1. Vijay A. Mittal v. Kulwant Rai (Dead) thr. Lrs.
Specific Performance - A finding on the issue of readiness and willingness is one of the important and relevant findings in a suit for specific performance of an agreement. It is a finding based on facts and once it is recorded, it becomes a finding of fact - Unless such finding is found to be against the pleadings or contrary to the evidence or the law governing the issue, it is binding on the High Court and also on this Court.
Held:- When the three Courts below have held against the defendants and in favour of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement, this finding was binding on the High Court and also on this Court.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 - Section 65 - Once the sale is declared bad, the transaction of sale fails and, therefore, the seller has no right to retain the sale consideration with himself and has to refund the sale consideration to the buyers.
What form of decree should be passed in the case of specific performance of contract where the suit property is sold by the defendant, i.e., the owner of the suit property to another person and later he suffers a decree for specific performance of contract directing him to transfer the suit property to the plaintiff in term of contract.
Where there is a sale of the same property in favour of a prior and subsequent transferee and the subsequent transferee has, under the conveyance outstanding in his favour, paid the purchasemoney to the vendor, then in a suit for specific performance brought by the prior transferee, in case he succeeds, the question arises as to the proper form of decree in such a case. The practice of the Courts in India has not been uniform and three distinct lines of thought emerge. According to one point of view, the proper form of decree is to declare the subsequent purchase void as against the prior transferee and direct conveyance by the vendor alone. A second considers that both vendor and vendee should join, while a third would limit execution of the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser alone. According to the Supreme Court, the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the prior transferee and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the prior transferee. He does not join in any special covenants made between the prior transferee and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the prior transferee.
Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 611 : 2019 (2) SCALE 151
Case Number : C.A. No. 5177 of 2009 28-01-2019
Case Number : C.A. No. 5177 of 2009 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Anis Ahmed Khan
Respondent's Advocate : Ajay Kumar
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Indu Malhotra
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre
2. Satya Raj Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 302 / 34 - The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - Section 313
It is not the function of Apex Court to reassess evidence and an argument on a point of fact which did not prevail with the Courts below cannot avail the appellants in Supreme Court.
Referred to : Lachhman Singh v. State, AIR 1952 SC 167
Evidence Law - Testimony being natural and consistent and without any contradiction as against the version stated in FIR, the same deserves to be believed.
Evidence Law - Some minor contradictions here and there without affecting the substance of the statements could not be made basis to reject the entire testimony.
Delay of FIR - Since B died after few hours of the incident and by that time it was dark night, it was, therefore, not possible for the complainant to go to the Police Station which was around 25 KM away from the place of occurrence immediately in the night to lodge the report/FIR. In these circumstances, if PW1 left for lodging report/FIR on the next day morning and lodged the report/FIR around 9.30 a.m. it cannot be said that there was delay in lodging the report/FIR.
The appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Citations : JT 2019 (2) SC 1 : 2019 (2) SCALE 161
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1314 of 2013 28-01-2019
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 1314 of 2013 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Laxmi Arvind
Respondent's Advocate : Swarupama Chaturvedi
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Indu Malhotra
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre
When the lessor and the lessee enters into an agreement for sale/purchase of the tenanted premises where the lessor agrees to sell the tenanted premises to his lessee for consideration on certain conditions, whether, as a result of entering into such agreement, the Jural relationship of lessor and the lessee in relation to the leased property comes to an end and, if so, whether it results in determination of the lease.
When the lessor enters into an agreement to sell the tenanted property to his lessee during the subsistence of the lease, whether execution of such agreement would ipso facto result in determination of the lease and severe the relationship of lessor and the lessee in relation to the leased property.
The aforementioned question has to be decided keeping in view the provisions of Section 111 of the TP Act and the intention of the parties to the lease whether the parties intended to surrender the lease on execution of such agreement in relation to the tenanted premises or they intended to keep the lease subsisting notwithstanding the execution of such agreement.
If the parties really intended to surrender their tenancy rights as contemplated in clauses (e) or (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act while entering into an agreement to sell the suit house, it would have made necessary provision to that effect by providing a specific clause in the agreement.
Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 165
Case Number : C.A. No. 1237 - 1238 of 2019 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Ajit Sharma
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre
The High Court has overstretched and exceeded its power even in the situation which was so grim which appears to have compelled it to take such a measure. In fact, its powers are much more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal with such situation court need not look for Bar Council to act. It can take action, punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconduct done in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but the autonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over by the Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintain the decorum of Court. In case power is given to the Court even if complaints lodged by a lawyer to the higher administrative authorities as to the behaviour of the Judges may be correct then also he may be punished by initiating disciplinary proceedings as permitted to be done in impugned Rules 14 A to D that would be making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would not be conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism of judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers' fearlessness in court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the virtues which cannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned authorities, which right cannot be totally curtailed, however, making such allegation publicly tantamounts to contempt of court and may also be a professional misconduct that can be taken care of either by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act and by the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The misconduct as specified in 77 Rule 14A may also in appropriate cases tantamount to contempt of court and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction. Resultantly, we have no hesitation to strike down impugned Rules 14 A to 14D as framed in May, 2016 by the High Court of Madras as they are ultra vires to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and are hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed.
Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 263
Case Number : W.P. (C) No. 612 of 2016 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Petitioner-in-person
For Respondent(s) Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, AOR
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 164 - 165 of 2019 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : K. Krishna Kumar
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi
3. Dr. H.K. Sharma v. Ram Lal
The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Chapter V Sections 53A and 105 to 111 - The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 - Section 21(1) (a) - Leases of Immovable Property.When the lessor and the lessee enters into an agreement for sale/purchase of the tenanted premises where the lessor agrees to sell the tenanted premises to his lessee for consideration on certain conditions, whether, as a result of entering into such agreement, the Jural relationship of lessor and the lessee in relation to the leased property comes to an end and, if so, whether it results in determination of the lease.
Or
When the lessor enters into an agreement to sell the tenanted property to his lessee during the subsistence of the lease, whether execution of such agreement would ipso facto result in determination of the lease and severe the relationship of lessor and the lessee in relation to the leased property.
The aforementioned question has to be decided keeping in view the provisions of Section 111 of the TP Act and the intention of the parties to the lease whether the parties intended to surrender the lease on execution of such agreement in relation to the tenanted premises or they intended to keep the lease subsisting notwithstanding the execution of such agreement.
If the parties really intended to surrender their tenancy rights as contemplated in clauses (e) or (f) of Section 111 of the TP Act while entering into an agreement to sell the suit house, it would have made necessary provision to that effect by providing a specific clause in the agreement.
Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 165
Case Number : C.A. No. 1237 - 1238 of 2019 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Ajit Sharma
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre
4. R. Muthukrishnan v. Registrar General of the High Court off Judicature at Madras
The Constitution of India - Article 32 - The Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970 - Rules 14A, 14B, 14C and 14D of - The Advocates’ Act, 1961 - Section 34(1) - Autonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over by the Courts.The High Court has overstretched and exceeded its power even in the situation which was so grim which appears to have compelled it to take such a measure. In fact, its powers are much more in Contempt of Courts Act to deal with such situation court need not look for Bar Council to act. It can take action, punish for Contempt of Courts Act in case it involves misconduct done in Court/proceedings. Circumstances may be grim, but the autonomy of the Bar in the disciplinary matters cannot be taken over by the Courts. It has other more efficient tools to maintain the decorum of Court. In case power is given to the Court even if complaints lodged by a lawyer to the higher administrative authorities as to the behaviour of the Judges may be correct then also he may be punished by initiating disciplinary proceedings as permitted to be done in impugned Rules 14 A to D that would be making the Bar too sycophant and fearful which would not be conducive for fair administration of justice. Fair criticism of judgment and its analysis is permissible. Lawyers' fearlessness in court, independence, uprightness, honesty, equality are the virtues which cannot be sacrificed. It is duty of the lawyer to lodge appropriate complaint to the concerned authorities, which right cannot be totally curtailed, however, making such allegation publicly tantamounts to contempt of court and may also be a professional misconduct that can be taken care of either by the Bar Council under the Advocates Act and by the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act. The misconduct as specified in 77 Rule 14A may also in appropriate cases tantamount to contempt of court and can be taken care of by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction. Resultantly, we have no hesitation to strike down impugned Rules 14 A to 14D as framed in May, 2016 by the High Court of Madras as they are ultra vires to Section 34 of the Advocates Act and are hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed.
Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 263
Case Number : W.P. (C) No. 612 of 2016 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Petitioner-in-person
For Respondent(s) Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, AOR
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra
5. C. Shanmugavel v. Eswari
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302, 364 and 379 - Custody of Vehicle - Magistrate was right in ordering the return of the vehicle to the wife of the deceased.Case Number : Crl.A. No. 164 - 165 of 2019 28-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : K. Krishna Kumar
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi