Lawyer did not take Timely Steps which resulted in Causing Delay cannot be a Sufficient Cause under Limitation Act [SC JUDGMENT]
The Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Second Appeal - Delay of
1942 days - Lawyer did not take timely steps, which resulted in causing delay
in its filing / refiling, then, it cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause.
If, according to the appellants-HUDA,
their lawyer did not take timely steps, which resulted in causing delay in its
filing/refiling, then, in our view, it cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In our view, it was
equally the duty of the appellants (their legal managers) to see that the
appeal be filed in time. If the appellants noticed that their lawyer was not
taking interest in attending to the brief in question, then they should have
immediately engaged some other lawyer to ensure that the appeal be filed in
time by another lawyer. In our view, it is a clear case where the
appellant-HUDA,i.e., their officers, who were incharge of the legal cell
failed to discharge their duty assigned to them promptly and with due diligence
despite availability of all facilities and infrastructure. In such
circumstances, the officers-in-charge of the case should be made answerable
for the lapse on their part and make good the loss suffered by the
appellants-HUDA.
The Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 - Delay of 1942 days in
filing the second appeal - delay was inordinate - it was not properly explained
- the ground alleged in support of application did not constitute a sufficient
cause.
A delay of 1942 days (4 years 6
months), in our view, is wholly inordinate and the cause pleaded for its
condonation is equally unexplained by the appellants. In any case, the
explanation given does not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was, therefore, rightly not condoned by the
High Court and we concur with the finding of the High Court.
Facts of the Case
The appellant HUDA is a statutory
authority created under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977. It
has its wellestablished legal department to look after the legal cases filed
by HUDA and against the HUDA in various Courts. They have panel of lawyers to
defend their interest in Courts. It is not in dispute that the appellants had
been contesting the civil suit and the first appeal since inception. The
appellants were, therefore, fully aware of the adverse orders passed in the
first appeal against them. There was, therefore, no justification on their part
to keep quiet for such a long time and not to file the appeal within 90 days
or/and refile it immediately after curing the defects.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE] AND [DINESH MAHESHWARI] JJ.
March 12, 2019
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.50515052 OF 2009
Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Gopi Chand Atreja …Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. These appeals are directed
against the final judgment and orders dated 23.01.2008 and 05.05.2008 passed by
the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No.4110 of 2007
and R.A.C. No.23C of 2008 in R.S.A. No.4110 of 2007 respectively whereby the
High Court dismissed the second appeal as well as the review application filed
by the appellants herein.
2. These
appeals involve a short point as would be clear from the facts mentioned
hereinbelow.
3. The appellants herein is
the Haryana Urban Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “HUDA”).
They are the defendants whereas the respondent is the plaintiff in the civil
suit out of which these appeals arise.
4. The respondent filed a
civil suit being Civil Suit No.305 of 2000 in the Court of Civil Judge(Jr. Division),
Karnal against the appellants(HUDA) claiming a decree for declaration with
consequential relief of permanent and mandatory injunction in relation to the
suit land. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court on contest vide
judgment/decree dated 01.05.2001.
5. The appellants
(defendants) felt aggrieved and filed first appeal being Civil Appeal No.92 of
2001 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Karnal. By judgment dated
07.02.2002, the first Appellate Courtdismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment/decree
of the Trial Court.
6. The appellants felt
aggrieved and filed second appeal in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh.
Since the appeal filed by the appellant was barred by 1942 days, the appellants
filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and prayed for
condoning the delay in filing the second appeal.
7. By impugned order dated
23.01.2008, the High Court rejected the application and declined to condone the
delay. The High Court held that the cause pleaded by the appellants for
condoning the delay is not a sufficient cause. As a consequence, the second appeal
was also dismissed as being barred by limitation.
8. Challenging the said
order, the appellants filed a review petition. By order dated 05.02.2008, the
High Court also dismissed the review petition.
9. Against the orders dated
23.01.2008 and 05.02.2008, the appellants(defendants) have filed these appeals
by way of special leave in this Court.
10. So, the short question,
which arises for consideration in these appeals, is whether the High Court was
justified in dismissing the appellants’ second appeal on the ground of
limitation.
11. In other words, the
question arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the High Court
was justified in not condoning the delay of 1942 days in filing the second
appeal by the appellants(defendants).
12. Heard Mr. Vishwa Pal
Singh, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Gagan Gupta, learned counsel for
the respondent.
13. Having heard the learned
counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit
in these appeals.
14. In our view, the delay of
1942 days in filing the second appeal in the High Court was rightly not condoned
by the High Court for the reasons mentioned below.
15. First, the delay was
inordinate; Second it was not properly explained; and Third, the ground alleged
in support of application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not
constitute a sufficient cause.
16. The appellantHUDA is a
statutory authority created under the Haryana Urban Development Authority Act,
1977. It has its wellestablished legal department to look after the legal cases
filed by HUDA and against the HUDA in various Courts. They have panel of
lawyers to defend their interest in Courts.
17. It is not in dispute that
the appellants had been contesting the civil suit and the first appeal sinceinception.
The appellants were, therefore, fully aware of the adverse orders passed in the
first appeal against them. There was, therefore, no justification on their part
to keep quiet for such a long time and not to file the appeal within 90 days
or/and refile it immediately after curing the defects.
18. If, according to the
appellantsHUDA, their lawyer did not take timely steps, which resulted in causing
delay in its filing/refiling, then, in our view, it cannot be regarded as a
sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. In our view, it was
equally the duty of the appellants (their legal managers) to see that the
appeal be filed in time. If the appellants noticed that their lawyer was not
taking interest in attending to the brief in question, then they should have
immediately engaged some other lawyer to ensure that the appeal be filed in
time by another lawyer.
20. In our view, it is a
clear case where the appellant-HUDA, i.e., their officers, who were incharge of
the legal cell failed to discharge their duty assigned to them promptly and
with due diligence despite availability of all facilities and infrastructure.
In such circumstances, the officersincharge of the case should be made
answerable for the lapse on their part and make good the loss suffered by the
appellantsHUDA.
21. A delay of 1942 days (4
years 6 months), in our view, is wholly inordinate and the cause pleaded for
its condonation is equally unexplained by the appellants. In any case, the
explanation given does not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was, therefore, rightly not condoned by the
High Court and we concur with the finding of the High Court.
22. The appeals thus fail and
are accordingly dismissed.