Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - S. 482 - Inherent Powers -
Quashing of the FIR / Complaint / Criminal Proceedings - Settlement between
Parties - Antecedents of the Accused - Accused persons were facing number of
trials for the serious offences would be relevant factors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
[L. NAGESWARA RAO] AND [M.R. SHAH] JJ.
FEBRUARY 22, 2019.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.336 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013)
The State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant
Versus
Dhruv Gurjar and another ..Respondents
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.337 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013)
State of Madhya Pradesh ..Appellant
Versus
Tinku Sharma and others ..Respondents
Petitioner's Advocate : C.D. Singh
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Leave granted in both the special leave petitions.
2. As common question of law
and facts arise in both these appeals, they are being disposed of by this
common judgment and order.
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013
3. Feeling aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 8.4.2013 passed by the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition
No. 2572/2013, by which the High Court has allowed the said application
preferred by the respondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
4. The facts leading to this
appeal are, that an FIR was lodged against the accused at police station,
Kotwali, District Datia for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and
34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime No. 552/2012. It was alleged that
at about 8:00 p.m. in the night on 17.12.2012 when after distributing the milk,
Cheeni @ Devasik Yadav came in front of his house situated at Rajghat Viram, at
the same time, Dhruv Gurjar (accused) being armed with 12 bore gun,Sonu
Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh Tiwari and 3 to 4 other persons came there and
asked him to take out his nephew, and they will kill him as on account of
enmity of scuffle took place between his nephew Anand and the accused persons.
When complainant told them that my nephew is not here at the same time all of
them started to abuse the complainant with filthy language and when he asked
them not to do so, at the same time, Sonu Khamaria, Rohit Gurjar, Avdhesh
Tiwari and 34 other persons spoken that “kill this bastard”, at the same time, Dhruv
Gurjar made a fire with intention to kill him, whose pellets struck on three
places of his body, i.e., on his forehead, left shoulder and left ear, due to
which, he sustained injuries and blood started oozing from it. According to the
complainant, Rampratap Yadav and Indrapal Singh were present on the spot, who
had witnessed the incident. On hearing the noise of fire, when other people of
vicinity reached there, then, all of these persons fled away from the spot of
the incident.
4.1 On the basis of a report, a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/12
was registered under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. As the complainant
sustained injuries, his MLC was performed. On the basis of the contents of the
said report, a Crime bearingNo. 552/2012 was registered under Sections 307, 294
and 34 of the IPC and the criminal investigation was triggered. Thereafter, the
investigation team reached the spot and prepared the spot map and articles were
seized.
4.2 That on 18.12.2012, the statements of the witnesses were
recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. That on 21.03.2013, the police
arrested the accused.
4.3 The accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 2572
of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused
arising out of the FIR, on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the
accused and the complainant.
5. That, by the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482
of Cr.P.C., has quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused on the ground
that the accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While
quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court has
considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu and others
vs. Radhika and another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.
6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment
and order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for the
offences punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9860/2013
7. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 15.3.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at
Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Petition No. 1936/2013, by which the High
Court has allowed the said application preferred by the respondents
herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Accused’), and in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has
quashed the proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under
Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act,
the State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
8. The facts leading to this
appeal are, that on 21.12.2012 one truck driver by name Janki Kushwah informed the
complainant – Malkhan Singh Yadav, who is also a truck driver that his truck
was having some problem and he is nearSitapur village. The complainant reached
there and found that his brother Mangal had also reached there with his truck.
It is alleged that when they were busy in repairing the truck, four persons at
around 5:00 a.m. came from the Sitapur village and they had beaten all of them
with legs and fists and snatched cash of Rs.7,300/and two Nokia mobiles having
Sim Nos. 9411955930 & 7599256400 from the complainant – Malkhan Singh
Yadav, Rs.19,000/from Mangal and Rs.16,500/from Janki Kushwah and a Spice
mobile having Sim No. 8756194727. That the complainant is driving on that route
since last 7 to 8 years and sometimes also stayed in Sitapur village. According
to the complainant, all the four persons were known to him and one of them,
namely, accused Tinku Sharma was having ‘Addhi’ in his hand, the second one was
Ravi Sharma, who was having gun in his hand, and the other two were Babloo
Sharma and Bhurerai. All the accused persons after robbing the complainant, Mangal
and Janki Kushwah, went towards Sitapur village.
8.1 That at 6:30 a.m., the complainant went to Goraghat Police Station,
District Datia and lodged the first information report, which was registered as
Crime No. 159 of 2012 against the accused under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13
of M.P.D.V.P.K. Actand 25/27 of the Arms Act. Thereafter, the investigation was
started and the police reached the spot of the incident and prepared spot map
and also recorded the statement of witnesses. Thereafter, they sent the
complainant and two other persons to the District Hospital, Datia for medical
examination, where the Medical Officer found simple injuries on various body
parts of them.
8.2 The police on 27.01.2013 reached to the house of the accused
persons and in the village but could not found them and ultimately prepared the
ascendance panchnama. On 14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Datia issued proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused
persons to appear before him on 16.04.2013. Meanwhile, on 12.03.2013, the
accused persons approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior
for quashing of FIR No. 159/2012, registered against them at Police Station
Goraghat, District Datia for the offences punishable under Section 394 of the
IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act.
9. That, by the impugned
judgment and order, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482
of Cr.P.C., has quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused on theground
that the accused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. While
quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Court has
considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra).
10. Feeling aggrieved and
dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order, quashing the criminal
proceedings against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 394
of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and 25/27 of the Arms Act, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.
11. So far as the criminal
appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9859/2013 is concerned, it is required to
be noted that the accused were facing the criminal proceedings for the offences
punishable under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC. It was alleged against
the accused that at the time of commission of the offence, the accused Dhruv
Gurjar fired from his fire arm on the original complainant with an intention to
kill him, and the original complainant sustained serious injuries and the
pellets struck on three places of his body, i.e., on the forehead, left shoulder
and left ear. That incident took place on 17.12.2012 and the investigating
officer commenced the investigation, recorded the statement of the witnesses
under Section 161 of theCr.P.C. on 18.12.2012. The investigating officer also
seized the articles. The Investigating officer also collected the medical evidence.
It appears that one of the coaccused, namely, Rohit Gurjar was arrested on
21.03.2013. Nothing in on record to show, whether in fact the respondent no.1
herein, the main accused – original accused no.1 was arrested or not. It
appears that during the investigation, immediately, the original accused no.1 –
Dhruv Gurjar approached the High Court on 5.4.2013 by filing an application
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR. Immediately on the
fourth day of filing of the application, by the impugned judgment and order
dated 8.4.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that
there is a settlement arrived at between the complainant and the accused. While
quashing the FIR, the High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in
the case of Shjji (supra), specially the observations recorded by this Court “that where
there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons and the
entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise of futility, the criminal
case registered against the accused persons, though it may not be compoundable,
can bequashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C”.
12. Now so far as the criminal
appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013 is concerned, original accused were facing the
criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of
M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act. The incident was alleged
to happen on 21.12.2012. Immediately, the investigating officer started the
investigation. All the accused were absconding. That when the investigation was
in progress, the original accused approached the High Court by way of an
application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on 12.03.2013 and prayed for
quashing of the FIR. That on 14.03.2013, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate
issued proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons
to appear before him on 16.04.2013. That, by the impugned judgment and order
dated 15.03.2013, the High Court has quashed the FIR solely on the ground that
the original complainant and the accused has entered into a compromise. Hence,
the present appeals.
13. Shri Varun K. Chopra,
learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh has
vehemently submitted that inboth these cases, the High Court has committed a
grave error in quashing the respective FIRs which were for the offences under Sections
307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and
Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively.
13.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellantState that in the present cases the High Court has
quashed the respective FIRs mechanically and solely on the basis of the settlement/compromise
between the complainant and the accused, without even considering the gravity
and seriousness of the offences alleged against the accused persons.
13.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellantState that while exercising the powers under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the respective FIRs, the High Court has not at all
considered the fact that the offences alleged were against the society at large
and not restricted to the personal disputes between the two individuals.
13.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellantState that the High Court has misread the decision of
this Court in the case of Shiji (supra),while quashing the respective FIRs. It is vehemently submitted by
the learned counsel that the High Court ought to have appreciated that in all
the cases where the complainant has compromised/entered into a settlement with
the accused, that need not necessarily mean resulting into no chance of
recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of a trial destined to be exercise
of futility. It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellantState that in a given case despite the complainant may
not support in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromise
with the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against the accused
persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on the basis of the
medical evidence and/or other evidence/material. It is submitted that in the
present cases the investigation was in progress and even the statement of the witnesses
was recorded and the medical evidence was also collected. It is submitted that
therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court has
clearly erred in considering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the
case of Shiji
(supra).
13.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellantState that as such in the appeal arising out of
SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, in fact, the accused were absconding from the day of
the commission of the offence and, in fact, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Datia issued a proclamation under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against
the accused persons to appear before him. It is submitted that in between the
day of the alleged commission of the offence and filing of the application
before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., and while they were
absconding, the accused managed to get the affidavits of the complainant and
other witnesses, which were dated 9.2.2013. It is submitted that all these aforesaid
circumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused were required to be
considered by the High Court while quashing the FIR in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and more particularly when the
offences alleged were against the society at large, namely, robbery and under
the Arms Act, and in fact noncompoundable. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the appellantState has placed reliance on the decisions of
this Court in the cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of
MadhyaPradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish
(2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of
Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State
of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh,
decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019.
13.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellantState has prayed to allow the present appeals and quash and set aside
the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court quashing and setting
aside the respective FIRs, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C.
14. Per contra, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has supported the impugned judgments
and orders passed by the High Court.
14.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned advocate appearing
on behalf of the accused that in the facts and circumstances of the case and
when the complainant and theaccused entered into a compromise and settled the
disputes amicably among themselves, and therefore when the High Court found
that there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons and
the entire exercise of a trial would be an exercise of futility, the High Court
has rightly exercised the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has rightly
quashed the respective FIRs. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for
the accused has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Jitendra Raghuvanshi
vs. Babita Raghuvanshi (2013) 4 SCC 58; Anita Maria Dias vs. State of
Maharashtra (2018) 3 SCC 290; and Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar vs. Union
of India (2018) 10 SCC 443.
14.2 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid
decisions of this Court, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeals.
15. Heard learned counsel for
the respective parties at length.
16. At the outset, it is
required to be noted that in the present appeals, the High Court in exercise of
its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. has quashed the FIRs for the
offences under Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC,11/13 of
M.P.D.V.P.K. Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively, solely on the
basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of
the compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision
of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), the High Court has observed that there is no chance of
recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a
trial would be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the respective FIRs.
16.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact
that the offences alleged were noncompoundable offences as per Section 320 of
the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgments and orders, it appears that the High
Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the
case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social impact.
From the impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court, it appears
that the High Court has mechanically quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise
of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all
considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong
and the social impact. As observed by this Court in thecase of State of Maharashtra
vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercising the powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire
facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement.
As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the
said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and
courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all taken
pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and
has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the
respective FIRs by the High Court in the present cases for the offences under
Sections 307, 294 and 34 of the IPC and 394 of the IPC, 11/13 of M.P.D.V.P.K.
Act and Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act respectively, and that too in exercise
of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid
down by this Court in a catena of decisions.
16.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, this Court has observed and held as under:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding
or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences
under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz.:
(i)
to secure the ends of justice, or
(ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the
criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and
the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though
the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to
the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.;
cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly
the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its
view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation ofthe criminal
case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the
High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest
of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends
of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if
the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall
be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
16.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, after considering the
decision in the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under: “29. In view of
the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by
which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or
refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences
under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the
High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the parties havesettled the matter
between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding
factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the
High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed
under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes
should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among
themselves.
29.5. While
exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as
crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPCin the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It
would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by
the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report
in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding
factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine
as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it
would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the
offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the
Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is
going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future
relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section
482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases
where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of
offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation.
It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and
even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge
is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy
stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably,
but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.
On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence isalmost complete or after
the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally
the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the
case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the
conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties
would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under
Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and,
therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a
crime.”
16.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Court has had an occasion to consider whether the
High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering a catena of
decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the following
propositions:
“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves
powers which inhere in the High Court.
(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not thesame
as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions
of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if
the offence is noncompoundable.
(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482,
the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise
of the inherent power.
(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii)
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
(5) the decision as to whether a complaint or first information
report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have
settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulate.
(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences
involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have
settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial
in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences.
(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil
dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned.
(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour mayin appropriate situations fall for quashing where
parties have settled the dispute.
(9) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility
of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause
oppression and prejudice; and
(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
Propositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving the financial and
economic wellbeing of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain
of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a
financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”
16.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specifically observed and held that, when it
comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34
IPC (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9859/2013) along with Sections 25 and 27
of the Arms Act (as in the appeal @ SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013), by no stretch of
imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private parties
simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on
the society at large. It is further observed that where the accused are facing trial
under Sections 307, 294 read with Section 34 IPC as well as Sections 25 and 27
of the Arms Act, as the offences are definitelyagainst the society, accused
will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating
their innocence.
16.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specifically observed that as offence under
Section 307 IPC is noncompoundable and as the offence under Section 307 is not
a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the
society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not
permissible. Similar is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of
this Court in the case of Kalyan Singh (supra).
17. Now so far as the
decisions of this Court upon which the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the accused has placed reliance, referred to hereinabove, are concerned, none
of the decisions shall be of any assistance to the accused in the present case.
In all the aforesaid cases, the dispute was a matrimonial dispute, and/or the
dispute predominantly of a civil dispute, and/or of the dispute where the wrong
is basically private or personal.
18. Now so far as the reliance
placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the respective
FIRs by observing that as the complainant hascompromised with the accused,
there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial
would be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High
Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIRs on the aforesaid ground. It
appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the said decision to the
facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is
not in every case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the
accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and
many a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the
prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining
the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when
the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is
not a private wrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this Court found that the case had its origin in the civil
dispute between the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore
this Court observed that, ‘that being so, continuance of the prosecution where
the complainant is not ready to support the allegations…will be a futile
exercise that will serve no purpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also
further observed ‘thateven the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely
related to the complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version’, and to
that this Court observed and held ‘that the continuance of the proceedings is
nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in such
circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the
process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below.
Even in the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observed as under:
“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of
the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High
Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the
nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in
cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view
that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations
in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we
need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of
justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in
the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining
interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume
the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have
to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is
a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.”
18.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case
which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties have
resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society at large
and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/matrimonial
dispute etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the offences
alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a social impact like
offences under Section 307 IPC and 25/27 of the Arms Act etc. Therefore,
without proper application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, in
our view, the High Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the respective
FIRs, by observing that in view of the compromise, there are no chances of
recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility.
The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court
in the case of Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of
the case.
18.2 Even otherwise, in the facts and circumstances of the case
of the appeal arising from SLP(Crl.) No. 9860/2013, the High Court has erred in
quashing the FIR. It is required to be noted that the FIR was lodged on
21.12.2012 for the offence alleged to happen on 21.12.2012. All the accused were
absconding. After a period of approximately three months, they approached the
High Court by way of filing a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., i.e.,
on 12.03.2013. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate issued a proclamation
under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C. against the accused persons on 14.03.2013. In
the meantime, the accused managed to get the affidavits of the complainant and
the two witnesses dated 09.02.2013, and the High Court quashed the FIR on
15.03.2013, i.e., within a period of three days from the date of filing the
petition. The High Court has also not considered the antecedents of the
accused. It has come on record that the accused persons were facing number of trials
for the serious offences. The aforesaid would be relevant factors, while
exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C and while considering
the application for quashing the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings. In fact,
in such a situation, the High Court ought to have been more vigilant and ought
to have considered relevant facts and circumstances under which the accused got
the settlement entered into. The High Court has not at all considered the
aforesaid relevant circumstances, while exercising the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
19. In view of the above and
for the reasons stated, both these appeals succeed, and are hereby allowed. The
impugned judgments and orders passed by the High Court are hereby set aside,
and the respective FIRs/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against
the respective accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law.
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