Advocate - An advocate is duty bound to act as per the higher
status conferred upon him as an officer of the court. He plays a vital role in
preservation of society and justice delivery system. Advocate has no business
to threaten a Judge or hurl abuses for judicial order which he has passed. In
case of complaint of the Judge, it was open to the advocate to approach
concerned higher authorities but there is no licence to any member of the Bar
to indulge in such undignified conduct to lower down the dignity of the Court.
Such attempts deserve to be nipped at the earliest as there is no room to such
attack by a member of noble profession.
The role of a lawyer is indispensable
in the justice delivery system. He has to follow the professional ethics and
also to maintain high standards. He has to assist the court and also defend the
interest of his client. He has to give due regard to his opponent and also to
his counsel. What may be proper to others in the society, may be improper for
him to do as he belongs to an intellectual class of the society and as a member
of the noble profession, the expectations from him are accordingly higher.
Advocates are held in high esteem in the society. The dignity of court is in
fact dignity of the system of which an advocate being officer of the court. The
act of the advocate in the present case is not only improper but requires gross
condemnation. [Paras 7 and 8]
Facts of the Case
In the instant case the advocate has
acted contrary to the obligations. He has set a bad example before others while
destroying the dignity of the court and the Judge. The action has the effect of
weakening of confidence of the people in courts. The judiciary is one of the
main pillars of democracy and is essential to peaceful and orderly development
of society. The Judge has to deliver justice in a fearless and impartial
manner. He cannot be intimidated in any manner or insulted by hurling abuses.
Judges are not fearful saints. They have to be fearless preachers so as to
preserve the independence of the judiciary which is absolutely necessary for
survival of democracy.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION
(ARUN MISHRA) AND (NAVIN SINHA) JJ.
MAY 10, 2019
CRIMINAL APPEAL
NO.1223 OF 2015
RAKESH TIWARI,
ADVOCATE … APPELLANT
VERSUS
ALOK PANDEY, C.J.M. …
RESPONDENT
Petitioner's Advocate : Vidhi International
Respondent's Advocate : Jagjit Singh Chhabra
J U D G M E N T
ARUN MISHRA, J.
1. The appellant, advocate,
has been convicted for his undesirable conduct by the High Court vide impugned
judgment and order under the Contempt of Courts Act and has been sentenced to
simple imprisonment of six months and a fine of Rs.2000/- and in case of
non-payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 15
days. He has also been directed not to enter the premises of the District
Judgeship, Allahabad for a period of six months w.e.f. 15.7.2015 and the contemnor
shall remain under constant watch of the District Judge, Allahabad, for a
period of two years; and in case of any objectionable conduct, causing
interference in peaceful and smooth functioning of the court, the District
Judge has been asked to report the matter to the High Court.
2. The contemnor has been
charged with criminal contempt to the following effect:
“Sri Rakesh Tripathi, Advocate, on 21st December, 2012 during lunch hour without taking permission from
C.J.M., Allahabad entered into his chamber along with 2-3 colleagues and at the
said point of time he started hurling filthy abuses to the CJM and the matter
did not end there, as he also raised his hand to beat the Chief Judicial Magistrate
and also threatened him of dire consequences. The contemnor also asked the
C.J.M. as to why he has not passed an order for lodging F.I.R. when he had
asked for the same. This act on the part of the contemnor constitutes criminal
contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as
this act has not only lowered the authority of the Court but also scandalised
the Court and the same has also the tendency of interference with the due
course of administration of justice.”
3. The reply was filed by the
contemnor to the effect that he had filed an application on behalf of Akhilesh
Kumar Shukla on 19.10.2012 under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which was heard by
C.J.M. of Allahabad on 30.10.2012 and 8.11.2012 was the date fixed for passing
the order. The contemnor alleged that before pronouncement of the order on
8.11.2012 he saw one of the accused, Sharad Tandon, General Manager, District
Industries Centre, Allahabad, sitting in the chamber of the CJM. He apprehended
that his client will not get justice, hence, he moved an application on 8.11.2012
before the Chief Judicial Magistrate not to pass any order since the contemnor
was willing to file a transfer application before the District Judge,
Allahabad. The CJM assured not to pass any order but actually passed an order
on the same day by converting application filed under section 156(3) Cr.PC into
a complaint case registered as Case No.13500 of 2012. The CJM took away the
application from record.Thereafter, the contemnor moved an application before
the District & Sessions Judge, Allahabad on 9.11.2012 making a complaint
against the CJM, Allahabad.
4. Another application was
filed by the contemnor on 30.11.2012 under section 156(3) Cr. P.C. by counsel
appearing on behalf of Alok Kumar Shukla. He stated to the CJM that he had
moved an application before the Sessions Judge, Allahabad, hence, CJM should
not pass any order. The same should be placed before the Sessions Judge,
Allahabad for assigning the same to some other court. In January, 2013 the
contemnor came to know that the CJM had passed an order on 18.12.2012 treating
the application registered as Complaint Case No.1919/2013. Initially, it was
registered as Miscellaneous Application No.1747/XII/2012. Non-bailable warrant
has been issued in the same. He did not enter into the chamber of the CJM on
21.12.2012, neither abused nor threatened him to beat. The advocates were on
strike on the said date. There was no question of entering the chamber of CJM
or to use filthy language.
5. The High Court has found
the contemnor along with 2-3 junior advocates entered the chamber of the CJM
and misbehaved as well as attempted to assault him. No application was filed by
him on 8.11.2012 before the CJM not to pass any order. It was a concocted
story. The Magistrate did not reject the application outright and required the
complainant to adduce evidence which course was available to him. The contemnor
did not pursue the matter and got the earlier case dismissed as not pressed and
filed second application. On this the CJM has again registered the complaint
case. The matter is pending in which non4 bailable warrant has been issued against the accused. The
allegation of sympathy towards accused by the Magistrate has been found to be
unfounded, baseless and figment of imagination of contemnor. The defense taken
has not been substantiated by the contemnor.
6. The High Court has observed
that considering the increasing tendency of the advocates in making scurrilous
allegations against the Presiding Officers of subordinate courts has to be
curbed. The acts of abusing and misbehaving are on increase. The action of the
advocate amounts to lowering the dignity and majesty of the court. A deliberate
attempt to scandalise a judicial officer of subordinate court is bound to shake
the confidence of the litigant public in the system and has to be tackled
strictly. Damage is not only to the reputation of the Judge but also to the
fair name of the judiciary. Judges cannot be tamed by such tactics into
submission to secure a desired order. The foundation of the system is based on
independence and impartiality of the Judges as well as responsibility to impart
justice. In case their confidence, impartiality and reputation are shaken the
same is bound to adversely affect the independence of the judiciary.
7. In our opinion, an advocate
is duty bound to act as per the higher status conferred upon him as an officer
of the court. He plays a vital role in preservation of society and justice
delivery system. Advocate has no business to threaten a Judge or hurl abuses
for judicial order which he has passed. In case of complaint of the Judge, it
was open to the advocate to approach concerned higher authorities but there is
no licence to any member of the Bar to indulge insuch undignified conduct to
lower down the dignity of the Court. Such attempts deserve to be nipped at the
earliest as there is no room to such attack by a member of noble profession.
8. The role of a lawyer is
indispensable in the justice delivery system. He has to follow the professional
ethics and also to maintain high standards. He has to assist the court and also
defend the interest of his client. He has to give due regard to his opponent
and also to his counsel. What may be proper to others in the society, may be
improper for him to do as he belongs to an intellectual class of the society
and as a member of the noble profession, the expectations from him are
accordingly higher. Advocates are held in high esteem in the society. The
dignity of court is in fact dignity of the system of which an advocate being officer
of the court. The act of the advocate in the present case is not only improper
but requires gross condemnation.
9. It has been observed by
this Court in the matter of Mr. ‘G‚‘, A Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 557 that an
advocate has to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable
profession. Following observations have been made in para 41 :
“41. .......
“with ordinary legal rights, but with the special and rigid
rules of professional conduct expected of and applied to a specially priviledged
class of persons who, because of their priviledged status, are subject to
certain disabilities which do not attach to other men and which do not attach
even to them in a non-professional character. ... He [a legal practitioner} is
bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable
profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if he departs
from thehigh standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of
him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action.”
10. Similarly in Lalit Mohan Das v.
Advocate General, Orissa AIR 1957 SC 250, this Court observed :
“A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and
must place before the Court all that can faitly and reasonably be submitted on
behalf of his client. He may even submit that a particular order is not correct
and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the Bar
is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is
appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything
to bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly
overstepped the limits of propriety when he made imputations of partiality and
unfairness against the Munsif in open Court. In suggesting that the Munsif
followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult to injury,
because preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, which order had been
upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalising the Court in such manner is
really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant
indulged in was not a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a
member of the judicial service; it brought into disrepute the whole
administration of justice. From that point of view, the conduct of the
appellant was highly reprehensible.”
11. The main question urged is
as to the sentence to be imposed in the case. In Supreme Court Bar
Association v. Union of India & Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 409, this Court has laid down that though it is
not permissible for a court to suspend the licence to practice but at the same
time it is open to this Court or the High Court to debar an advocate from
appearing in the court. This Court has laid down that though suspension of a
lawyer is not permissible to be ordered but when he is convicted under the
contempt of court, it is possible for this Court or the High Court to prevent
the advocate to appear in the court. The Court has observed:
“80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or
the High Court, the prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it till he
purges himself of the contempt but that is much different from suspending or
revoking his license or debarring him to practice as an advocate. In a case of
contemptuous, contumacious, unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an
Advocate-on-Record, this court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court
Rules itself, to withdraw his privilege to practice as an Advocate-an- Record
because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the power to grant the
privilege includes the power to revoke or suspend it. The withdrawal of that
privilege, however, does not amount to suspending or revoking his license to
practice as an advocate in other courts or Tribunals.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. In Pravin C. Shah v.
K.A. Mohd. Ali & Anr. (2001) 8 SCC 650, this Court observed that an advocate found
guilty of contempt cannot have an unreserved right to appear in court, the
court may refuse to hear him:
“17. When the rules stipulate that a person who committed contempt
of court cannot have the unreserved right to continue to appear and plead and
conduct cases in the courts without any qualm or remorse, the Bar Council
cannot overrule such a regulation concerning the orderly conduct of court
proceedings. Courts of law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect
and reverence for the majesty of law and justice. The machinery for
dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the court. Proceedings
inside the courts are always expected to be held in a dignified and orderly
manner. The very sight of an advocate, who was found guilty of contempt of
court on the previous hour, standing in the court and arguing a case or
crossexamining a witness on the same day, unaffected by the contemptuous
behavior he hurled at the court, would erode the dignity of the court and even
corrode the majesty of it besides impairing the confidence of the public in the
efficacy of the institution of the courts. This necessitates vesting of power
with the High Court to formulate rules for regulating the proceeding inside the
court including the conduct of advocates during such proceedings. That power
should not be confused with the right to practice law. While the Bar Council
can exercise control over the latter the High Court should be in control of the
former.
*** *** ***
20. Lord Denning had observed as follows in Hadkinson vs. Hadkinson
1952 (2) All ER 567: (All ER p.575B-C)
"…I am of the opinion that the fact that a party to a
cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his
being heard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it
impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the
court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the
court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed
or good reason is shown why it should not be removed."
*** *** ***
35. It is still open to the respondent Advocate to purge
himself of the contempt in the manner indicated above. But until that process
is completed respondent Advocate cannot act or plead in any court situated
within the domain of the Kerala High Court, including the subordinate courts
thereunder. The Registrar of the High Court of Kerala shall intimate all the
courts about this interdict as against the respondent-advocates.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. In Bar Council of India
v. High Court of Kerala (2004) 6 SCC 311, this Court has observed thus:
“29. Punishment for commission of contempt and punishment for
misconduct, professional or other misconduct, stand on different footings.
A person does not have a fundamental right to practice in any court. Such a
right is conferred upon him under the provisions of the Advocates Act which
necessarily would mean that the conditions laid down therein would be
applicable in relation thereto. Section 30 of the Act uses the expressions "subject
to", which would include Section 34 of the Act.“
(emphasis supplied)
14. In R K Anand v.
Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106, this Court has observed that advocate can be
disallowed from appearing in court on being found guilty of contempt of court:
“238. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. the direction prohibiting an advocate from appearing in court
for a specified period was viewed as a total and complete denial of his right
to practice law and the bar was considered as a punishment inflicted on him. In
Ex. Capt. Harish
Uppal it was seen
not as punishment for professional misconduct but as a measure necessary to
regulate the court's proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning
of the courts. We may respectfully add that in a given case a direction
disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in
court may not only be a measure to maintain the dignity and orderly
functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self-protection of
the court and for preservation of the purity of court proceedings. Let us, for
example, take the case where an advocate is shown to have accepted money in the
name of a judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or where an advocate is
found tampering with the court's record; or where an advocate is found actively
taking part in faking court orders (fake bail orders are not unknown in several
High Courts!); or where an advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and
abuse judges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a case
transferred from an “inconvenient” court; or where an advocate is found to be
in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiated allegation petitions
against judicial officers and judges to the superior courts. Unfortunately,
these examples are not from imagination. These things are happening more
frequently than we care to acknowledge.
239. We may also add
that these illustrations are not exhaustive but there may be other ways in
which a malefactor's conduct and actions may pose a real and imminent threat to
the purity of court proceedings, cardinal to any court's functioning, apart
from constituting a substantive offense and contempt of court and professional
misconduct. In such a situation the court does not only have the right but it
also has the obligation cast upon it to protect itself and save the purity of
its proceedings from being polluted in any way and to that end bar the
malefactor from appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.
240. It is already
explained in Ex. Captain Harish Uppal that a direction of this kind by the Court cannot be equated
with punishment for professional misconduct. Further, the prohibition against
appearance in courts does not affect the right of the lawyer concerned to carry
on his legal practice in other ways as indicated in the decision. We
respectfully submit that the decisionin Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India places the issue in correct
perspective and must be followed to answer the question at issue before us.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. In the instant case the
advocate has acted contrary to the obligations. He has set a bad example before
others while destroying the dignity of the court and the Judge. The action has
the effect of weakening of confidence of the people in courts. The judiciary is
one of the main pillars of democracy and is essential to peaceful and orderly
development of society. The Judge has to deliver justice in a fearless and
impartial manner. He cannot be intimidated in any manner or insulted by hurling
abuses. Judges are not fearful saints. They have to be fearless preachers so as
to preserve the independence of the judiciary which is absolutely necessary for
survival of democracy.
16. The act stated amounts to
criminal contempt of court. The High Court has noted that the concerned
advocate did not apologise and has maligned and scandalised the subordinate
court. He has made bare denial and has not shown any remorse for his
misconduct. Considering the gravamen of the allegations the High Court has
imposed the imprisonment of SI for 6 months with fine of Rs.2000 and in default
to pay fine or to undergo SI for 15 days. He has been restrained from enering
the judgeship of Alahabad for a period of 6 months that was to commence from
15.7.2015 and he had been kept under watch for a period of 2 years. Considering
the nature of misconduct, while upholding the conviction for criminal contempt,
we modify thesentence in the following manner :
1. The
sentence of imprisonemnt of 6 months shall remain suspended for further period
of 3 years subject to his maintaining good and proper conduct with a condition
that he shall not enter the premises of the District Judgeship, Allahabad for a
further period of three years in addition to what he has undergone already. The
period shall commence from 1.7.2019 to 30.6.2022. In case of non violation of aforesaid
condition the sentence after three years shall be remitted.
2. However, sentence
of imprisonment may be activated by this Court in case it is found that there
is breach of any condition made by the concerned advocate during the period of
three years.
3. He shall deposit
fine of Rs.2000 as imposed by the High Court. In case of failure to deposit
fine he shall not enter the premises of District Judgeship for a period of
three months.
17. The appeal is, accordingly,
disposed of. No costs.

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