, in which a proviso was added by which even in winding up petitions where notice has been served and which are pending in the High Courts, any person could apply for transfer of such petitions to the NCLT under the Code, which would then have to be transferred by the High Court to the adjudicating authority and treated as an insolvency petition under the Code. [Para 17]
The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 11 - Persons not entitled to make applications.
This Section is of limited application and only bars a corporate debtor from initiating a petition under Section 10 of the Code in respect of whom a liquidation order has been made. From a reading of this Section, it does not follow that until a liquidation order has been made against the corporate debtor, an Insolvency Petition may be filed under Section 7 or Section 9 as 17 the case may be, as has been held by the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, any reference to Section 11 in the context of the problem before us is wholly irrelevant. However, we decline to interfere with the ultimate order passed by the Appellate Tribunal because it is clear that the financial creditor’s application which has been admitted by the Tribunal is clearly an independent proceeding which must be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Though, we are not interfering with the Appellate Tribunal’s order dismissing the appeal, we grant liberty to the appellant before us to apply under the proviso to Section 434 of the Companies Act (added in 2018), to transfer the winding up proceeding pending before the High Court of Delhi to the NCLT, which can then be treated as a proceeding under Section 9 of the Code. With these observations, we dispose of the aforesaid appeal. [Paras 22-24]
Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 142
Case Number : C.A. No. 818 of 2018 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : A. Venayagam Balan
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman
Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 763
Case Number : C.A. No. 898 - 900 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Abhinav Mukerji
Respondent's Advocate : Anip Sachthey
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D. Y. Chandrachud
Case Number : C.A. No. 932 of 2019 22-01-2019
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi
For Petitioner(s) Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. A. T. M. Rangaramanujam, Sr. Adv. Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR Mr. C. Rubavathi, Adv. Mr. P. Raja Ram, Adv. Mr. V. Senthil Kumar, Adv. Mr. Pratyush Raj, Adv.
Constitution of India - Art. 226 - Restoration of Writ Petition - the High Court has disposed of the Writ Petition in terms of its earlier decision and directed consideration of the case in accordance with the judgment - Since the High Court has not dealt with the individual facts pertaining to the case, it appropriate and proper to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. Accordingly, restored the Writ Petition to the file of the High Court for disposal afresh.
Citations : (2019) 3 SCC 301
Case Number : C.A. No. 901 of 2019 22-01-2019
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta
5. Yatinder Kumar Aggarwal v. Mukund Swarup
Contempt Petition - Contemnors have violated the orders of Apex Court by selling the property - Properties are not subject matter of sale - taken a lenient view of the contempt committed - contemnors shall pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as compensation to the plaintiff/decree holder.Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 594
Case Number : Con.P. (Crl. ) No. 2 of 2012 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Mohd. Irshad Hanif
Respondent's Advocate : Dinesh Kumar Garg
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri, Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri
6. New Delhi Municipal Council v. Association of Concerned Citizens of New Delhi
Rent Law - The expression ‘annual rent’ is to be read in contradistinction to ‘annual value’. Two concepts are altogether different. Inasmuch as the latter expression relates to annual value of the property which may be based on parameters different from fixing the annual rent of the property.Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 638
Case Number : C.A. No. 903 - 930 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Yoginder Handoo
Respondent's Advocate : Saurabh Mishra
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri
7. State of Kerala v. Mohammed Basheer
The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Section 8 - The Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 - Section 72K - The Kerala Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules, 1970 - Rule 5 - Private forests to vest in Government - Land Tribunal to initiate suo motu proceedings.It is clear from sub-section (2) of Section 3 that the extent of land comprised in private forests held by the owner under his personal cultivation is exempted from vesting, if the ceiling limit under the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not exceeded. Similarly, sub-section (3) of Section 3 does not apply in respect of so much of extent of private forests as is held by an owner under a valid registered document of title executed before the appointed day and intended for cultivation by him, if the ceiling limit under Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not exceeded. The appointed day for the purpose of Section 3 is 10.5.1971, which is clear from Section 2(a) of the KPF Act. [Para 9]
The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Section 3 - To bring the land under the exempted category, the claimant should hold the same as an owner and that it should be under his personal cultivation.
As noticed above, sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the KPF Act provides for the exemption of the private forest from vesting. It states that the land comprised in private forest held by an owner under his personal cultivation is exempted from vesting, if the ceiling limit under the Kerala Land Reforms Act is not exceeded. The land in question measures about 2 acres. It is not the case of the appellants that the land exceeds the ceiling limit under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The expression 'held by the owner under his personal cultivation' contained in subsection (2) of Section 3 of the KPF Act is crucial. To bring the land under the exempted category, the claimant should hold the same as an owner and that it should be under his personal cultivation. [Para 17]
Own - Meaning of - 'To own' is to have good legal title to hold and possess the property. Black's Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition defines the word 'own' as 'to rightfully have or possess as property; to have legal title to'.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 4 - "conclusive proof" - The certificate issued by a competent Land Tribunal after finding that the tenant was in possession of the property as a cultivating tenant is a conclusive proof of possession as well.
In the instant case, the land in question is jenmam land. The Land Tribunal initiated suo motu proceedings under Rule 5 of the Land Reform Rules, after obtaining information that the cultivating tenant had been in possession, obviously on a report of the revenue inspector. It is evident from Section 74 of the Land Reforms Act that any tenancy after 01.04.1964 is prohibited. Any tenancy created after that date is invalid. The Land Tribunal initiating proceedings under Section 72B in favour of the cultivating tenant would be considering the possession of a tenant as on the said date which is far earlier than the KPF Act. Possession and title under the certificate of purchase have to relate back to a date prior to the date of vesting under the Land Reforms Act, i.e. 01.04.1964. Therefore, there is no question of vesting of the land in the Government under the KPF Act which has come into force subsequent to the date of Land Reforms Act. As noted above, the certificate of purchase issued under the Land Reforms Act is attributed with statutory conclusiveness as regards ownership/title under sub-section (2) of Section 72K.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 4 - "conclusive proof" - When the enactment enjoins that any evidence would be treated as a conclusive proof of certain factual situation or legal hypothesis, the law would forbid other evidence to be adduced for the purpose of contradicting or varying the aforesaid conclusiveness.
The certificate of purchase was issued by the Land Tribunal, under sub-section (1) of Section 72K. Sub-section (2) of Section 72K of the Land Reforms Act clearly states that the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) shall be a conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landlord and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates. Thus whatever right, title and interest, the landlord had in the land, has been assigned in favour of the respondent under the certificate of purchase. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the respondent is the owner of the land as he has legal title to hold the said land. As noticed above, the certificate is also a conclusive proof of the fact that the respondent has been in possession of the land as a cultivating tenant right from the date of vesting of the land under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. In our view, the land in question is exempted from vesting in the State under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the KPF Act. [Para 18 & 21]
Facts of the Case
In the instant case, certificate of purchase has been issued in favour of the respondent after enquiry by the Land Tribunal. Though the State Government is not a party to this order, there was no bar for it to challenge this order under Section 102 of the Land Reforms Act. No appeal has been filed challenging the certificate of purchase either by the Government or by any other person. Thus, the certificate of purchase has become final. The respondent has established that he is the owner and in possession of the land on the appointed day on the basis of certificate of purchase and other materials placed on record. The appeals are devoid of merit and are accordingly dismissed without order as to costs.
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 588
Case Number : C.A. No. 10075 - 10076 / 2014 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : C.K. Sasi
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer
8. State of Kerala v. Padalooiyil Mary Antony
The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Section 8 - No forest trees are found in the schedule property - the schedule property is not a private forest as defined under the KPF Act.The High Court has relied on the local inspection report dated 08.06.1998, wherein it was clear that the schedule property is under cultivation. The Village Officer had marked one portion shaded and other portion unshaded, and it was stated that the property with green shade was cultivated with cashew and the property unshaded was cultivated with rubber and cashew trees. It was found that cashew trees and rubber plantation therein were more than 30 to 40 years old. It was also found that the schedule property is not covered by Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 and that it is not a part of the forest. The Court found that no forest trees are found in the schedule property. The Court, on appreciation of the materials on record, recorded a finding of fact that the schedule property is not a private forest as defined under the KPF Act. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed without order as to costs.
Facts of the Case
The respondents filed the petition before the Forest Tribunal for a declaration that 1 acre 30 cents of land in survey No. 1293 of Ayyankunnu village, Tellichery Taluk of Kannur district (hereinafter referred to as 'schedule property'), is not a private forest as defined in the KPF Act. By relying on a Commissioner's report in a civil case, the respondents contended that the schedule property was under cultivation when the KPF Act came into force. They further contended that the certificate of purchase has been issued in their favour by the Land Tribunal under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The appellants opposed the application contending that the schedule property is a private forest, vested in the State Government under the provisions of the KPF Act.Citations : JT 2019 (2) SC 479 : 2019 (1) SCALE 586
Case Number : C.A. No. 10563 of 2014 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : C.K. Sasi
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer
9. Saraswatibai v. Lalitabai
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 420, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 34 - Quashing of Complaint - Cheating - Sale of Plot - Once the Investigating Officer submitted the Final Report on conclusion of the investigation, the High Court was not justified in interfering with the criminal proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC and particularly when in the Final Report it was specifically concluded on the basis of the material on record that a prima facie case is made out for the offences alleged against the accused persons.Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 394 : 2019 (1) SCALE 583
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 118 - 119 / 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Lawyer S Knit & Co
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. R. Shah
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
10. Nagpur Improvement Trust v. M/s. Bombaywala
The Nagpur Improvement Trust Act 1936 - The Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 - Section 39 - The NIT (Land Disposal) Rules, 1983 - Rule 5 (2) - Object and purpose of MRTP Act - Variation of town planning scheme by development plan - Merely because to avoid any further legal complication, if the NIT has modified the Scheme that would not preclude the NIT and/or the original land owners/developers to challenge the impugned judgment and order.Questions of Law
- Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the Development Plan sanctioned under the provisions of MRTP Act do not provide an internal road from the land in question, still the Scheme published under Section 45 of the NIT Act which provided 15 metres internal road would be applicable and/or would have to be implemented, though the Scheme may be contrary to the Development Plan sanctioned under the provisions of the MRTP Act ?
Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 598
Case Number : C.A. No. 937 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Anagha S. Desai
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah
11. Nawaz v. State rep. by Inspector of Police
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 201 - The deceased provoked the accused No.1 by uttering the word ‘prostitute’. In our society, no lady would like to hear such a word from her husband. Most importantly, she would not be ready to hear such a word against her daughters. The incident is a result of a sudden and grave provocation by the deceased. Since the body came to be transported by the accused to a different place in order to hide the offence, the accused are rightly convicted for offence under Section 201 of IPC.Citations : 2019 (1) SCALE 718
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1941 of 2010 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Rekha Pandey
Respondent's Advocate : M. Yogesh Kanna
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheswari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
12. Forech India Ltd. v. Edelweiss Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd.
The Companies Act, 2013 - Section 434 - The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Sections 9 - The Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 - Rule 5 - The Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 - Rules 26 and 27 - Transfer of certain pending proceedings - Transfer of pending proceedings of Winding up on the ground of inability to pay debts - Service of petition - Notice of petition and time of service.Rules 26 and 27 clearly refer to a pre-admission scenario as is clear from a plain reading of Rules 26 and 27, which make it clear that the notice contained in Form No. 6 has to be served in not less than 14 days before the date of hearing. Hence, the expression “was admitted” in Form No. 6 only means that notice has been issued in the winding up petition which is then “fixed for hearing before the Company Judge” on a certain day. [Para 16]
The resultant position in law is that, as a first step, when the Code was enacted, only winding up petitions, where no notice under Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules was served, were to be transferred to the NCLT and treated as petitions under the Code. However, on a working of the Code, the Government realized that parallel proceedings in the High Courts as well as before the adjudicating authority in the Code would stultify the objective sought to be achieved by the Code, which is to resuscitate the corporate debtors who are in the red. In accordance with this objective, the Rules kept being amended, until finally Section 434 was itself substituted in 2018, in which a proviso was added by which even in winding up petitions where notice has been served and which are pending in the High Courts, any person could apply for transfer of such petitions to the NCLT under the Code, which would then have to be transferred by the High Court to the adjudicating authority and treated as an insolvency petition under the Code. [Para 17]
The Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 11 - Persons not entitled to make applications.
This Section is of limited application and only bars a corporate debtor from initiating a petition under Section 10 of the Code in respect of whom a liquidation order has been made. From a reading of this Section, it does not follow that until a liquidation order has been made against the corporate debtor, an Insolvency Petition may be filed under Section 7 or Section 9 as 17 the case may be, as has been held by the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, any reference to Section 11 in the context of the problem before us is wholly irrelevant. However, we decline to interfere with the ultimate order passed by the Appellate Tribunal because it is clear that the financial creditor’s application which has been admitted by the Tribunal is clearly an independent proceeding which must be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Though, we are not interfering with the Appellate Tribunal’s order dismissing the appeal, we grant liberty to the appellant before us to apply under the proviso to Section 434 of the Companies Act (added in 2018), to transfer the winding up proceeding pending before the High Court of Delhi to the NCLT, which can then be treated as a proceeding under Section 9 of the Code. With these observations, we dispose of the aforesaid appeal. [Paras 22-24]
Facts of the Case
The present matter arises from an Operational Creditor’s appeal to continue with a winding up petition that has been filed by the said creditor way back in 2014. A winding up petition, being No. 42 of 2014, was filed by the present appellant before the High Court of Delhi on 10.01.2014, against Respondent No. 2-Company, alleging (under Section 433(e) of the Companies Act) inability to pay dues. Notice in this petition had been served, as is recorded by an order dated 20.01.2014 of the High Court of Delhi. Further orders which have been pointed out to us by learned counsel for the appellant, have gone on to state that there is a debt or liability which is, in fact, admitted. It was also pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant that a Reference had been made by the Company itself on 14.07.2015 to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985, which, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, has abated as on 11.12.2016. It transpires that another operational creditor, viz., SKF India Ltd. had filed an application under Section 9 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (in short ‘the Code’), against Respondent No. 2, which was allowed to be withdrawn so that the aforesaid operational creditor could go to the High Court in a winding up petition which would then be heard along with the Company Petition No. 42/2014. Meanwhile, Respondent No. 1, being a financial creditor of the selfsame corporate debtor, moved the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in an insolvency petition filed under Section 7 of the Code sometime in May/June 2017. This petition was admitted on 07.08.2017. Against the aforesaid order, an appeal was filed by the appellant herein which was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal, in which Section 11 of the Code was referred to, and it was held by the Appellate Tribunal that since there was no winding up order by the High Court, the financial creditor’s petition would be maintainable, as a result of which the appellant’s appeal has been dismissed.Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 142
Case Number : C.A. No. 818 of 2018 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : A. Venayagam Balan
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman
13. State of Himachal Pradesh Revenue Secretary v. Pinju Ram
Service Law - The seniority of the part time chowkidars who are granted daily wage status will be counted from the date of completion of ten years as part time chowkidars though without any financial benefits for the past.Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 763
Case Number : C.A. No. 898 - 900 of 2019 22-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Abhinav Mukerji
Respondent's Advocate : Anip Sachthey
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D. Y. Chandrachud
14. Ramasamy v. Venkatachalapathi
Injunction - Violation of the order of injunction is a serious matter and unless there is a clear evidence that the party has wilfully disobeyed the order of the court, the party cannot be punished for disobedience and sent to imprisonment.Case Number : C.A. No. 932 of 2019 22-01-2019
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi
For Petitioner(s) Ms. Preetika Dwivedi, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. A. T. M. Rangaramanujam, Sr. Adv. Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR Mr. C. Rubavathi, Adv. Mr. P. Raja Ram, Adv. Mr. V. Senthil Kumar, Adv. Mr. Pratyush Raj, Adv.
15. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Ganesh Dutt
Constitution of India - Art. 226 - Restoration of Writ Petition - the High Court has disposed of the Writ Petition in terms of its earlier decision and directed consideration of the case in accordance with the judgment - Since the High Court has not dealt with the individual facts pertaining to the case, it appropriate and proper to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. Accordingly, restored the Writ Petition to the file of the High Court for disposal afresh.
Citations : (2019) 3 SCC 301
Case Number : C.A. No. 901 of 2019 22-01-2019
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta