11 Important Supreme Court Judgments January 29, 2019

1. Harbans Kaur v. Iqbal Singh

Rent Control Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) - Sections 4, 6, 7, 9 and 14 - Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 - Rent to be as agreed - Revision of rent in respect of existing tenancies - Revision of rent in respect of new tenancies - Procedure for revision of rent.

Rent Control Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) - Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 - S. 6 - Fixation of Standard Rent.

Important differences between the statutory scheme as contained in Section 6 of Act, 1950 and as now contained in Act, 2001.

(i) Under the old Act the landlord or the tenant both were entitled to file a suit for fixation of standard rent, if it is claimed that rent is either low or excessive. Thus, landlord could have moved the Court for enhancement of the rent and equally the tenant could have instituted a suit in the event the rent was excessive and the Court after holding inquiry was to determine the standard rent for such premises.

(ii) In Section 6 of Act, 2001 the tenant has not been given any right to apply for revision of the rent on any ground. The old Act did not contain any prohibition regarding the annual increase of rent whereas Section 6 now contains the prohibition, restricting annual increase only by 5% for both the tenancies which were in existence prior to enforcement of the Act as well as tenancies which commenced after the commencement of the Act, 2001.

Question of Law

Whether the agreed rent which was being paid by the tenant immediately before the commencement of Act, 2001 i.e. with effect from 01.04.2003 is liable to be redetermined as per provisions of Section 6 of Act, 2001 by a tenant and tenant can unilaterally revise the rent under new Section 6.

Rent deed contained a clause for yearly increase of rent by 10%. The tenant continued to pay rent to the landlord as per the agreed rent with 10% enhancement yearly. The landlord was not entitled to enhancement of the rent more than 5% in view of the Act, 2001. The landlord cannot claim revision of rent as per agreement at the rate of 10% per annum after the enforcement of the Act.

The present is not a case that the landlord is claiming rent after the enforcement of the Act by adding 10% increase in the rent. The landlord having not added 10% increase in the rent demanded, there was no breach of Section 6 and the High Court has committed error in allowing the writ petition of the tenant.

Rent Control Act, 2001 (Rajasthan) - S. 9 (a) - Eviction of tenants - Eviction can be ordered only when the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the rent due from him for four months.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 193
Case Number : C.A. No. 12562 of 2017 29-01-2019

Petitioner's Advocate : Pratibha Jain

Respondent's Advocate : Samir Ali Khan

Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.M. Joseph

Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan

2. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dharmendra Rathore

Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 - Sections 3, 4, 13 and 18 - Power to make restriction order - Dispersal of gangs and bodies of persons - Power of externment of State Government - Delegation of power and duties of District Magistrates.

In the present case, the State Government had issued a notification under Section 13 delating the power of the District Magistrate to the Additional District Magistrate.

In the Statutory Scheme of the Adhiniyam, 1990, there is no provision, which prohibit passing an order by an officer lower than the rank of District Magistrate rather under Section 13, there is no limitation on the State Government while specially empowering an officer of the State to exercise the power of District Magistrate under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 and further under Section 18, the powers and duties of District Magistrate can be directed to be exercised or performed by Additional District Magistrate or Sub -Divisional Magistrate for such areas as may be specified in the order. Thus, the Scheme of the Adhiniyam, 1990 clearly contemplate exercise of the power of District Magistrate under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 by an Additional District Magistrate or Sub -Divisional Magistrate.

Citations : JT 2019 (1) SC 530 : 2019 (2) SCALE 187
Case Number : Crl.A. No. 171 of 2019 29-01-2019

Respondent's Advocate : Nidhi

Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan, Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. M. Joseph

Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan

3. Swaraj Infrastructure v. Kotak Mahindra Bank

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 - Sections 17, 18, 19, 34 - Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals - Bar of jurisdiction - Application to the Tribunal - Act to have overriding effect

Companies Act, 1956 - Sections 434, 439, 441, 529 - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts - Provisions as to applications for winding up - Commencement of winding up by Tribunal - Application of insolvency rules in winding up of insolvent companies.

A petition for voluntary winding up of a company presented before the Tribunal would be said to commence at an anterior point of time, namely, at the time of the passing of the resolution whereby the company resolves to voluntarily wind itself up.

Settled Law

A winding up proceeding initiated under Section 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 is not a means of seeking to enforce payment of a debt.

Section 434(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956.

It is obvious that Section 434(1)(b) is attracted only if execution or other process is issued in respect of an order of a Tribunal in favour of a creditor of the company is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part. This is only one of three instances in which a company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. If the fact situation fits sub-clause (b) of Section 434(1), then a company may be said to be deemed to be unable to pay its debts. However, this does not mean that each one of the sub-clauses of Section 434(1) are mutually exclusive in the sense that once Section 434(1)(b) applies, Section 434(1)(a) ceases to be applicable. Also, on the facts of this case, we may state that the company petition was filed only on 03.07.2015, pursuant to a notice under Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956 dated 15.04.2015. This petition was filed under Section 433(e) read with Section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956. At the stage at which the petition was filed, it could not possibly have been filed under Section 434(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 1956, as execution or other process in the form of a recovery certificate had not been issued by the Recovery Officer till 12.08.2015, i.e., till after the company petition was filed. For this reason also, it is clear that this contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant must be rejected.

Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 - Sections 9, 47 - Conditions on which creditor may petition - Secured creditors.

Cases like the present one have to be decided by balancing the interest of creditors to whom money is owing, with a debtor company which will now go in the red since a winding up petition is admitted against it. It is not open for persons like the appellant to resist a winding up petition which is otherwise maintainable without there being any bona fide defence to the same. We may also hasten to add that the respondent cannot be said to be blowing hot and cold in pursuing a remedy under the Recovery of Debts Act and a winding up proceeding under the Companies Act, 1956 simultaneously. When secured creditors like the respondent are driven from pillar to post to recover what is legitimately due to them, in attempting to avail of more than one remedy at the same time, they do not “blow hot and cold”, but they blow hot and hotter. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 171
Case Number : C.A. No. 1291 of 2019 29-01-2019

Petitioner's Advocate : Udit Kishan And Associates

Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha

Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman

4. Poona Ram v. Moti Ram

Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 64 - Suit for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title - brought within 12 years from the date of dispossession - Such a suit is known in law as a suit based on possessory title as distinguishable from proprietary title - ‘settled possession’ or effective possession of a person without title entitles him to protect his possession as if he were a true owner.

A person who asserts possessory title over a particular property will have to show that he is under settled or established possession of the said property. But merely stray or intermittent acts of trespass do not give such a right against the true owner. Settled possession means such possession over the property which has existed for a sufficiently long period of time, and has been acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession does not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. Settled possession must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser. There cannot be a straitjacket formula to determine settled possession. Occupation of a property by a person as an agent or a servant acting at the instance of the owner will not amount to actual legal possession. The possession should contain an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser is to be decided based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

The plaintiff has to prove his case to the satisfaction of the Court. He cannot succeed on the weakness of the case of the defendant.

There is absolutely no material in favour of the case of the plaintiff to show possessory title. In order to claim possessory title, the plaintiff will have to prove his own case, and also will have to show that he has better title than any other person. Since there is no documentary proof that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property, that too for a long period, he cannot be allowed to succeed based on minor discrepancies in the evidence of the defendants. Accordingly, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 207
Case Number : C.A. No. 4527 of 2009 29-01-2019

Petitioner's Advocate : Pratibha Jain

Respondent's Advocate : K.V. Bharathi Upadhyaya

Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar

Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar

5. Union of India v. M/s. Premier Limited

The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - If the Adjudicating Officer has passed an order after the repeal of FERA in the proceedings initiated prior to 01.06.2000, whether an appeal against such order will lie before the “Special Director (Appeals)” under Section 17 of FEMA or before the “Appellate Tribunal” under Section 19 of FEMA - Held, the appellate forum for deciding the appeals arising out of the order passed under Section 51 of FERA whether filed prior to 01.06.2000 or filed after 01.06.2000 must be the same, i.e., Appellate Tribunal under FEMA.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 373
Case Number : C.A. No. 3529 of 2008 29-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : B. Krishna Prasad
Respondent's Advocate : Rajan Narain
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

6. Adani Gas Limited v. Union of India

The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Regulations Act, 2006 - Ss. 2 (d), 2 (i), 16, 17 - Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Authorizing Entities to Lay, Build, Operate or Expand City or Local Natural Gas Distribution Networks) Regulations, 2008 - Reg. 18 - “authorised entity” - “city or local natural gas distribution network” - Authorisation - Application for Authorisation - Setting up of Natural Gas Distribution Networks within India - Gas Distribution Network (‘GDN’) - No Objection Certificate (‘NOC’) - the requirement under the Act/Regulations is for grant of personal hearing to the appellant before deciding its application and if personal hearing was given, to have discussed the same in the order, which aspect has also been ignored by the Board - there was illegality committed by the Board in deciding the application of the appellant while passing the order dated 19.05.2011, and as such the same deserves to be quashed - the decision of the State Government to revoke the NOC vide order dated 18.05.2011 was also highly unfair and unjust in as much as the reply of the petitioner dated 16.03.2011 in response to the notice dated 26.02.2011 has not been dealt with by the Government of Rajasthan while passing the said impugned order dated 18.05.2011. As such, the same does not stand to reason, which also deserves to be quashed.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 213
Case Number : C.A. No. 1261 of 2019 29-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Karanjawala & Co.
Counsel for the parties : Mr. Gaurav Juneja, Adv. Mr. Divyansu, Adv. Mr. Aayush Jain, Adv. for Khaitan & Co. Mr. Munawwar Naseem, Adv. Mr. Palak Mishra, Adv. Mr. Utsav Trivedi, Adv. for M/S. Karanjawala & Co. Mr. Amit Sharma, Adv. Mr. Ankit Raj, Adv. Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Adv. Ms. Iti Agarwal, Adv. Ms. Nikita Choukse, Adv. Ms. Rinali Batra, Adv. for DSK Legal Ms. Ruchi Kohli, AOR Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan, AOR Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vineet Saran
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vineet Saran

7. Union of India v. Radha Yadav

The Railways Act, 1989 - Section 123, 124 A - The Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules, 1990 - “untoward incident” - Principle of Strict Liability.

The amount of compensation payable on the date of accident with reasonable rate of interest shall first be calculated. If the amount so calculated is less than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award, the claimant would be entitled to higher of these two amounts. Therefore, if the liability had arisen before the amendment was brought in, the basic figure would be as per the Schedule as was in existence before the amendment and on such basic figure reasonable rate of interest would be calculated. If there be any difference between the amount so calculated and the amount prescribed in the Schedule as on the date of the award, the higher of two figures would be the measure of compensation.

For instance, in case of a death in an accident which occurred before amendment, the basic figure would be Rs.4,00,000/-. If, after applying reasonable rate of interest, the final figure were to be less than Rs.8,00,000/-, which was brought in by way of amendment, the claimant would be entitled to Rs.8,00,000/-. If, however, the amount of original compensation with rate of interest were to exceed the sum of Rs.8,00,000/- the compensation would be in terms of figure in excess of Rs.8,00,000/-. The idea is to afford the benefit of the amendment, to the extent possible. Thus, according to us, the matter is crystal clear. The issue does not need any further clarification or elaboration.

Citations : (2019) 3 SCC 410 : JT 2019 (1) SC 95 : 2019 (2) SCALE 323 : 2019 (1) RCR (Civil) 916
Case Number : C.A. No. 1265 - 1266 of 2019 29-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Anil Katiyar
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit

8. Pyarelal v. Shubhendra Pilania

The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 - Section 9, Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 - Courts to try all civil suits unless barred - A claimant seeking a decree of khatedari rights is barred from filing a suit in the civil court prior to their khatedari right being decreed by a revenue court when the relief sought for by the civil court includes a determination of khatedari rights.

In the present case, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the suit seeking a declaration of the gift deed relating to disputed agricultural land situated in Sikar as void and restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 from transfer or sale of the agricultural land before the civil court is squarely covered by the bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. The claim of the appellant to khatedari rights is pending adjudication by a revenue court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a claim. The appellant has no right to seek relief before the civil court without first getting his khatedari rights decreed by the revenue court.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 492
Case Number : C.A. No. 1269 - 1270 of 2019 29-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Annam D. N. Rao
Respondent's Advocate : Aishwarya Bhati
Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud
Judgment By : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

9. Union of India v. Wg. Cdr. Subrata Das (19942h)

Air Force Act, 1950 - Premature Separation from Service (PSS) - The determination of the number of PSS applications that should be granted is based on a careful exercise of assessing the manpower requirements of the Air Force. Whether a request to withdraw an approved PSS application meets the criterion of “extreme compassionate grounds” has to be considered by the competent authority. So long as the assessment is fair and bona fide, the decision ought not to be faulted. The right to withdraw from an approved PSS application is neither absolute nor unqualified.

Citations : 2019 (2) SCALE 385
Case Number : C.A. No. 10953 - 10953 of 2014 29-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Mukesh Kumar Maroria
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta
Judgment By : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

10. Pallavi v. State of U.T. Chandigarh

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 406 and 498A - When the Judicial Magistrate has, based on the chargesheet and on the materials filed along with the chargesheet, satisfied himself, order of framing of charge against respondents no.2 and 3. The learned Sessions Judge, ought not to have gone into the merits of the materials and erred in setting aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate framing charge against accused.

Framing of Charge - At the stage of framing of charge, the court is concerned only with the aspect that there is prima facie materials presuming that the accused has committed the offence. At the initial stage the court is not called upon to examine the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials produced by the prosecution and also to examine whether the same are sufficient to sustain the conviction of the accused thereon.

Case Number : Crl.A. No. 176 of 2019 29-01-2019
Petitioner's Advocate : Akshay Verma
Bench : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy
Judgment By : Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi

11. Hirandra Kumar v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

The Constitution of India - Articles 32 and 136 - Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1975 (Uttar Pradesh) - Rules 8(1) and 12 - Constitutional validity of - Number of appointments to be made - Age - So long as the rules hold the field, a candidate in order to be eligible, must fulfil the requirements of age and other conditions which are prescribed by the Rules - there is no merit in the challenge to the constitutional validity of Rules 8 and 12.

Age Relaxation - The petitioners had sufficient opportunities in the past to appear for the HJS examinations at a time when they were within the age limit. Having not succeeded in that, their attempt at moving this Court to seek a relaxation of the Rules or through a challenge to the Rules, is misconceived.

Age Criterion - Allowing a group of candidates to breach the age criterion by taking recourse to the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India would not be appropriate inviting, as it does, a breach of the governing Rules for the UP Higher Judicial Service.

Service Rules - No case of discrimination or arbitrariness can be made out on the basis of a facial comparison of the Higher Judicial Service Rules, with the Rules governing Nyayik Sewa. Both sets of rules cater to different cadres. A case of discrimination cannot be made out on the basis of a comparison of two sets of rules which govern different cadres.

Judicial Service - Cut-off Date - Age - For the purpose of determining whether a member of the Bar has fulfilled the requirement of seven years’ practice, the cut-off date is the last date for the submission of the applications. For the fulfillment of the age criterion, the cut-off date which is prescribed is the first day of January following the year in which a notice inviting applications is being published. Both the above cut-off dates are with reference to distinct requirements. The seven year practice requirement is referable to the provisions of Article 233(2) of the Constitution. The prescription of an age limit of 45 years, or as the case may be, of 48 years for reserved category candidates, is in pursuance of the discretion vested in the appointing authority to prescribe an age criterion for recruitment to the HJS.

Cut-off date - the validity of the Rule cannot be made to depend on cases of individual hardship which inevitably arise in applying a principle of general application. Essentially, the determination of cut-off dates lies in the realm of policy. A court in the exercise of the power of judicial review does not take over that function for itself. Plainly, it is for the rule making authority to discharge that function while framing the Rules.

Cut-off date - The legal principles which govern the determination of a cut-off date are well settled. The power to fix a cut-off date or age limit is incidental to the regulatory control which an authority exercises over the selection process. A certain degree of arbitrariness may appear on the face of any cut-off or age limit which is prescribed, since a candidate on the wrong side of the line may stand excluded as a consequence. That, however, is no reason to hold that the cut-off which is prescribed, is arbitrary. In order to declare that a cut-off is arbitrary and ultra vires, it must be of such a nature as to lead to the conclusion that it has been fixed without any rational basis whatsoever or is manifestly unreasonable so as to lead to a conclusion of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Citation(s) : 2019 (2) Scale 752
Case Number : W.P. (C) No. 1343 of 2018 29-01-2019
Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta
Judgement By: Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud

Whether Plaint can be Rejected only against one of the Defendant(s) [SC JUDGMENT]

The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order 7 Rule 11 (d) – Rejection of Plaint - Relief of reject the plaint only against one of the defendant(s) – Held, Such a relief “cannot be entertained” in exercise of power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC - the relief of rejection of plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of CPC cannot be pursued only in respect of one of the defendant(s) - the plaint has to be rejected as a whole or not at all, in exercise of power Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of CPC - the plaint as presented must proceed as a whole or can be rejected as a whole but not in part.

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