Whether an Offence involving Bodily Injury can be categorized as a Crime involving Moral Turpitude [SC JUDGMENT]
Service
Law – Offence involving Moral Turpitude - Discharged from service - Whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized
as a crime involving moral turpitude.
In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very
difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral
turpitude. A simple assault is
different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt
cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand,
the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may may
result in an offence involving moral turpitude.
In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to
cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the
injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall
consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime
committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent
is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged
from service.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
[L. NAGESWARA RAO] AND [M.R.SHAH]
JJ.
April 26, 2019
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7011 of
2009
The State Bank of India
& Others. .... Appellants
Versus
P. Soupramaniane ….
Respondent
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. The
Respondent who was working as a Messenger in the State Bank of India at
Puducherry was discharged from service by an order dated 15.05.1986. The appeal
filed by the Respondent against the order of discharge was dismissed on
03.07.1986. Later, the Staff Union took up the cause of the Respondent and made
a representation on his behalf which was also rejected on 04.05.1992. Challenging
the aforementioned orders, the Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High
Court of Judicature at Madras which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on 07.06.2000.
Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent filed a Writ Appeal which was allowed by the
Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The order of discharge of the Respondent
from service was set aside and the Appellants were directed to reinstate the
Respondent. The Appellants were directed to pay 1/4th of
the salary from the date of discharge till the date of reinstatement as back
wages. Notice was issued by this Court in Special Leave Petition filed by the
Appellants on 01.09.2009 and the judgment of the High Court was stayed.
Thereafter, leave was granted on 19.10.2009 and the interim order was made
absolute. We are informed that the Respondent has attained the age of
superannuation on 31.12.2012.
2. Since the
discharge of the Respondent from service is on the basis of conviction for an
offence involving moral turpitude, it is necessary to refer to the facts of the
criminal case. A report was submitted by the Station House Officer (SHO), Grand
Bazaar Police Station, Puducherry
that on 17.06.1983 at 9.00 hours
the Respondent voluntarily stabbed Karthiban s/o Dharamssivam and Sivagurunathan
s/o Brame Dhanabal with a broken soda bottle. On completion of investigation, charge
sheet was filed against the Respondent. Thereafter, charge was framed under
Section 307 IPC. After appreciation of the evidence on-record, the trial court
found that the Respondent had no intention to cause murder of the victims who
were examined as PWs-1 and 2. The injuries were certified as simple by PW-5.
The trial court was of the opinion that there was no material to convict the
Respondent under Section 307 IPC. However, the trial court convicted the
Respondent under Section 324 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for
three months. The motive for the crime was an earlier dispute between two
groups belonging to different political parties. The conviction was affirmed by
the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court released the Respondent on probation
as it was of the opinion that the Respondent was a fit person to be dealt with
under Section 360 CrPC. One of the reasons given by the Appellate Court to
release the Respondent on probation was that the Respondent was employed as a Messenger
in a Bank and any sentence of imprisonment would affect his career.
3. As stated
earlier, discharge of the Respondent from service was on the ground of his
conviction by a criminal court for an offence involving moral turpitude.
4. Section
10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 provides that conviction by a
criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude shall disentitle a
person from continuing in employment of a banking company. The Writ Appeal
filed by the Respondent was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court on
the ground that the criminal court released the Respondent under probation in exercise
of its power under Section 360 CrPC to enable the Respondent to continue in
service. The High Court was of the opinion that the purpose of the order of the
criminal court would be defeated if the Respondent is discharged from service.
Another reason given by the High Court is that the provision of law under which
the bank discharged the Respondent from service was not mentioned and no reasons
were assigned by the bank in the order of discharge.
5. We do not
agree with the reasons given by the High Court for setting aside the order of
discharge and directing the reinstatement of the Respondent in service. A
showcause notice was issued to the Respondent in which it was categorically mentioned
that the Respondent cannot continue in service after his conviction in a
criminal case involving moral turpitude in view of Section 10(1)(b)(i) of the
Banking Regulation Act, 1949. After considering the explanation of the
Respondent, an order of discharge was passed. The High Court is not right in
holding that no reasons had been given by the bank for discontinuing the Respondent
from service. The High Court committed an error in holding that the order of
discharge should be set aside on the ground that the provision of law under
which the Respondent was discharged was not mentioned in the order. Yet another
reason given by the High Court for interference with the order of discharge is
that the criminal court released the Respondent on probation only to permit him
to continue in service. The release under probation does not entitle an
employee to claim a right to continue in service. In fact the employer is under
an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offence
involving moral turpitude. Sushil Kumar Singhal v. Punjab
National Bank, (2010) 8 SCC 573 The observations made by a criminal court are not
binding (This Court has observed on multiple occasions that in criminal
jurisdiction, Courts do not have the power to pass a direction that the said
conviction will not have any impact on the convict’s services. See: Girraj
Prasad Meena v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 13 SCC 674) on the employer who has the liberty of dealing with
his employees suitably.
6. Though we
do not agree with the reasons given by the High Court for setting aside the
order of discharge of the Respondent from service, it is necessary to examine whether
Section 10 (1)(b)(i) of Banking Regulation Act is applicable to the facts of
the case. Conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude disqualifies a
person from continuing in service in a bank. The conundrum that arises in this
case is whether the conviction of the Respondent under Section 324 IPC can be
said to be for an offence involving moral turpitude.
7. Moral
Turpitude’ as defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.)
is as follows:
“The Act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in the private
and social duties which man owes to his follow man, or to society in general,
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” (p.
1008)
“implies something immoral in itself regardless of it being
punishable by law”; “restricted to the gravest offences, consisting of
felonies, infamous crimes, and those that are malum in se and disclose a
depraved mind.” (p. 1517)
According to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, ‘Moral Turpitude’ is :
“An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
man.”
Burton Legal Thesaurus defines ‘Moral Turpitude’ as :
“Bad faith, bad repute, corruption, defilement, delinquency,
discredit, dishonor, shame, guilt, knavery, misdoing, perversion, shame, ice, wrong.”
8. There is
no doubt that there is an obligation on the Management of the Bank to
discontinue the services of an employee who has been convicted by a criminal
court for an offence involving moral turpitude. Sushil
Kumar Singhal (supra) Though every offence is a crime against the society,
discontinuance from service according to the Banking Regulation Act can be only
for committing an offence involving moral turpitude. Acts which disclose
depravity and wickedness of character can be categorized as offences involving
moral turpitude. Whether an offence involves moral turpitude or not depends
upon the facts (Allahabad Bank v. Deepak
Kumar Bhola) and the circumstances (Pawan
Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1996) 4 SCC 17) of the case. Ordinarily, the tests that can be applied for
judging an offence involving moral turpitude are:
a) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could
shock the moral conscience or society in general;
b) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one, and
c) Whether on account of the act having been committed the
perpetrators could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was
to be looked down upon by the society. Mangali v. Chakki Lal, AIR 1963 ALL 527
The other important factors that are to be kept in mind to
conclude that an offence involves moral turpitude are :– the person who commits
the offence; the person against whom it is committed; the manner and circumstances
in which it is alleged to have been committed; and the values of the society. Jorabhai
Hirabhai Rabari v. District Development Officer, Mehsana, AIR 1996 Guj 3. According to the National Incident – Based Reporting System
(NIBRS), a crime data collection system used in the United States of America,
each offence belongs to one of the three categories which are: crimes against
persons, crimes against property, and crimes against society. Crimes against
persons include murder, rape, and assault where the victims are always
individuals. The object of crimes against property, for example, robbery and
burglary is to obtain money, property, or some other benefits. Crimes against
society for example gambling, prostitution, and drug violations, represent
society’s prohibition against engaging in certain types of activities.
Conviction of any alien of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for deportation
under the Immigration Law in the United States of America. To qualify as a
crime involving moral turpitude for such purpose, it requires both
reprehensible conduct and scienter, whether with specific intent, deliberateness,
willfulness or recklessness. Cristoval Silva – Trevina 241 & N Dec 687 (AG
2008)
9. There can
be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed
as involving moral turpitude e.g.
offences under the Prevention of
Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in
this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a
crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an
assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence
involving moral turpitude. A
simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or
simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the
other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the
victim may may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant
case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims.
The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were
simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are
of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve
moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral
turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.
10. For the
aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the High Court. The Appeal is
dismissed accordingly.
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